It was allegedly established to ensure a "civilized divorce" of the Soviet republics, but I don't share this opinion. I believe the founding fathers of the CIS pursued tactical political goals (to remove Mikhail Gorbachev from power as soon as possible) and strategic objectives - to keep control over the Soviet Union's nuclear capability, to pursue relatively coordinated defense and security policies, if only initially, and to preserve the main forms of economic cooperation between the republics.
It was owing to these considerations that Russia has acted until recently as the main advocate of preserving the CIS. Had the CIS been merely an instrument for a "civilized divorce," it would have fallen apart no later that at the end of the 1990s.
Relations with the CIS came to the fore after President Vladimir Putin said the dissolution of the Soviet Union was "the biggest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century", and especially after a series of Russia's political flops in the South Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova.
The numerous reasons for Russia's political failure in relations with the former Soviet republics can be divided into three groups.
First, in the 1990s, when Russia suffered the indignity of having lost the Cold War and was afflicted with numerous economic ailments, the Kremlin rulers needed somebody towards whom they would pursue a policy similar to the Western policy towards Russia. This allowed them to forget their inferiority complex, if not overcome it.
This explains Russia's actions towards its neighbors, including assistance to "controlled instability" in some regions and threats of separatism. Transdnestr, Abkhazia and South Ossetia became for Russia what Chechnya was for the West. It also issued lavish loans for obscure goals. In particular, the policy towards Tajikistan in 1992-1995 was strongly reminiscent of the IMF policy towards Russia in 1997-1998.
Second, Russia was the strongest economic and military power in the CIS, which allowed it to assume responsibility for all of the member countries. Russian politicians adopted a very strange policy of relations with the CIS leaders, allowing them to do what they wanted in their countries, and apparently wishing to do the same in Russia. As a result of this policy, relations with different political forces in the former Soviet republics were drastically reduced and largely lost, which curtailed Russia's possibility to maneuver. Russia has been working with the interests of the CIS ruling elites in mind, and has never tried to "play" on internal contradictions in the CIS countries.
Third, Russia's economic relations with the CIS are very strange. Until the turn of the 21st century, the Kremlin gave the member states the most favored status in the economy, frequently to the detriment of Russian interests. I am referring, in part, to the maintenance of the ruble zone in Central Asia in 1992-1994 and the subsidizing of the Ukrainian economy through low gas prices until early this year. In return, Russia did not demand any economic or political concessions. It only wanted declarations of eternal friendship, which the former Soviet states readily made.
The recent decision to revise this policy was made rashly, so that economic measures acquired a political lining. Instead of demonstrating the benefits of economic cooperation with Russia, the CIS countries are being told about the dangers of political dissent. We will most likely see the results of this policy after 2008.
Taken together, these policies produced a sad result. Russia failed to translate its economic and political superiority in the CIS into serious influence. The majority of the CIS countries are now mature, independent (primarily of Russia) countries. Other global players, notably the European Union, the United States and China, have their own interests in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine and Moldova.
Ukraine and Moldova will gradually move towards the EU. Georgia and Azerbaijan are looking up at the U.S., for whom energy security is a problem because it imports oil from the Middle East and West Asia.
China will most likely strengthen its positions in Central Asia, where it has already become the largest creditor.
And Belarus, which has been keeping itself to itself, is a hard nut on which Russia may break its teeth.
It is usually said that Russian-Belarusian friendship is based on "special relations" between two Slavic nations. But Belarus has surged ahead of its "big brother" in some ways. It has never had tycoons, individuals control only 8.7% of Belarusian enterprises, and private industrial companies constitute only 15% of the total.
Foreign owned companies account for 0.6% of output in the steel industry, 2.5% in chemicals and 3.9% in the food sector in Belarus. This looks like dreamland for part of the Russian political class.
Those who set up a private company in Belarus have to spend 122% (!) of gross revenues on the payment of 113 taxes. In 2005, the republican government approved an average of 4.4 resolutions, the president issued 1.9 decrees and instructions, and the parliament approved 20 bylaws a day. The reelection of Alexander Lukashenko for a third term was a deserving crown on that "perfect" state edifice.
This is exactly where Russia and Belarus clashed. The two power verticals, in Moscow and in Minsk, failed to come to terms on gas prices and ownership of a gas pipeline from Russia to Europe via Belarus. Minsk keeps saying that Belarus is a European country, and these are not empty words. Lukashenko is preparing to defend the independence of his country and himself against Russia's gas attacks. If he succeeds, this victory will unite the Belarusian political elite, including his political opponents from the Popular Front.
Will Moscow back off, limiting itself to declarations of friendship with the fraternal Belarusian people, or fight back? This is not important for the future of the CIS. It will become clear in either case that the CIS is only a cover for the solution of private problems, a phantom organization without an economic or political strategy.
The CIS will hardly live to celebrate its 20th anniversary, which could be for the better, because divorced couples feel better if they do not meet too often in the same kitchen.
Vladislav Inozemtsev, scientific director of the Center for Postindustrial Research and member of the RIA Novosti Expert Council
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
