MOSCOW. This, the latest in our series of articles about the less known aspects of World War II, is the second part of the story about the Potsdam (Berlin) conference of the leaders of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and Britain, held from July 17 to August 2, 1945, at the Cecilienhof Palace.
The conference was convened to determine the future of the defeated Germany and the structure of the world in the second half of the 20th century.
Historian Valentin Falin talks with RIA Novosti military commentator Viktor Litovkin.
Question: Last time you stopped by saying that the Potsdam conference would not have been held if the U.S. had not needed Soviet assistance to defeat Japan. However, some situations during the conference threatened to derail the talks.
Answer: You are right. It was a conference of light and shadows. Let us try to determine why that was.
What did the Soviet leaders know about the intrigues of their adversaries in the West? Some Western historians exaggerate by saying that the Kremlin knew absolutely everything about the secret moves and intentions of London and Washington. It is true, however, that Moscow knew very well where the political barometer was moving. It knew why the Western powers avoided fulfilling the commitments they had made at Yalta and why the British maintained combat-ready Wehrmacht divisions in Schleswig-Holstein and southern Denmark. The Kremlin also knew why Truman started talking in the language of ultimatums during his talks with Molotov and other Soviet representatives. And it knew many other things.
We know now that Churchill's "perjury" in spring 1945 was not a sudden maneuver. Everyone would agree that the death of Franklin Roosevelt led to a fundamental review of values in the U.S. policy. But Stalin either underrated the scope of the imminent crisis or hoped to keep Washington from making rash decisions. He probably hoped to convince Truman that the U.S. would suffer by sacrificing one of the best chances humankind had ever had to stop relying on military force.
In late May 1945, the Supreme Command warned Marshal Georgy Zhukov that the British were nurturing an opportunistic plan involving German divisions. British forces in Europe did not switch to a peacetime regime, and the Kremlin was worried by London's obstructions to the implementation of the Yalta agreements on occupation zones.
Moscow decided to improve the situation by setting a good example. On June 23, 1945, it adopted a law on the transition of its army and navy to peacetime routine. Demobilization began on July 5, 1945, and the strength of the Soviet Army was slashed from 11 million to below 3 million by 1948. The Soviet Army left northern Norway in September 1945, Czechoslovakia in November, and Bornholm (Denmark) in April 1946. The number of troops deployed in eastern Germany, Poland and Romania was slashed.
In short, the Soviet Union demonstrated readiness to go its part of the road, both before and after the Potsdam conference, to develop the combat unity of the Allied nations into a peaceful construction effort. But the last hope of winning the trust of the partners and encourage them to reciprocate and respect the interests of each other, so as not to waste the invaluable capital accumulated by the anti-Hitler coalition, had waned by autumn 1947.
The Soviet policy at the Big Three meeting was elaborated to suit the principles of honest cooperation. On July 17, the first day of the Potsdam conference, Truman easily received what he came for, he wrote to a friend. Stalin will enter into the war [against Japan]. We can say now that we will end the war a year sooner, and I am thinking of the boys that will not be killed as a result of this.
During the discussion of other issues on the conference agenda, the chief Soviet delegate pursued the tactics that proved reliable at Yalta, which was to accept U.S. proposals as the basis when opinions did not clash. Even when the American ideas clashed with the Soviet stand, Stalin spoke his mind positively, inviting Truman to consider possible variants.
Admiral Leahy, an adviser to President Truman, had in his portfolio a plan of splitting Germany into three or five states. But the plan was buried after the Soviet delegation suggested retaining Germany as an integral state. The Americans were disappointed but preferred to keep their plans secret.
On July 21, as the British prime minister recalled, Truman's mood changed visibly. The friendliness with which he treated his partners disappeared. The president started telling Russians what they should do and how, and in general bossed everyone around, Churchill wrote. He linked the change in Truman's mood to a telegram from Stimson in Washington, who informed the president about the successful test of the A-bomb. The U.S. had got the ultimate weapon and decided that it could order humankind around. The idea of global domination was becoming the axis of the U.S. political and military line.
It is very important that the Potsdam conference opened on July 17, and two days later the U.S. reviewed its military-political doctrine. Previously, the U.S. relied on repelling attacks, while the new doctrine was based on the precept of preemptive strikes against the adversary. Emphasis was made on surprise attack against any source of threat. Washington retained the right to determine the nature and scope of the threat and the time of eliminating it.
The authors of the doctrine had pondered ideas and formulas since May 1945, and the Soviet Union was the main potential enemy. Soviet intelligence acquired initial information about this by June 1945. Taken together with information about Operation Unthinkable [Britain's plan to bomb the Soviet oil fields at Baku], this was certainly highly alarming news.
The headquarters ordered Zhukov to regroup his forces and study the deployment of the Western allies. However, it is not clear to this day if Stalin was informed about the revision of U.S. military doctrine during the Potsdam conference.
In Potsdam the three leaders were seemingly paving the way to peaceful coexistence and a world where every nation would be able to reap the fruit of their common victory. But was it really so? In fact, the expansive statements made by Truman in Cecilienhof Palace camouflaged the degradation of the policy of cooperation into the continuation of the war by different means.
