MOSCOW. (Tatyana Stanovaya for RIA Novosti) - Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has reacted harshly to a growing pressure from the Kremlin.
In a meeting with Altai Territory Governor Alexander Karlin, he said that Belarus would never become part of Russia or sell the Beltransgaz pipeline concern at the balance cost.
This is no news at all. What is important is that Lukashenko has opted for conflict and against accepting Moscow's offer of a joint venture with Beltransgaz.
Alexander Karlin is an unusual governor. Before his appointment, he headed the presidential department for state service and his functions included a reform of state service carried out under the guidance of Dmitry Medvedev, now first deputy prime minister.
In other words, Karlin has most probably maintained close ties with the Kremlin administration and Medvedev.
Although he most likely went to Belarus as an unofficial Kremlin envoy, and a person whose formal status is much lower than that of his interlocutor, Lukashenko discussed top priority issues with him. He said by raising gas prices for Belarus Russia violated the principle of equal rights of the two countries' companies. According to Lukashenko, if gas prices are raised for Belarus, this should also affect the Russian parties. He said he was surprised that gas for enterprises in Smolensk (central European Russia) was cheaper than for Belarusian companies.
"Economically-wise, we want to work as a united country," the Belarusian president said. This statement was almost immediately followed by a declaration that Belarus was a self-sufficient country and would never agree to become incorporated into Russia.
The formula is simple: Russia and Belarus should be divided politically but united economically. Lukashenko thinks this would be a true union of fraternal nations, whereas Russia says this is paramount to subsidizing the Belarusian economy.
After the "orange revolution" in Ukraine, the Kremlin has revised its foreign economic strategy, refusing to subsidize even friendly economies. Russia has abandoned the policy of signing contracts to ensure the geopolitical loyalty of CIS leaders, because this policy malfunctioned in periods of crisis.
Leonid Kuchma, the pro-Russian president of Ukraine, disregarded Moscow's interests when he added to his country's strategic doctrine an objective of joining NATO. Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, who had been loyal to Russia, decided to turn "orange" when he saw signs of pre-election political destabilization in his country, which greatly worsened relations with Russia.
Russia's more pragmatic policy is to create relations of interdependence, in particular, by buying the other countries' gas distribution networks. Therefore, the Kremlin intends to press fraternal Belarus into respecting the commitment to create a joint venture of Gazprom and Beltransgaz. If Minsk goes back on its pledge, it will have to pay a market price for Russian gas.
A tougher policy regarding Belarus has forced Lukashenko to review its foreign policy rhetoric. He speaks about friendship with China, offers good relations to the West, and renounces Moscow's demands and advances his own proposals during a meeting with a Russian governor. But he has to be much more restrained when talking with the Russian president. The Kremlin is making harsh demands, and Lukashenko has no bargaining levers.
The Belarusian leader has limited maneuverability in the political dialogue with Russian political leadership. That is why Lukashenko is using non-political regional figures for making his stand. It is impossible to imagine a Russian governor negotiating the future of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, or Ukraine's accession to NATO, with President Viktor Yushchenko. No leader of a sovereign nation will discuss strategic intergovernmental issues with unauthorized persons. The only exception is Alexander Lukashenko.
The situation of the Belarusian leader is extremely complicated. His meeting with Governor Karlin showed that Russia is introducing isolation elements into relations with Belarus. This looks like a prelude to a harsh semi-latent conflict, with assurances of "friendship" at the top level and sharp statements at lower-level negotiations, when Lukashenko publicly rejects Russian demands.
Lukashenko has decided to take the risk, gambling on his relations with the only geopolitical ally Belarus has. But will the Belarusian voters follow him after Russia raises gas prices?
Tatyana Stanovaya is head of the expert department at the Center for Political Technologies.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
