The head of the delegation, Mahmud Jannatian, deputy chief of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), was accompanied by the director of the Bushehr project, and an AEOI technical representative in Moscow. The Iranians held a number of business meetings with representatives of the Russian companies Atomstroiexport and Rosenergoatom.
Mr. Jannatian is relatively new to the Iranian nuclear establishment. He was appointed to his high position to ensure the completion of the Bushehr project. The Iranians are tired of endless procrastinations in the construction of the first nuclear power plant. They have been waiting for its commissioning for 30 years now.
First, the Germans let them down by leaving the almost completed project for good in 1980 because of Iran's war with Iraq (1980-1988). Now the Russians, who have undertaken to finish the project, are dragging it out further. Jannatian made his first trip in Russia to the Kalinin nuclear power plant in the Tver Region in order to see unit No.3, a replica of the Bushehr bloc. He also had an opportunity to watch the operation of the unit's new-generation automated control system (ACS). Then the guests went to Elektrogorsk in the Moscow suburbs, and saw with their own eyes the Bushehr ACS, which is being built by the workers of Nuclear Power Plants Safety Research Center.
Assessing the talks with the Iranian delegation, chief of Atomstroiexport department on the Bushehr project Vladimir Pavlov emphasized, "the dialogue with the Iranian colleagues was positive and smooth. There was no need to remove contradictions, or persuade anyone of anything." Pavlov said, "the Iranian colleagues have seen all they wanted to see, and had all their questions answered." What was the subject of their discussion? This time the talks were predominantly commercial. In principle, business meetings between customers and contractors are a routine procedure, but they always have matters to discuss before the turnkey project is finished. But the commissioning of the plant, scheduled last time for October 2006, is being delayed again, at least for one year. Head of the Atomic Energy Federal Agency Sergei Kiriyenko officially promised to commission the plant in the second half of 2007, strictly according to schedule. Pavlov confirmed: "There are no secrets - everything will be in line with the schedule we will sign." But where is this schedule? The partners have not endorsed it so far, which means that there are some nuances which are an obstacle to this. There were several schedules in the process of construction, and none was observed. The problem is that this project is unique in world practice. Russian engineers had to rack their brains trying to marry the Russia ACS with the remainder of the Siemens project.
The unit's building sustained serious damage from rocket fire. After the war ended, nobody wanted to complete the disfigured project. The game was not worth the candle. Only Russia went for it because of the circumstances: the Soviet Union had disintegrated, and the country was going through its worst socio-political crisis, economic upheavals, and moral shock. Specialists working in Bushehr are saying in unison: "God save us from another project like that!"
The unfinished plant stayed under the sun and desert winds for almost 20 years. But it was not too difficult to restore what was built. Equipment posed a much bigger problem. Siemens had brought in about 35,000 units, but many pieces were covered with rust, or become obsolete. A joint Russian-Iranian commission conducted a colossal technical expertise, which accepted no more than 5,000 units as fir for use. The sizes and configuration did not coincide with the Russian project. It was necessary to get new equipment.
As time passed the construction of the project was delayed by political difficulties around Iran. Washington was exerting pressure on Moscow, demanding that it should give up the project, but the construction went on, albeit very slowly.
Today, the construction part has been fulfilled by 92%. The level of the unit's general readiness stands at 75%, which the partners recalled at their recent Moscow meeting. It would have been routine, if it had not been affected by the political situation around Iran. The commissioning of the project is a very sensitive subject in Iranian society. It is equally sensitive for Russia, too. The Bushehr project has put its image at stake. Russia wants to prove to the world that its national engineering is solvent, and that it has an adequate technical potential as a nuclear power. Fulfilling its commitments to Iran is a matter of honor.
Several months ago the sides set up a special bilateral group to remove the obstacles, which prevent the completion of the project. Rosatom Director Sergei Kiriyenko blames the delay on the failure to observe the production schedule and deliver some assembly units. At the same time, he announced his department's ambitious plans on the world market - to build from 40 to 60 nuclear power plants abroad before 2030.
"In this context, the Bushehr nuclear power plant should be a good PR instrument for Russia," said PIR Center political scientist Anton Khlopkov. "This is exactly why Russia has continued with this project despite U.S. political pressure over these eleven years. Iran is a very important geopolitical center with enormous hydrocarbon resources, which makes it special in interstate relations," he explained. "Russia is pursuing a consistent policy towards developing relations with Iran. This fact does not make the U.S. optimistic - it doesn't want to miss Iran's economically promising niche."
Khlopkov thinks that the unit may well go into operation in 2007, if the crisis around the Iranian nuclear program abates, and full-scale sanctions are not imposed.