Immediately after leaving Germany, the U.S. president gave instructions to General Dwight Eisenhower to develop Operation Totality, a concept of military confrontation with the Soviet Union. In August 1945, a strategic map of certain industrial regions of Russia and Manchuria was compiled with the assistance of the U.S. Air Force command.
The document included a list of 15 biggest Soviet cities, the priority targets in them and calculations (with due regard for the experience of nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) of the number of nuclear bombs necessary to destroy them. It was cynicism bordering on perversion, and it happened at the time when the Soviet Army was routing the million-strong Kwantung Army in coordination with the U.S. forces.
At the same time, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was analyzing the vulnerability of the Soviet Union in case of nuclear bombing. The result of that work was Document 329/1, which provided for nuclear strikes at 20 Soviet cities. Half a year later, the Americans produced Operation Pincer, under which they planned to ruin Russia with 50 nuclear strikes. And it was only the beginning.
The third world war, which was, quite wrongly, called the Cold War, was gathering momentum, destroying normal views of morality and humanness.
Q: Just as in family relations, it is rare that only one side is to blame for the conflict. Maybe the line of limitless confrontation with the Soviet Union was provoked by Stalin's actions?
A: Stalin is guilty of the gravest crimes and sins against the Soviet people. But this is not a reason to blame him for others' sins, above all for the violation of the commitments made by the three powers in Tehran and Yalta and confirmed at Potsdam - to preclude violence, to show tolerance, and to live side by side as good neighbors.
Before, during and after the Potsdam conference, the Soviet side did everything it could to ensure a breakthrough into a just and safe world, for which there had been solid prerequisites. Honest analysts of the past will not question Moscow's readiness at the 1945 crossroads to honor the legitimate interests of the U.S. and other partners in the anti-Hitler coalition. After what it had suffered in the war against Germany, the Soviet Union had no desire to provoke new tensions and conflicts. It was open to friendship and sought it. American intelligence reported to the president that the Soviet Union would pose no danger to anyone in the next 10-12 years.
Q: What exactly did the Soviet Union do to help?
A: Germany was the main enemy of the United Nations. Its giant military potential largely determined the course of World War II, and post-war stability depended on preventing Germany from becoming an apple of discord between the victor nations. How could this be achieved?
Moscow suggested regarding Germany as a single entity, despite changes in its political, social and economic systems. To ensure the practical recognition of this principle, the Soviet Union called for granting left- and right-wing antifascist parties, trade unions and the church the right to act according to the same rules in the four occupation zones, and for allowing Germans to determine their socio-economic regime.
It suggested holding elections on the basis of the same election law in the four occupation zones in order to form local, and subsequently central, governments on the results of voting.
American and British leaders rejected this proposal. They demanded that the principle of regarding Germany as a single state be limited to a common currency (Reichsmark) and barter trade between the zones. The supreme commanders of the armed forces of the four allies were given supreme authority in Germany, each in his zone of occupation, acting on the instructions of their respective governments, and jointly on issues concerning Germany as a whole.
The compromise formula said that a German administration should be created to introduce and maintain economic control as stipulated by the control council, with the reservation stipulating the same attitude to the German population throughout Germany, in as far as this was possible.
The split of Germany was preprogrammed. The French believed that everything should be done openly. They joined the Potsdam settlement with a clause that Paris would not be bound by provisions that stipulated the preservation of German unity. After taking some time to consider the problem, Washington decided to exploit that French proviso. By mid-1946, the Americans drafted a plan to create a separate German state, rearm it and involve the three Western zones in military preparations against the Soviet Union. The results were apparent: The split of Germany was predetermined.
The alienation of the Soviet zone could not be ensured without forming a block of major differences. The U.S., Britain and France soon nullified the provisions on ensuring Germany's democratic economic development. The occupation authorities decided to hold referenda in Hessen and North Rein-Westphalia, expecting the bulk of Germans to vote against the nationalization of banks and major factories, including those whose owners had closely cooperated with the Nazi. Much to their surprise, the overwhelming majority voted for state ownership of key industrial and financial establishments.
The Democrats immediately overruled the public vote and ensured that such appeals to the public, called "the crowd," by politicians, would be banned in the future Bonn constitution. Eventually, the development of democracy was replaced with "de-cartelization," which created problems for a number of concerns but did not limit their influence.
The situation was even worse with the collection of reparations in the Western zones for the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia and several other countries that suffered most from the German aggression.
Q: But the Potsdam agreements said that 10-15% of equipment dismantled in the American and British zones should be delivered to the Soviet Union.
A: Yes, but that pledge was not honored. The Soviet Union received less than $6 million worth of equipment in money terms from the Western zones, which is a drop in the ocean compared to the required compensation of damage. The Western powers took over Germany's gold reserves, thousands upon thousands of patents worth up to $10 billion, the shares of enterprises, and much more. Washington did not stint with money, especially during the creation of NATO, helping Britain, Italy, Turkey and West Germany. But the Truman administration closely watched that not a dollar or Reichsmark more would be spent on the economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union.
