Moscow. (Alexey Malashenko, member of the Moscow Carnegie Center's scientific council, professor of Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry, for RIA Novosti)
The millennium of Kazan is an appropriate occasion for recalling the past and thinking about the present.
Let's try to combine the two.
The 10th volume of the Great Encyclopedia wrote in 1902: "at present Kazan is one of the best governor cities of Russia..." It still applies to modern-day Kazan. It is an amazing city consisting of several layers: traditional Tartar, Russian, Soviet, and now new-Russian.
The city is a major political center: federalism, oil business, understanding of inter-ethnic relations, or religious dialogue are unthinkable without it. Kazan is the capital of a powerful constituent member of the federation, one of the few that are not subsidized from the latter's budget. Tatarstan features prominently among other regions, and in many cases the heads of other federation members hemmed looking at Kazan: "They can dare do this, they enjoy respect..." Finally, the capital of Tatarstan is simply a beautiful city, and now when the first metro line was commissioned, it become even more convenient for life.
This is the end of the toast: the jubilee does not cancel the problems that are become increasingly obvious. Kazan would look even better if the budget of Tatarstan could keep more of the taxes at home. Not long ago the head of the republic, Mintimer Shaimiyev, complained bitterly that the more taxes the republic collected, the more money was taken out by the Center. The State Duma can't wait to adopt a resolution on the growth of such exemptions.
One more problem is Tatarstan's attempt to keep as many powers as it can from the list stipulated by the Moscow-Kazan treaty of 1994. Since Vladimir Putin has embarked on the building of his power vertical, this document has been increasingly relegated into history. But nevertheless Tatarstan hopes that the vertical of power will not become a rope that would tie it hand and foot.
Yet another difficulty in relations between Moscow and Kazan is rooted in the manifestations of nationalistic trends in Tatarstan. For the most part they are of moderate nature, similar to the discontent of dissident intellectuals in the Soviet era. But this moderate nationalism may always be scrutinized through a great-power magnifier. In 2004-2005, the sides had heated debates over the transfer of Tartar from the Cyrillic alphabet to Latin. Without quoting different arguments, let's point out that all participants in the debates seemed to derive pleasure from this competition of intellects. Needless to say, the Cyrillic alphabet won.
But the problem is still there. It makes sense to resume these debates with a passage of time, and with less politics involved.
The theme of nationalism surfaced again, mostly in the Moscow press, after a monument to Peter the Great was erected in Kazan. At one time the Russian tsar had built in Kazan an admiralty settlement that he had planned to use for the construction of the Caspian fleet. The monument evoked protests of some Tartar intellectuals (just like the monument to Peter the Great did in Moscow), and one of them, whose word carries much weight in Kazan, suggested that Peter should be replaced with Catherine the Great. This idea makes sense because the Russian Empress indeed did much for the unity of Moscow with the regions of Russia, and, moreover, always tried to learn more about the life of her Muslim subjects. She was the one who created the Muftiyat institute in 1788.
Moscow is often scared by Tartar nationalism. But with very rare exceptions this nationalism is defensive rather than offensive: it is not easy to live for centuries in a predominantly Russian ethnic and religious environment. Besides, it does not have a separatist tinge. Out of almost 3.8 million-strong population of Tatarstan, 53% are Tartars, and about 39% are Russians. In Kazan the ratio is about fifty-fifty.
Islam is also regarded today as a source of anxiety. In connection with the jubilee celebrations and particularly the arrival of Vladimir Putin in Kazan, all secret services in Moscow and Kazan have been put on the alert to look for international terrorists. To be honest, this is not a reason for gloating, but a desire to kowtow to the superiors, typical for both Tartars and Russians, is obviously there.
True, the rudiments of the Islamic trend were manifest in the middle 1990s in Tatarstan: both in Kazan and in Naberezhnye Chelny that played host to teachers from the Middle East and Tajikistan, and visitors from the Northern Caucasus. Groups calling themselves parties came into being. The nationalists were trying to use the Islamic card but radical Islam failed to produce any tangible impact on religious life, not to mention politics. Tartars did not swallow the bait.
The jubilee does not remove problems. Apprehensions in Moscow-Kazan relations would disappear, and then come back all of a sudden. But the Russian capital and the ambitious federation member always find a common language.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
