Abkhazia did not pass the test of sovereignty, while the republic's political stability is in question now and internal political disputes have shattered its independence. Abkhazia's political establishment has developed a tradition of blaming Tbilisi for all their mistakes. However, the current political crisis is the result of Abkhazia's internal policy and is not due to any Georgian intrigue.
Elections are extremely important for de-facto independent republics. Elections are a symbolic act, a kind of message to the international community demonstrating that an unrecognised republic's state machinery is working smoothly.
Likewise, elections are of great practical meaning for self-proclaimed republics. The statehood of entities seeking the final secession from their "big brothers" (Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, the Dniester Region from Moldova, the Republic of Nagorny Karabakh from Azerbaijan) becomes stronger with every election. The legitimacy of these republics' political elite, which in this case means being perceived as legitimate by the population, grows in strength too. On every occasion, elections are a point of no return for authorities. Therefore, elections in self-proclaimed states are also a kind of contest for legitimacy and substantiality with the "big brother" and a show of the political elite and population's unity in the face of an external threat.
Elections also inspire hope that by resorting to democratic procedures and democratic rhetoric, a self-proclaimed republic's political elite will eventually join the community of the united nations as a legitimate member, rather than a state with a "marginal" status. Any other democratic scenarios of political development and legitimisation only promote the image of a rogue state.
On October 3, 2004, Abkhazia's authorities had an opportunity to hand over power through elections. The first president and the "founding father" of the independent Abkhazia could have stepped down peacefully. In so doing, Abkhazia would have gained a major ideological and political advantage over Tbilisi. Indeed, why should a rather successful state be put under the jurisdiction of a country that has been unable to overcome a legitimacy crisis for years? This would be logical, as all the five presidential contenders in Abkhazia put an emphasis on the republic's sovereignty during their campaigns.
However, the reality appeared to be grimmer. The vote count scandal, abuse of power and ballot-rigging accusations against the incumbent authorities, repeat elections proposals and the heightening of political standoff between Raul Khadzhimba and Sergei Bagapsh are only a few preliminary outcomes of the presidential elections in the republic. Thus, Abkhazia did not pass the test of sovereignty, while its political stability is in question and an internal political conflict has shattered the republic's independence. In the late 1990s, Abkhazia's political elite repeated nearly all the mistakes radical Georgian nationalists made in the early 1990s. Their major errors were to put an excessive focus on the foreign factor, disregarding internal disputes and an ethnocentric policy.
Since 1993, Abkhazia has explained away its mistakes and failures through Tbilisi's intrigues. Corruption and nepotism among top officials were featured as a lesser evil compared to the external threat. President Vladislav Ardzinba's ruling clan has actually established a monopoly on patriotism and the idea of defending Abkhazia's statehood. However, the first president, his entourage and official successor, Raul Khadzhimba, underestimated the internal challenges of their regime. They believed accusing opponents of a pro-Georgian position was enough to ensure re-election. However, the "Georgians' supporter" label does not seem to work any longer. Many of the former supporters of Abkhazia's "founding father" joined the opposition's ranks, as did ordinary voters who were repelled by the authorities who had become increasingly aristocratic and ousted the most zealous champions of Abkhazia's independence from power.
"What did we fight for?" is the main question for opposition leaders in Abkhazia. Abkhazian society is under the strong influence of traditional, direct democracy, institutions, and "vertical power" will not take root there. The Kremlin paid little heed to the fact, as it did not use the tactics of "putting eggs in different baskets," i.e. it only pinned its hopes on Raul Khadzhimba. However, back in May 2003, the influential Abkhazian from Moscow, Alexander Ankvab, warned that appointing a president using the administrative resources would be impossible at next elections in Abkhazia. The ruling clan that decided to use the Russian-style model with a political successor did not take into account a mere detail - Abkhazia's socio-cultural context. Instead of resorting to traditional legitimisation tools (for example, meetings), the ruling elite chose to achieve success with the help of the administrative resource. However, what was good for Russia did not work in Abkhazia. They also overestimated Abkhazians' pro-Russian sentiments. Although they are prepared to have Russia's military and political support, Abkhazians are unwilling to be Russia's pliant electorate. By casting their votes in favour of Sergei Bagapsh and three other presidential candidates, Abkhazians showed that Abkhazia and Russia do not always pursue similar interests.
The views expressed in the article are the author's and may not necessarily coincide with the views of the editorial board.
