Post-revolutionary stabilization. In the last five years, a high level of macroeconomic and political stability has characterized Russia, which is particularly evident in contrast with the situation of the late 1980s-early 1990s. The full-scale revolution that Russia experienced while implementing the systemic post-Communist transformation is over, and the basic state institutions have been restored. At the same time, the elites have not consolidated much, and a stable national consensus on basic values has not been reached. Solving this problem will take decades. Meanwhile, the lack of consensus on such matters will result in periods of relative stability alternating with sudden political turns.
The reproduction of instability is brought about by the government's constant maneuvering between social groups of varying interests. As a result, there emerges a peculiar system in which stability is ensured by fluctuations inside the government that seeks to create new coalitions.
Challenges of post-industrial society. Russia must solve specific tasks related to "catch-up development" under the new conditions and challenges presented by the post-industrial epoch. The mechanisms for solving these tasks differ essentially from the solution of similar problems in the epoch of industrialization.
Russia requires a deep structural transformation. Meanwhile, as the experience of the most developed countries shows, the period of structural reforms is often accompanied by slower growth rates or even external stagnation (as happened in some Western countries in the 1970s). This is partly because new sectors (especially services) are not adequately covered by traditional statistical methods,
and partly because a new technological breakthrough requires the accumulation of resources.
Economic growth without structural shifts can be easily achieved by state administration, but such growth will not make the country richer or the economy more effective.
There are several important principles for achieving economic growth.
First, the government must give up its attempts to set longterm sectoral (industrial) priorities on which it could focus its attention and resources. Practical work on these priorities would only give prominence to those sectors with maximum lobbyist possibilities. Much more effective would be a strategy of regularly correcting the structure, under which the government would be ready to protect, flexibly and by political methods, all those who achieve success through competition.
Second, the government must make the economic system flexible and adaptive, while economic agents must be able to react to the present challenges quickly and effectively. Adaptability must replace the concentration of resources as a key benchmark of state policy. The solution of this task is inseparable from the task of building an effective system for the protection of ownership rights.
Third, in the contemporary world a "catching-up" country must have a lower budgetary load on its economy than the most advanced countries in the world.
Fourth, the government and private entrepreneurs must give priority to investment in human capital.
Fifth, the economy must be made sufficiently open. Foreign economic policy must be oriented to the stimulation of the development of new, high-tech sectors, and to the production of high added value products from traditional Russian exports. At the same time, negotiations on Russia's accession to the World Trade
Organization must be aimed not at the primitive protection of domestic producers but at a post-industrial breakthrough. Energy price situation. It is generally believed that high energy prices are exceptionally favorable for the country. However, high energy prices over a long duration may have negative consequences for the stability of the country's economic and political development in the future. This is due to the degradation of the tax and budgetary systems, in which a high level of revenues that do not stem from growth in labor productivity substantially reduces the effectiveness of decision-making.
The country's political and economic dependence on petrodollars increases annually as the boom in world energy prices continues. Meanwhile, the political and economic risks of a decrease in oil prices continue to grow. A fall in oil prices may provoke an inappropriate reaction from the elite, which has become accustomed to the exceptionally favorable budget situation. As a result, the country may face a budgetary as well as a political crisis characteristic of post-revolutionary development.
To cushion a possible crisis, the government must work out, without delay, a plan of action in case the world economic situation deteriorates. This plan must include various measures concerning monetary, budgetary and tax policies, changes in foreign economic regulation, and other measures that would help alleviate the consequences of a hypothetical crisis. Without such a plan, the likelihood that the situation may get out of control will be very high. On the bright side, a decrease in oil prices and the government's reaction to it will be a maturity test for Russia's political elite and a gauge for determining the country's real devotion to a responsible economic policy.
Vladimir Mau, rector of the Academy of National Economy under the government of the Russian Federation
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