Q: As far as I remember, the Potsdam agreement also stipulated the denazification and thorough demilitarization of Germany. Was that goal achieved?
A: The decision was indeed stipulated in black and white. The Nazi heritage was rooted out in the Soviet zone zealously, and hence with excesses, and the same was true of the promotion of economic democracy. But the Western states only skimmed the surface and let it go at that. The "Democrats" did not want left-wing elements, who would potentially oppose Germany being attached to the U.S. war chariot, to be allowed to take influential posts in law enforcement, education and information.
As for demilitarization, the Soviet authorities demolished underground military plants and bunkers and other military and engineering structures. The Western representatives in the Allied Control Council commended the Soviet Union for this and promised to catch up with us - but, as the saying goes, [they were] "hurrying slowly," waiting for the time to gather stones, not cast them.
Q: Which questions provoked the most acute disputes at the conference?
A: The western border of Poland was a difficult question. In Yalta, it was decided to draw the border along Oder-Neisse, but Truman did not like to honor the pledges of his predecessor. Flexible and temporary borders better suited the Pax Americana, as it was easier to intrigue around them. Thanks to the persistence of the Soviet side, modus vivendi was found at last. Lands east of the Oder-Neisse line were removed from the Soviet zone and put under the government of Poland, which reflected the fact that almost all Germans had left the area by that time. The formalization of the new territorial status of that area was postponed "until later," which turned out to be in 1991.
Q: And when exactly did the Germans leave the area?
A: In April-May 1945.
Q: Did they flee of their own free will or were forced out of the area?
A: Most Germans fled the area fearing the approaching Soviet Army. Goebbels gave them such a big scare that millions decided not to risk it. Those who stayed behind were forced to leave East Prussia, Pomerania, Sudetenland, Hungary and Romania. The overall number of displaced Germans was about 14 million.
But almost everything is relative under the sun. How many Russians, Belarussians, Jews, Poles and other nationalities left their homes and property trying to save their lives from the Nazi hordes and their henchmen? 30-35 million, I would say. Of them, over 2 million died in German bombing raids and were crushed by German tanks. This is a part of the bitter truth, a part of history.
Q: When Poles report on the Potsdam conference, they either leave out the Soviet advocacy of Polish interests or distort it.
A: As the French say, "No good deed is left unpunished." And the harsher residents of the Middle East say, "Gratitude is a mortal sin."
Q: Let's get back to the beginning. You said that July 21 was the turning point in Truman's conduct, when the A-bomb started to deform the American political and military mentality. Why then did the U.S. still demand that the Soviet Union should enter the war against Japan?
A: This is a tricky question. Washington knew that Japan's top authorities planned to surrender immediately after the Soviet Union entered the war. American military leaders saw Tokyo's decision as proof of the correctness of their decision to team up with Moscow. But Truman and his political advisers did not want the people to associate the surrender of Japan with the Soviet Union's entry into the war.
Acting on President Truman's instructions, his State Secretary John Byrns (this is an obscure fact) started to convince Chiang Kai-shek to obstruct the fulfillment of one of the conditions for Moscow's entry into the war - the recognition of Mongolia's independence by China. Byrns's intrigues were neutralized at the time and the attempt to close the Pacific door in Moscow's face fell through. Truman had to concede to his Joint Chiefs of Staff, with one exception: He did not act on their advice not to drop the bomb on Japan, even though there was no military necessity to do so.
Having learned from Stalin that the Soviet Army would engage the Japanese in the night of August 8/9, 1945, President Truman ordered that the bomb be dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. I would say that Potsdam and the era of United Nations, which joined forces to protect the future generations from the scourge of war, ended not on August 2 but on August 6, 1945.
Hundreds of thousands of people were sentenced to extermination or a deadly doze of irradiation only to show to the world, and above all Moscow, that American military might had acquired a new quality. A new "gentlemen's kit" was added to international relations: "The end justifies the means," "There is no equality among unequals," "The global interests of the strong justify interference in the affairs of any region and nation," and "The strong has the right to shuffle the cards at will."
Washington described unpredictability as "balancing at the edge of war" and a strategic ace.
It is symbolic and logical that the Potsdam talks did not distract the U.S. from its main task. I said before that the Washington brain trust overhauled the country's military doctrine in parallel with the sittings of the Big Troika. The philosophy of violence in its most exaggerated form found a successor; it became the alpha and omega of the American strategy. Truman would tell his team upon leaving Potsdam: No more summit meetings attended by Soviet representatives. The ultimate ruler does not need partners.
Q: But the world community hailed the Potsdam conference as the crowning of the anti-Hitler coalition.
A: The uninitiated did not want to think that the lessons of two world wars would be forgotten so quickly, that yesterday's allies would lose the historic chance to rebuild the world according to human principles. Political romantics wanted to crown the Potsdam conference with a laurel wreath, refusing to admit that they were witnessing a requiem. It was not a laurel wreath but a crown of thorns that was made in Potsdam.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of RIA Novosti.
