MOSCOW, (Tatyana Stanovaya for RIA Novosti) -
Russia has toughened its policy towards Belarus. According to popular business daily Kommersant, the management of energy giant Gazprom intends to sell gas to Belarus at $200 per 1,000 cubic meters, which Belarus claims is a violation of the Union Treaty.
Vedomosti, a Moscow-based daily, writes about a customs war, which Belarus has allegedly initiated in response to Moscow's gas offer. It writes that Belarusian customs officials have allegedly applied a dormant order of President Alexander Lukashenko to arrest a Russian batch of spirits and cigarettes sent to its enclave, the Kaliningrad Region, via Belarus.
The Kremlin is unlikely to accept Lukashenko's terms. If Moscow and Minsk fail to agree, Belarus will be isolated both from the west and from the east.
It is clear why Russia has decided to raise gas prices for Belarus. By supporting Lukashenko in his confrontation with the West during the presidential elections in Belarus, Moscow was protecting its own interests because political destabilization in Belarus would have affected Russia's geopolitical standing.
After that, Moscow waited for an opportune moment, and used the chance when Lukashenko became isolated from the West after the elections and had to listen more politely to the Kremlin's opinion.
Russia has its own strategy and tactics regarding Belarus. Strategically, it wants to integrate Belarus into Russia, which entails the introduction of the common monetary unit (ruble) and the adoption of the Constitutional Act that stipulates the election of a sole head of the Union State. This is a full-scale difficult-to-implement integration project. The Kremlin is skeptical of its chances.
The tactics provides for Gazprom gaining full control of Beltransgaz, the Belarusian state-owned gas company whose pipelines carry Russian gas to Europe. In fact, Russia's strategic objective is to gain control of gas distribution networks in nearly all countries that transit and buy Russian gas.
The issue was an object of economic bargaining in relations with Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia, but has a strong political aspect in the case of Belarus. Moscow regards its right to control Beltransgaz as logical and justified because Lukashenko's election victory was mostly based on an "economic miracle" paid for by Russia.
Russia wants to keep Belarus within reach by using economic (the acquisition of gas networks) or political (possible election of a pro-Russian president) methods. If Russia assumes control of the Belarusian gas network, the latter goal will lose its significance - Moscow will be independent of the Belarusian gas transit network even with a pro-Western president in Belarus.
Therefore, Gazprom's acquisition of Beltransgaz (by setting up a joint venture) is one of the main strategic objectives of the Kremlin. Moscow would regard this as partial payment for gas, and would not raise gas prices very high. But if Belarus refuses to heed Gazprom's request for a JV, it will be made to pay.
Belarus is not budging so far, and so the Kremlin is toughening its policy towards it. At first, it planned to demand $147 for its gas. Then Kommersant reported that President Vladimir Putin had instructed the government to stop subsidizing the Belarusian economy and to put an end to the Belarusian policy of re-exporting Russian energy resources. And lastly, it has transpired this week that gas price could be spiked to $200.
However, the use of the "gas weapon" against Belarus will be less effective than against Ukraine - Russia simply cannot turn off the gas, as it did to Ukraine. There is a major difference between Belarus and Ukraine although both countries transit Russian gas to Europe.
Ukraine, which is eager to join the European Union and does not want to damage its relations with the West, had to let Russian gas pass to Europe. Although President Viktor Yushchenko approved the siphoning off of a certain amount of gas for domestic purposes, he did this very cautiously, while defending his stand against Russia.
If Russia turns off the gas to Belarus, Lukashenko, who is no longer afraid of affecting his country's relations with Europe, may ignore Russia's obligations to the European consumers and would siphon off as much gas as he needs, thus endangering Moscow's relations with the West. A gas war would be especially detrimental to Russia this year, when it presides in the G8.
On the one hand, Belarus is more dependent on Russia [than Ukraine] and Russia has more instruments for pressurizing it. On the other hand, their application might prove damaging to its own interests. Moscow may have to diversify its methods and choose other than the strategic gas weapon.
Anyway, Russia has a very effective argument against Lukashenko: an aggravation of the crisis might push the Belarusian president into total isolation. This would threaten economic and political stability in Belarus and would be fraught with very serious consequences for him.
Tatyana Stanovaya is head of the expert department at the Center for Political Technologies.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
