MOSCOW. (Dmitry Danilov for RIA Novosti) - Far from concealing its expectations, Moscow has made it clear that it hopes Germany will lead the EU towards rapprochement with Russia during its EU presidency.
Indeed, why not? Germany is Russia's number one partner in Europe, and their partnership rests on a solid foundation of economic contacts and interests. Therefore, Germany is interested more than any other country in upgrading its cooperation with Russia and in veering European policy in this direction. Moscow is also confident about the prospects of the German presidency in the context of Russia-EU relations. Brussels is interested no less than Moscow in an early beginning of the talks on a new agreement on strategic partnership and cooperation. The old one is due to expire in late 2007. Now that the Polish veto has prevented the start of the talks under the Finnish presidency, even greater hopes are pegged on Germany in this context.
The personal factor is important as well. Many believed that Gerhard Schroeder's departure from his post would weaken Russia's positions in relations with Germany, which were largely based on the chancellor's personal friendship with Vladimir Putin. When Angela Merkel came to power, she made it very clear that she was not going to follow the same road, and that German-Russian relations must rest on objective interests and should occupy a more definite place in the European context. However, Moscow did not lose anything from the change of government. Quite the contrary, it even gained - it transpired that bilateral relations were by no means determined by the Schroeder-Putin friendship. Merkel did not have to look for objective interests which would replace personal sympathy. These interests were already there, and they were quite strong. Moreover, Schroeder's departure and Merkel's restraint in her Russian policy made this abundantly clear. Germany and Russia's mutual interests appeared to be too strong for their leaders to afford estrangement. Quite soon, Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin developed partnership, if not a friendship. For Moscow, this is a major factor in the context of Germany's EU presidency. It does not want to get any additional points, but still hopes that Germany's pragmatic stance will help counter anti-Russian attitudes in the EU. This is very important, especially considering the results of the Finnish presidency.
On the one hand, during the Finnish presidency, Russia-EU relations and dialogue made steady progress. It is enough to mention the first five ministerial meetings of the Russia-EU Permanent Partnership Council, a basic document on a new Northern Dimension program, and agreements on relaxed visa procedures. Although, EU leaders failed to persuade Putin to join the Energy Charter at the Lahti summit, or to start talks on a new Russia-EU agreement at the Helsinki summit, the partners are ready to start drafting new parameters of the strategic agreement. In this context, the change of presidency was quite a success. However, on the other hand, the "Christmas present" for Moscow at the end of the Finnish presidency came as an unpleasant surprise. Sharp criticism of Russia by Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen is in striking contrast with the positive results of the Finnish presidency. The Kremlin will have to analyze the motives behind this position. It may conceal some Finnish discontent or routine EU remarks about "different values." But it may also be attributed to a very dangerous trend of mounting anti-Russian attitudes in Europe. Vanhanen said that he was not sure that Russia was moving in the right direction (though during the Finnish presidency it was not moving in the wrong direction). Now Germany will have to deal with this issue as well. It will have to balance between Europe's negative attitudes towards Russia, and pragmatic EU and domestic interests. This is a real challenge for Germany - how to accomplish its European mission without losing Russia.
It would seem that the answer is simple - do everything possible for the new Russia-EU partnership agreement. But this is easier said than done. Let's ignore self-serving obstacles - the Polish "meat" blackmail, which impressed the EU more than Russia, and Warsaw's position on the Prussian Trusteeship lawsuits, which are unbalanced and unacceptable for Germany. These are not the headaches of the German presidency. Germany will have to deal with extremely complicated strategic challenges, the resolution of which will determine the future of the EU. It is enough to mention the EU constitutional crisis, the issue of borders, social and political contradictions that point to European society's lack of trust in the EU, and the Bologna economic growth dilemmas. Germany bears special responsibility for resolving these tasks also in connection with the preparations for the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 2007 - the Berlin declaration should leave no doubts in the EU's historical success and future. When Germany takes over the G8 presidency from Russia, the EU will have to deal with such political issues as Kosovo, Central Asia and the Middle East, to name but a few.
Russia will not be a priority on this list. Even if Berlin wants to map out a new EU eastern policy and draft a strategy of Russia's stage-by-stage integration in Europe, its opportunities are limited. Moreover, a line towards upgrading relations with Russia by no means enjoys broad support in the EU. Russia's image as an authoritarian and undemocratic country with excessive ambitions compels many in Europe to think of forced partnership which rests on Europe's energy dependence. This is not the Bush-Chavez pattern of relations, but still a trend that spells danger both for the EU and Russia. If Berlin's persistence in its line towards Russia is interpreted as EU German policy rather than Germany's European policy, it will be even more obvious that the potentialities of the German presidency are limited. Counting on Germany as a European heavyweight, capable of promoting Russian-European cooperation better than anyone else, Moscow has failed to realize that in this case Germany's weight can in fact impede progress. Some German politicians are already warning Moscow not to expect too much.
But what does Moscow expect? Clearly, Germany does not find it easy to answer this question. Lack of comments on the busy pre-Christmas Moscow visit by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier makes the situation even more vague. Does the Kremlin want strategic partnership but is not ready to set forth clear-cut strategic goals? Should the future agreement be called strategic in this case? If the Kremlin wants a really new long-term legal agreement, why rush with its conclusion? Will Germany justify its Russian program by Moscow's desire to sign the agreement now that the Kremlin does not seem to rush with the elaboration of new parameters of its relations with the EU? After all, there is an old agreement, which can be extended automatically every year. There are also roadmaps on four common spaces, which allow the partners to develop cooperation the way they see fit - from real strategic partnership to its imitation.
The future elections in Russia, the prospects of its WTO entry, and the expectations of more definite results from European discussion are impeding progress to the new agreement with the EU, not to mention fundamental Russian-European differences on energy security and cooperation. Moscow is not quite clear, either, on the meaning of Central Asian accents under the German presidency. Should Russia think that Germany and the EU want to develop mutually advantageous energy cooperation together, or should it interpret these accents as their attempt to get an additional energy flow bypassing Russia? These are questions of priority importance. Heated discussion on gas supplies which followed the death of Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov bears this out, among other things.
In other words, the more serious and meaningful the agreement that Germany and Russia will have in mind at the talks, the fewer the chances for their completion before the end of this year. If the partners start drafting a broad document accompanied by specific cooperation agreements, they will have to uphold their competing positions, and the deadline for the completion of the talks will not be that important. But if they are content to merely preserve a legal stamp on their cooperation and to declare its strategic character once again, they will not encounter any special problems. However, in this case the conclusion of a new agreement on strategic partnership will mean that the sides have placed their bets on the status quo - limited pragmatic cooperation where their interests coincide, and carte blanche in those spheres where their interests diverge. Their diplomatic success will leave the main question unanswered - what will be the future of Europe, which is still divided despite such clear signs of strategic partnership.
Dmitry Danilov is the head of the European security department at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
