The efforts of the 1,300 delegates who met in Baghdad early this week for a National Conference should have been focused on the election of a provisional parliament. Instead, they tried to put an end to the slaughter in Najaf and reconcile the Interim Government with the supporters of Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr. However, no reconciliation emerged, which left the results of the National Conference without any meaning against the backdrop of continued fighting in Najaf.
Iraq needs a provisional parliament, as it would give more legitimacy to the interim government and the appointed, not elected, president and premier. But does Iraq need a parliament that would have no influence on the situation in the country, especially now that it is tottering on the edge of a civil war?
What Iraq needs now is talks between the interim government and the opposition, which only seems to be possible with the mediation of the international community and the central role of the UN. But is the UN ready to assume this challenging mission, and will the US and the new Iraqi government give it a chance?
Two influential Iraqi movements - the Shiite movement of Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Sunni Committee of Muslim Ulemas - refused to attend the conference in Baghdad. This does not mean that they will not take part in the political process in Iraq, but they do not want to do it by attending the conference.
It would be difficult to imagine how Mr al-Sadr, who thinks the occupation of his country has not ended and is fighting multinational forces, could come to Baghdad. He needs security guarantees, and not only from the Iraqi government and the command of the multinational forces (which he mistrusts) but also from the international community. Today the Shiite leader is prepared to accept any mediation that he can regard as neutral, meaning unbiased.
This brings us back to the Russian idea of holding an international conference on Iraq with the participation of the largest possible number of the country's political forces, including the opposition. Mr al-Sadr and other opposition leaders might attend such a conference, provided it is held under the auspices of the UN on neutral territory, and not in Baghdad.
Moscow advanced the idea in the very first days after the toppling of Saddam Hussein. However, it was rejected by the occupation forces, which did not need broad international involvement in the political settlement in Iraq. Moreover, the UN officials and the new Iraqi leadership also gave the idea the cold shoulder.
Officially, UN Security Council Resolution 1546 "invites the Government of Iraq to consider how the convening of an international meeting could support the above [political] process." But UN Special Representative for Iraq Lakhdar Brahimi said during the Istanbul meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in mid-June that he doubted the meeting would seriously influence the situation in Iraq. He told the Russian newspaper Vremya Novostei that it would be useless in the current situation.
A month later in Moscow, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zibari promised his Russian counterpart that the Iraqi government would ponder the possibility of the conference. But later he said in an interview with Al-Jazeera that he did not think the conference would be a success. In his words, it would have been useful only if it had been held immediately after the overthrow of Saddam. This may be so, but the conference could still have its uses now, because the political, national and religious contradictions in Iraqi society now run deeper than ever. However, a part of the opposition, in particular al-Sadr, is ready to talk.
Mr al-Sadr knows that he cannot defeat the US-led multinational forces and his units will be defeated sooner or later and he may die. He does not need to fight to reinforce his reputation: he has alreadyattained his goal, which is the love of thousands of Iraqis and Muslims around the world. He can lay down arms now - on the condition that it will not look like a surrender.
The Shiite leader is ready to discuss the transformation of the Mahdi Army into a political movement. But this entails participation in the provisional parliament and government, the nomination of candidates for the future elections to the "proper" parliament, and a full amnesty for all those who fought on his side. Are the Iraqi government and, most importantly, the US, which continues to control the political process in Iraq, ready to grant this condition?
US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld calls Mr al-Sadr's actions illegal, and many people in Baghdad agree with this assessment. Indeed, the spiritual leader inspired the Shiite revolt largely to bolster his prestige; he is personally to blame for the loss of hundreds of innocent lives. He hid in mosques with arms in hand, and his supporters used holy places as fire emplacements. Nevertheless, his word carries great authority.
The US has no choice. It can suppress Mr al-Sadr's movement, but only at the cost of Iraqi lives and the destruction of Shiite holy places. And this will certainly provoke a new wave of resistance. Besides, the elimination of Mr al-Sadr will not end the Iraqi opposition; it will not add legitimacy to developments in Iraq but will only add to contradictions in Iraqi society. And anyway, if the world does not negotiate with Muqtada al-Sadr, it will have to do this with his successor.
