Vladimir Putin's visit to Kiev on March 19 will not be a simple mission. He will be met by a president who he did not back in the elections, a prime minister who is under investigation in Russia, and will have to deal with reinvigorating bilateral relations after the "orange revolution." Viktor Yushchenko's visit to Moscow in January certainly helped return Russian-Ukrainian relations back to the bounds of decency, but it was merely a matter of protocol, not business. And the latter is far more important.
Of all the CIS states, only Russia under Boris Yelstin experienced a democratic revolution with all its pluses and minuses. The other former Soviet republics had no serious truly revolutionary cataclysms but saw local Soviet bureaucrats take over after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Some of them, for example Aliyev senior in Azerbaijan, were rescued by their political skills. The Turkmen leader, for instance, relied on gas and his people's old custom of living under feudalism. In some republics, the authorities retained power using demagogy and cunning. The same happened in Ukraine. Now, though with a hiatus in the historical perspective, revolutionary mines have started to explode in the former Soviet republics, though thankfully the casings turned out to be made of velvet. This was predictable.
When commenting on the end of Mr. Putin's first term, this commentator noted the most obvious and immediate risks facing the president, including in foreign policy. These risks above all included political instability in some neighboring countries. The president's task in the second term was to maintain regular good-neighborly relations, regardless of who came to power in these countries.
The Russian leader is naturally not omnipotent, but, considering Russia's influence, the brunt of responsibility for stability on the border and protection of national interests was definitely on Moscow's shoulders.
However, Moscow was not very lucky with its negotiating partners in Georgia and Moldova, and Mr. Putin should not be criticized too strongly for the deterioration in bilateral relations. Mikhail Saakashvili's or Vladimir Voronin's unpredictability has repeatedly baffled Russian diplomats.
Ukraine is a different matter. Russia has far more interests there, and its mistakes were fairly obvious. The main thing, however, is that many current developments in Ukraine, unlike in Georgia for example, are very predictable. Moreover, what is happening in Ukraine today is a kind of political deja vu.
Ukraine today is Russia yesterday, i.e., Russia under Mr. Yeltsin. It has the same enthusiasm of a beginner, the same revolutionary black-and-white judgments, the same romanticism at the expense of balanced pragmatism, the same unrealistic promises to the population, and, regrettably the same, inevitable rush to appoint inappropriate people at the top. And, at last, it has the same blind belief that "the West will help us."
These symptoms can only pass with time and with the help of Russia, which emerged from the same troubles quite recently.
As an experienced patient, Russia can provide Ukraine with numerous tips on how to avoid some of the mistakes committed by Russia's young reformers, if the Ukrainians choose to listen. It can happen at any moment, sooner or later. Mr. Putin's task is to seize the moment tactfully.
There is no doubt that the crucial moment will come. Market and geopolitical laws cannot be ignored, and Russia-Ukraine relations are no exception.
The main thing that has to be understood, though, is that Russia may have lost out in the short-term, but it will still win in a long term. With this in mind, the president's visit to Kiev can be seen with more optimism.
There is no reason to panic whatsoever.
