Observers say North Korea’s new law ‘On the Policy of Nuclear Force of the DPRK’ has two purposes: to demonstrate that Pyongyang is serious about a defense doctrine centered around its strategic deterrent, and to “clarify” to the Biden administration and Seoul what actions the socialist nation will take if threatened.
The updated doctrine gives President Kim Jong-un the sole authority to use nuclear weapons, but allows for their “automatic” deployment to “annihilate the hostile forces” if an enemy attack threatens the nation’s command and control centers. The document characterizes the country’s strategic deterrent as a “powerful means for defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and fundamental interests of the state,” and toward “preventing a war in the Korean Peninsula and the northeast Asian region and ensuring the strategic stability of the world.”
The doctrine forbids the country from deploying its nuclear weapons on the territory of any other state, and prohibits the sharing of nuclear technology. In addition to “automatic” attack, the document allows Pyongyang to use its nukes if “it judges that an attack with a nuclear weapon or a weapon of mass destruction was made or imminent,” or if a “fatal” conventional military attack “on important strategic objects of the state was made or imminent.”
The doctrine “suggests that given the deteriorating strategic circumstances, the DPRK leadership might have decided to go ahead and acquire this ‘upgrade’ as both a status and a stated defense policy in order to show its seriousness in pursuing a defense doctrine centered around their nuclear capabilities,” says Dr. Victor Teo, a North Korea expert and political scientist specializing in Asia-Pacific affairs.
Teo suggests Pyongyang made the decision to put all its eggs in the nuclear basket after analyzing the growing strength of the US, Japanese and South Korean militaries, and concluding that it would be nearly impossible to secure North Korea’s security via conventional forces alone.
“For Pyongyang, obtaining the nuclear weapon presents the cheapest, easiest and fastest [way] to acquire a deterrent that the US and her allies would take very seriously,” the academic says.
At the same time, the IR specialist says the new doctrine is meant to serve as a message not only to the international audience (i.e. don’t mess with North Korea) but to the domestic one as well. “For the domestic audience it was [a message] of resolve, of how Kim would lead the North Korean people to continue [the] struggle with the US and the ROK in order to ensure the survival of their nation,” Teo says.
Message to 'Rabid Dogs'
Dr. Zhang Baohui, director of the Center for Asian-Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong, believes the timing of the doctrinal update is significant, and highlights the cooling in relations with Pyongyang from both Washington and Seoul.
“The decision is likely to be shaped by developments in inter-Korean relations. Seoul’s new conservative government, which preaches a hardline policy toward North Korea’s nuclear programs, has made Kim more insecure,” Zhang says. “Moreover, unlike [Donald] Trump, who suspended joint military war games with South Korea to appease Kim, the Biden administration has restored them.”
“Kim has never liked Biden, who used to criticize Trump for his diplomatic approach to the North Korea nuclear issue,” the academic recalled.
On the campaign trail in 2020, Biden referred to Kim as a “thug” and a “tyrant,” prompting Pyongyang to retaliate by calling the Democrat an “imbecile” and a “rabid dog” that should “be beaten to death with a stick.”
“In that context, North Korea may think that clarification of its nuclear policy should serve to deter worst-case scenarios that could harm its national security and the leadership’s personal security. By officializing its nuclear status, North Korea may hope that it could project a stronger deterrence posture. This is especially the case by outlining situations that would trigger a pre-emptive nuclear strike by North Korea,” Zhang says.
Sanctions Baton All Used Up
The United States, its allies and the United Nations have heavily sanctioned North Korea over its nuclear ambitions, and there’s little left the West can do to respond to the nuclear doctrine, particularly amid the recent escalation of global tensions, Zhang argues. “They can do very little as North Korea is already severely sanctioned. China and Russia also would not support additional sanctions through the UN.”
Dr. Teo echoes this sentiment, suggesting that it’s “unlikely that [the US] would react in a major way to rhetoric from North Korea because the focus of the administration is on China (much like Trump). Unless North Korea follows with additional nuclear tests, the response is likely to be political and diplomatic followed by more military preparations.”
Ultimately, Dr. Zhang thinks that the DPRK’s nuclear doctrinal update “should be truly irreversible,” in the sense that it will demonstrate once and for all that the pathway to denuclearization in exchange for security guarantees is now closed. “Becoming a nuclear weapon state is the end objective of North Korea’s grand strategy. It’s not something to be used to bargain for something else.”