Early presidential elections will be held in Chechnya, the North Caucasus, on August 29. The vote was triggered after President Akhmad Kadyrov, the irreconcilable enemy of Chechen separatists and Wahhabite terrorists who chose Chechnya as their bridgehead in the North Caucasus, was assassinated on May 9.
Mr Kadyrov was not just the mouthpiece of the Kremlin's policy in the republic but also the leader of a considerable part of Chechens who advocate Chechnya's peaceful existence in the Russian Federation. Besides, former field commanders who followed his example and stopped armed resistance supported their president. Mr Kadyrov was the cornerstone of the political structure that ensured Chechnya several years of life by the "neither war nor peace" formula.
It has become clear today, three months after his death, that his assassination has not dramatically changed the lineup of forces in Chechnya and around it.
Moscow still believes that the political settlement in Chechnya is mostly complete and categorically rejects holding political talks with the separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, former president of Chechnya. It says it will only talk with Maskhadov if he lays down arms and recognises Russia's sovereignty in Chechnya.
The suppression of separatism was the main political goal of the Russian authorities in Chechnya, towards which they strove for nearly ten years. The goal was removed from the agenda in March 2003, after Chechens came to a referendum and voted for the republic's constitution that describes Chechnya as an inalienable part of Russia.
The next strategic political goal of Moscow is to adjust Chechnya as far as possible to the status of an ordinary Federation member, with the same rights and duties as those of the other 20 republics of the Federation.
The August 29 presidential elections in Chechnya offer a good chance for attaining this goal. It is vital that they are held in strict compliance with the republic's new constitution. Another important thing is that police general Alu Alkhanov, who is even more pro-Moscow than Mr Kadyrov was, is the apparent favourite of the presidential race. Mr Alkhanov never sided with separatists, who he fought back in 1996 when Akhmad Kadyrov was on Maskhadov's side. He would hardly demand political privileges for Chechnya, as Mr Kadyrov tried to do when he negotiated with the Kremlin a draft agreement on the delineation of powers. In that draft, Chechnya acted on a par with Russia, as an independent negotiating party.
Mr Alkhanov's election programme spotlights economic matters concerned with the reconstruction of the republic that was ruined by many years of the war. He will seek Moscow's permission to create a free economic zone in Chechnya, reduce taxes and customs duties for it, and give the republican government the right to freely dispose of its oil revenues.
Though President Vladimir Putin has been trying for over four years to standardise regional legislation and strengthen the common Russian legal and economic regime, the Kremlin may support Alkhanov's initiatives, at least partially. In the immediate future, the Chechen economy must be in the focus of attention of the Russian government, otherwise the Chechen settlement will hardly move ahead.
The point is that in the past 10-15 years, Chechnya has been excluded from the positive economic processes that have swept the rest of Russia. It had no economic reforms or privatisation and did not develop the roots of a civilised market. It is time the republic made up for the lost opportunity. Besides, the incorporation of Chechen society in the federal economic development would be an additional weapon in the struggle against terrorism, crime and separatism.
Like Mr Kadyrov before him, Mr Alkhanov points out that the nearly 70% unemployment rate in the republic creates favourable conditions for terrorism on apar with the aggressive Wahhabite propaganda of preachers from the Arab countries.
Several opinion polls show that Mr Alkhanov's prestige in the republic is not as high as Kadyrov's was, which could have a detrimental effect on his work, especially at the start. And this lack of prestige can deliver a blow at Mr Alkhanov from another angle. President Kadyrov energetically tried to win over former separatists, allowed them to carry weapons and registered them as his guards, whom his son Ramzan commanded. That process lasted several years, saved many lives and prevented fratricide in Chechnya. Though Mr Alkhanov promises to carry on Kadyrov's policy in this sphere, it is not clear how effective it would be.
Separatist leaders have already expressed their attitude to the forthcoming presidential elections. They do not recognise them, just as they did not recognise the elections which Akhmad Kadyrov won. On the other hand, several years ago the US and Western Europe were persistently calling on Moscow to start political talks with separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, which gave the latter major advantages in his relations with the Kremlin. These voices are silent today, partly because of Mr Putin's policy of active rapprochement with the West, and partly because the US is too busy in Iraq and Western Europe is trying to settle Trans-Atlantic scores and problems of the extended EU.
Anyway, the Chechen settlement is a purely Russian internal affair and its dynamics depends mostly on the success of Moscow's interaction with Grozny, meaning the new Chechen president who will be elected on August 29.
