These statements spotlight the desire of the US that the rose and orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine would be followed by a "grape revolution" in Moldova. Alas, these dreams will hardly come true.
The Communist Party led by the incumbent president, Vladimir Voronin, will most probably win the parliamentary-cum-presidential election in Moldova on Sunday (under the republic's law, parliament elects the president). Polls show that the local Communists (who look very much like Social Liberals) can win about 40% of the vote. Confident of victory, Mr. Voronin is running a very slack election campaign.
The incumbent president went to Ukraine demonstratively for a meeting with Viktor Yushchenko and invited Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to Chisinau. Active members of the Georgian youth organization Kmara, which led demonstrations in Tbilisi and Kiev, have come to the Moldovan capital to witness the elections.
Chisinau Mayor Serafim Urechean, the rival of Mr. Voronin, is using effective election methods. His supporters are dressed mostly in yellow and act under yellow flags - the color of maize, which is the basis for the favorite local dish, mamaliga (a kind of polenta).
Mr. Urechean avoids using rebellious rhetoric in his election speeches. "We are in favor of coming to power in a democratic way, and not for a year or two, but forever," he says. This is a rather ambitious goal if we recall that 26 criminal cases have been instituted against the mayor. But this does not prevent him from accusing the Voronin regime of corruption, persecuting the opposition, and falsifying elections.
The main rebel in Moldovan politics is Iurie Rosca, leader of the pro-Romanian Christian Democratic Popular Party (PPCD) and the third prominent candidate for the presidency. He represents the forces that unleashed massacre on the left bank of the Dniester, predominantly populated by Russians, in 1992. Those tragic events led to the creation of the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic there. Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE are acting as the mediators in the settlement process.
A nationalist radical of a fascist hue, Mr. Rosca likes the colors of the Ukrainian opposition. He wears orange, has had photographs taken with Mr. Yushchenko, and claims the role of the leader of Moldovan students. His main election slogan is, "We have a communist dictatorship and hence revolutionary conditions." Sociologists promise him 15% of the vote, but these are not people that can be convinced to demonstrate a protest.
However, the same is true of the supporters of Mr. Voronin and Mr. Urechean. A famous Russian poet, Alexander Pushkin, wrote in the 19th century: "I am impressed by the fearful attitude of the Moldovan people to the powers that be." This national trait has been exaggerated by economic problems. Moldovans are too busy trying to survive to take to the streets or blockade the parliament and the presidential residence. The minimum pension there is less than $20 a month.
It is clear why there is hardly any difference between the election platforms of election rivals. All of them badly want to become part of Greater Europe without breaking up friendship with Russia. The latter is becoming a problem, as Russia-Moldova relations have greatly deteriorated in recent times.
Chisinau stopped the political dialogue with Tiraspol in summer 2004, imposed an economic blockade of the region, hinders the entry of Ukrainian, Russian and OSCE mediators there, refused to let CIS observers watch the elections and the other day forced out a group of Russianhuman rights activists, accusing them of "illegal interference in the election campaign."
The Russian State Duma adopted a tough statement in response, threatening economic and political sanctions, a transition to global prices for energy resources, and a boycott of Moldovan wines and tobacco. In point of fact, these would not be sanctions but "the adjustment of economic relations to existing realities," said Russian Ambassador in Moldova Nikolai Ryabov.
His logic is simple: If Moldova refuses to invite CIS observers, it means that it does not respect the norms of that organization. In this case, it cannot claim the privileges afforded to CIS members, such as visa-free travel, low gas prices, and nearly duty-free export of wine. "Moscow should not humiliate its Moldovan colleagues with 'imperial handouts'," Mr. Ryabov said ironically.
This quarrel, which is far from the first one, conceals contradictions that run far deeper. Last year, Mr. Voronin prevented the signing of the so-called Kozak Memorandum (he and Transdniester leader Igor Smirnov had initialed it the day before) in a highly eccentric, if not treacherous, manner. The Memorandum offered a practical chance of a comprehensive political settlement, including the withdrawal of the remaining units of the dissolved Russian 14th Army from the left bank of the Dniester.
Moscow is convinced that Mr. Voronin yielded to "outside pressure." Many Russian political scientists explain that action by Moldova's chief Communist by the radical change of his course toward the EU and NATO.
Anyway, this time Russia does not have a pro-Russian candidate at the Moldovan elections, but it does have interests and obligations there.
Moscow cares about the future of Transdniester, where 191,000 of Moldova's 562,000 ethnic Russians live. These people must not live in fear of a new massacre, which the local ultra-nationalists are eager to provoke. This is why Russia is present in the republic as a member of the joint peacekeeping operation under the 1992 agreement, which put an end to the fratricidal war on the Dniester.
There are warehouses with munitions and military equipment of the 14th Army there (their withdrawal was cut short by an outbreak of mistrust between Chisinau and Tiraspol after Mr. Voronin prevented the signing of the Kozak Memorandum).
In short, the knot of intertwining problems in the Transdniester region is connected with the vital interests of Russia, and it does not intend to stand on one side of the efforts to untie it.
Russia's position on the Moldovan election is clear and simple: No preference to any political party. Moscow is ready to promote partnership with any parliament and any president of Moldova elected by the people.
