Leaders of 28 NATO countries redefined their military doctrine at a summit in Wales, which was seen as one of the most important in alliance’s 65-year history. The first NATO summit since the start of the Ukrainian crisis turned out to be a critical test to alliance’s ability to response to major international issues and handle its relations with Russia.
Studio guest Dmitry Polikanov, Vice-President of the PIR Center, Tomila Lankina, Associate Professor at the International Relations Department of the London School of Economics, Arkady Moshes, Program Director at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Michal Mocek, political analyst with Pravo newspaper (Prague) shared their opinions with Radio VR.
What is the air around the summit?
Tomila Lankina: I think a turning point has actually been reached in the relations between NATO and Russia for a number of reasons. And this summit is also illustrating that, first, up unit now NATO has been criticized for a lack of mission in the post Cold War European order. Now there is a clear mission and a very clear strategy emerging, and a concrete set of responses to this emerging challenge that is presented by the Ukrainian crisis.
And what is very important is that these challenges are now framed in terms of a response against the possible threats coming from Russia. And that is very-very different, because in the past NATO and Russia actually cooperated quite well on common challenges coming from other parts of the world. Now this is a very different set of challenges framed in terms of the response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
And what is also interesting is that the key players, like Germany, who used to take a more balanced approach to this particular crisis, are now taking a tougher stance. There are divisions, and the Welsh summit is showing it very clearly, divisions between the so-called old member states and the newer member states.
Previously, it has been easier to portray the reactions of, for instance, the Baltic States as hysterical, when they claimed that there are possible future threats. And now it is easier to take these concerns more seriously. And I think that’s what we are seeing as well, although the divisions are still there.
Can you specify, is it a turning point or a point of no return in the relationship between NATO and Russia? What is the cost of refocusing NATO’s attention on the Ukrainian crisis at the expense of cooperation with Russia?
Tomila Lankina: The cost of noncooperation is enormous and NATO recognizes that. I think there is a genuine will to continue this cooperation, but, obviously, with the annexation of Crimea that largely went without a strong response and then followed these events in the eastern Ukraine, and now the concerns are which area of the post Soviet region will be next. So, I would say it is a turning point, but it is definitely not a point of no return, because, clearly, there are areas of common concern that NATO and Russia can still work on.
But now Russia would need to convince the alliance that it is not seeking to create a situation of frozen conflict in the post Soviet region, which is perceived as presenting a security threat to NATO.
What is you stance on what is happening within NATO right now and how do you return from this point, when NATO is extending its membership close to the Russian borders?
Arkady Moshes: I think Russia definitely has a reason to be concerned as well. But, however, the devil is in details. This is a reaction to the escalation that happened in the east of Ukraine and to the fact that the Baltic states and Poland, and maybe some other nations, throughout this year felt that in order to guarantee their territorial integrity and to ensure that NATO would be able to fulfill the Article 5 commitments something has to be done.
But this is not yet permanent. The NATO-Russia founding act will not be relinquished as such. I mean, it is true that the Russian military should and definitely will take the counter steps and, in that sense, the escalation will be going on already in the military and political sense in the Russian-Western relations. But I think that was inevitable.
It seems that Prime Minister Sobotka is not very enthusiastic about a possible Ukraine integration with NATO and the EU. What is the reason for that?
Michal Mocek: That is not the question of enthusiasm but of realism. He simply stressed that there is no discussion on early Ukrainian membership in the EU or NATO. It means in Europe there is not political effort to make it. Realistically, in Europe there is nothing done in this regard.
It seems that Slovakia is also not very happy over the policy of pressuring Russia and putting more sanctions on it. How can you explain that?
Michal Mocek: It is not only Slovakia. We (the Czech Republic) are not happy with the sanctions too. Hungary has also its observations and other countries in the EU too. You can see that Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles and Lithuanians are the countries which 25 years ago were part of the so-called eastern bloc. Now, after 25 years you can see that we are not on the same wavelength, as we were forced to be at that time.
And it can be fairly easily explained, because neither Hungary, nor Slovakia, or the Czech Republic have a border with Russia. None of our countries have big Russian minorities and we also do not have a century-long tradition of violent relations as Poland and Russia have. So, we are in a little bit easier situation and we can think not only about our security, which is the first idea for the politicians in the Baltic countries or in Russia vis-à-vis the situation in Ukraine, we can also think about our economy and about other things.
