Initially, Ovezgeldy Atayev, 55 year-old speaker of the Mejlis (parliament), and deputy head of the People's Assembly or Halk Maslahaty (the highest legislative body), was mentioned as a possible successor. A former teacher, lawyer and ex-Chairman of the Supreme Court, he is not a striking personality. However, the domestic Security Council rejected his candidacy because the Prosecutor General has initiated criminal proceedings against him.
Deputy Prime Minister Kurbangeldy Berdymukhamedov has been appointed Acting President of Turkmenistan. He was in charge of Turkmenbashi's funeral. He is also viewed at home as a weak, rubber-stamp politician without serious influence. Judging by all, he will become the next President of Turkmenistan.
Incidentally, all Turkmen elite is weak, has limited resources, and lacks charismatic figures. Top officials in Turkmenistan are suffering from the fly-by-night syndrome more than their counterparts in any other post-Soviet republic. In Turkmenbashi's government a minister occupied his post no more than half a year on average, after which he was ousted, sent to prison, or fled abroad. It is enough to recall that parliament speakers were changed four times from the early 2001 to November 2002. None of the claimants to power have great resources, especially as regards social support.
Now the local elites are gaining strength, and are apparently in for a short but tough struggle for power. The range of people who could claim the highest government position is extremely broad. They enjoy roughly the same modest influence.
Niyazov did not concern himself with choosing a successor. To all intents and purposes, he was so confident of his exclusivity that he did not even wish to think that someone might replace him one day. Nobody dared remind him of a successor. A quasi-dynastic change of power patterned after Azerbaijan is not likely - Niyazov's son Murad does not have any support at home.
It would seem that law enforcers are in a better position to fulfil their ambitions, and take power in their hands. But the army, ministry of the interior, and ministry of national security were regularly purged every six to twelve months, and they are no stronger than the others.
Presidential elections will take place on February 11. Nobody knows who will succeed Niyazov. I think that there is no successor at all, which is not surprising considering Niyazov's regular clean-up operations among the Turkmen elites. Political life in Turkmenistan looks like a desert. The country does not have any mechanisms for force majeure, such as the President's death.
The influence of the members of the opposition on relations within the elites is not great, and was limited to government positions of their relatives. The Turkmen political class rests on multiple family and regional interrelations, but after Boris Shikhmuradov, Khadaiberdy Orazov, Nurmukhammed Khanamov, and other "nomenclature oppositionists" were removed from power, their relatives were ousted from top echelons of government and big business.
In fact, the domestic opposition does not exist - Niyazov did away with it once and for all. Emigre oppositionists cannot control the situation from afar. They are not likely to be allowed to return home in the near future - nobody needs extra rivals in the mounting struggle for power and business.
Turkmenistan will not be able to carry out Kyrgyz-style social mobilization, or match the scale of Orange protests in Ukraine. The population is used to demonstrating loyalty to the central government, and it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to encourage it to go for a velvet revolution. Most people will accept a figure that will seize power and make the loudest declaration about this.
Local power ministers will play a very important role during interregnum. They are backed by real power. There are three power centers - a 60 year-old Defense Minister Agageldy Mamedgeldyyev (the oldest from Niyazov's entourage, and, hence most likely to head the Halk Maslahaty), who was previously the director of a military health resort, and deputy defense minister for logistics support. Judging by all, the defense minister is acting together with the number one security official - Akhmurad Redzhepov, the head of the Presidential Guards.
The Minister of the Interior and Niyazov's confidant Akmamed Rakhmanov heads the second group, while Security Minister Geldy Ashirmukhamedov is in charge of the third one. The latter is a seasoned security veteran with a Soviet training. He is well connected in the Turkmen army - for several years he was the commander of the ground forces before he was appointed to his current position.
Power ministers have the strongest positions in the Turkmen elites. Civilian politicians can only claim compromise, rubber-stamp positions. Acting President and Deputy Prime Minister in charge of healthcare Kurbangeldy Berdymukhamedov, or Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov may well become the formal leaders of the country, but will not have any real levers of power.
The same is true of the Halk Malakhaty nominees. One of them is deputy head of the Turkmengeologiya State Corporation, and Minister of the Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources Ishankuli Nuryyev. There are many other candidates, and this fact alone testifies to the general weakness of the domestic elites.
After Niyazov's death the bad domestic situation has changed for the worse. The social and economic sphere is the hardest hit. Hidden unemployment is widespread; professional personnel who received education abroad cannot be employed because their diplomas were declared invalid; the living standards are very low, which further discredits Niyazov's regime; Turkmen salaries are among the lowest in the region in terms of real purchasing capacity; hidden inflation has persisted for several years - the manat (national currency) has depreciated 12,500 (sic!) times since it was put into circulation. Niyazov's death will bring out all economic and social problems, and reveal the worst contradictions in the Turkmen economy.
The regime is likely to become milder because the Turkmen elites are by no means interested in bringing another Niyazov to power. Moreover, they would like to become less odious in the eyes of the world community. However, this "dosed" democratization will be very modest, and will take place only if the change of power is more or less peaceful.
Under the circumstances, Russia has a window of opportunity for enhancing its influence in the republic. No matter who becomes President, he will be interested in getting political and financial resources - on a big scale and as soon as possible. Only one organization can offer this - Gazprom. It has been working in Turkmenistan for a long time, and has a ramified network of influence on local elites.
There are also objective reasons for the preservation of Russian influence regardless of who becomes Turkmen President. The mechanism which brings Turkmen gas to the world market is simple - all streams pass though Russian, Uzbek, and Kazakh territory and pipelines. Gazprom is the owner of the local gas deposits, and will keep them in its hands for another 25 years in line with the corresponding agreement between Moscow and Ashgabat.
Until recently, Russia's attitude to Turkmenistan's encroachments on the rights and freedoms of tens of thousands of our compatriots has been extremely lax. Having signed a bilateral agreement on the export of Turkmen gas to third countries, we have tied up our hands to a certain extent. But now Moscow has many serious arguments for talks with Ashgabat. If Russia seriously limits Turkmenistan's gas exports for at least a month, the latter's economy will cease to exist. It is time to realize that the late Turkmen leader was a man who did not accept criticism or listen to diplomats - he only respected force. His successors are likely to be the same.
If Russia does not take a number of important measures as regards the future regime in Turkmenistan, the United States is likely to do this. Turkmenistan is very rich in gas, and is the last link in the anaconda belt, which encompasses Iran. It is also a country which may potentially become a serious rival to Russia in the European gas market. Right now the emigre opposition has no influence at home, but time, money and political technologies are capable of shaking the positions of Turkmen-style stability.
In this situation, Russia should concentrate not on short-term gas deals, but on building long-term relations with the young and old Turkmen elites, which would consolidate Russian influence in the republic and the rest of Central Asia.
Andrei Grozin is an expert at the Institute of CIS Countries
