MOSCOW. (Alexei Makarkin, Deputy Director General of the Center for Political Technologies, for RIA Novosti).
Romanticism is over in Ukraine. The time of the Orange Revolution, with its protesting emotions and the black-and-white confrontation between the forces of good and evil, has been replaced by the time of pragmatic political deals.
In late 2004, everything was clear to Europeans. Viktor Yushchenko was an honest politician prevented from becoming president by the "dark forces" associated with the Leonid Kuchma regime and the then Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. In their turn, the "dark forces" were known for corruption and did their best to falsify the election results. Now, a little more than a year later, the cliches have been discarded. Quite different issues are being debated now, for example, the composition of the future government coalition, which may comprise in varying combinations the country's three leading political forces: the Party of Regions (Viktor Yanukovich), Our Ukraine (Viktor Yushchenko) and Yulia Tymoshenko's bloc.
True, the Orange coalition of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko broke up last year and the former associates transformed into opponents. That is not surprising, considering that Tymoshenko's political career mostly rests on populism. As a prime minister, she was known for her ambition to carry out a large-scale revision of privatization results, which could scare foreign investors whose money was badly needed by Ukraine and revolution activists. In his turn, Yushchenko preferred pin-point campaigns, like the revision of Krivorozhstal privatization tender results, to keep with his election promises and replenish government coffers.
Upon closer examination, Yanukovich's supporters are striving to protect political and economic interests of the eastern Ukrainian elite, rather than the notorious authoritarianism. That's why they are ready to make significant compromises that do not run counter to the crucial priorities of businessmen from the east of the country. Actually, the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian elite see themselves living in united Europe, but only a few of them are ready to make economic sacrifices for that.
Naturally, Ukraine's political forces differ considerably in their pro-Western attitudes. It is doubtful that a government comprising the Party of Regions would have opted for economic sanctions against Transdnestr, the unrecognized republic which clearly irritates united Europe, the way the Yushchenko government did in the wake of the election campaign. However, if Yanukovich's supporters become government members, these measures will not necessarily be cancelled, on the same grounds of pragmatism.
What about Yanukovich's idea of a referendum on NATO membership? While Yushchenko would like to see Ukraine a member of NATO as soon as possible and at any cost, Yanukovich comes against "speedy integration" and favors comprehensive cooperation with the Alliance. Actually, the choice is to be made between a speedy and cautious, well-considered integration into NATO. Interestingly, in the 1982 election campaign in Spain the local Socialists also opposed membership of NATO, while the right-centrist government advocated speedy integration into it. Having won, they switched to other goals, prepared public opinion and held a successful referendum after which the country safely became a NATO member. By the way, the then little known Spanish Socialist politician Javier Solana was quite critical of the North Atlantic Alliance.
How will the West reconcile itself to the possible coalition of the "honest" Yushchenko and "dishonest" Yanukovich? Quite easy: the West did not want Yanukovich as president - who, it believed, was pushing his way to power through falsifications. Yet, the West has nothing against Yanukovich as a minister or prime minister, provided European observers acknowledge that the Party of Regions got as many votes as was reflected in Central Election Commission protocols.
The post-election time is likely to spell a long and tough bargaining over government coalition. Evidently, a "broad coalition" of all the three leaders would be impossible, while two parties will not necessarily be supported by the overwhelming majority. In this case, the role of second flank political forces who are ready to act as junior partners in any coalition - the Socialists led by Alexander Moroz and the People's Party of incumbent parliament Speaker Vladimir Litvin - may increase. Neither the former nor the latter have anything against European integration.
Does that mean that after the elections Ukraine's road to united Europe looks idyllic? Such a conclusion would be completely wrong. Economy matters more than politics to the majority of the Ukrainian elite. That means that any government coalition will be dependent on business lobbyists and will find it hard to adopt unpopular decisions. For example, European integration is highly likely to provoke large-scale restructuring of the Ukrainian economy which will primarily affect the east of the country with its highly developed industry dating back to the Soviet times. Similarly, any coalition government with populist members - both Tymoshenko's supporters and the Socialists - will have hard time adopting tough economic measures that will hit the socially vulnerable strata of society in order to attain financial stability which is a must for European integration.
Any post-election government coalition will not be stable enough, so its chances for conducting a sensible socio-economic course will be low. It is possible that Ukraine is in for "government leapfrog", with one coalition replacing another. So, regardless of what the Ukrainian elite may wish, the country's prospects for European integration remain quite vague.
