MOSCOW. (Andrei Suzdaltsev, Higher School of Economics, for RIA Novosti) - The plaque on the door to Alexander Lukashenko's office reads, "Chairman of the Supreme State Council of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. President of the Republic of Belarus."
The order of his titles seems to imply that the Belarusian president gives priority to economic and political integration with Russia.
Nevertheless, the two countries are not getting on well. The era of euphoria in their relations gave way to a period of mounting problems, which have now been compounded. In recent years, unresolved issues have led to the unraveling of the Union's agreements. The first to be disrupted were vital agreements on Russian gas supply to Belarus at domestic Russian prices and on duty-free oil supply to Belarusian companies within the single customs zone.
Minsk's fight for cheap Russian energy has affected the image of the Union State. The latter's existence helped to justify the politically motivated economic privileges and preferences (worth about $7 billion annually) enjoyed by Belarus. However, now that Belarus, as Lukashenko claims, has entered a period of "prosperity," Minsk can afford to buy its energy at average European prices.
Belarus' failure to honor its commitments under the oil agreement of 1995 has cost Russia more than $35 billion over the past 10 years. This is more than Belarus' annual GDP. Gazprom's losses from Minsk's failure to abide by the package agreement of 2002 (under which it would buy gas at domestic Russian prices in exchange for the set up of a joint gas shipment venture) amounted to some $10 billion. The unilateral interpretation of bilateral agreements sooner or later leads to a crisis in relations and to a deadlock. The first victim of this crisis has been trust between the two countries' leaderships.
To break a deadlock, it is usually necessary to change the entire foundation of political relations between two countries, which sometimes takes a whole era and a generation of politicians. However, the Belarusian government was able to convince its citizens that Lukashenko would return from Moscow on December 18 having secured the cheapest gas price in Europe and discounts on oil. Russia was to shoulder the cost of this odd integration. Unfortunately, years of unconditional economic and political support to the Lukashenko regime have led Belarusian politicians, including the opposition, to believe that Moscow has to foot the bill for the Union entirely on its own.
Importantly, the Belarusian people still do not know that the Moscow talks failed. Taking advantage of Russians' generally low level of interest in Russian-Belarusian integration, because of which relations between Moscow and Minsk are not even among the top 30 priorities for Russian television, Belarusian electronic mass media are portraying bilateral relations as favorable to Lukashenko.
Real sovereignty comes at global prices. This maxim, however, does not sit well with the Belarusian president, who believes that Russia has to pay for his country's sovereignty. He fears that the "Belarusian economic model" he has built will not bear market prices and will therefore collapse, burying his third presidential term. In early 2006, his ability to maintain gas prices for Belarus at 2005 levels - at the time of a bitter gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine - helped Lukashenko get re-elected.
This is a vicious circle: talks imply concessions. Belarus was expected to allow Beltransgaz to set up a joint venture with Gazprom. However, the venture has yet to get off the ground, and postponing its creation by six or even twelve months will not help the regime. Lukashenko's integration model, which involves reaping the benefits of close relations with Russia while not participating in any real integration, will inevitably collapse and may cost him his post in the long run.
If there is no progress in talks on gas or any other source of conflict, Lukashenko may face a full-scale Russian-Belarusian crisis on January 1. This scenario could jeopardize his power, but in the near term he may be able to create and ride a wave of popular outrage, just as he did in February 2004 (when Gazprom was forced to cut gas supplies to the country for one day after not receiving payments).
Part of the Belarusian opposition may then go over to Lukashenko's side, and he may even get political support from Central Europe. Moscow will then be blamed for Belarus' economic troubles. Lukashenko will be able to keep his post by adopting an anti-Russian attitude.
The campaign launched by Belarusian mass media applauding Lukashenko's success in Moscow may be pursuing a definite goal: on January 1, Moscow will come across as a treacherous villain who has "deceived" his brother nation. Apparently, this is what Minsk is trying to achieve by concealing from its people the truth about the deadlock in Russian-Belarusian relations.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
