The law, which curtails the president's powers to appointing delegates for meetings with the European trio of Germany, France and Britain (parliament may blackball the appointment) is a logical thread in the fabric of post-revolutionary logic. Revolutionaries and their enemies, who probably had different plans during the 2004 "orange" revolution, also had one idea in common: to dismantle the power system of President Leonid Kuchma.
It was the only method of winning for the "orange" team led by Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. Interestingly, however, the same idea also ensured the success of Viktor Yanukovych, whom Yushchenko defeated two years ago in presidential polls but was forced to appoint prime minister last August.
The conversion of a presidential republic into a parliamentary (or a presidential/parliamentary) one is the final element of decentralization of power, which had been held by one pair of hands (the president) and exercised by his team.
Yanukovych who lost in a vertical structure of power, is rapidly avenging himself in conditions of a multipole structure of power. This is the main consequence of the Ukrainian revolution.
A political reform devised by Kuchma long ago to preserve the vertical system of power has led to its almost complete destruction. The current president is losing some of his power, and the regional administrations are sharing their power with local self-governments, thus completing the destruction of the vertical system of power. There are nearly as many centers of power in Ukraine as there are adversaries (parliament, the government, administrations of all levels, the Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Court). The president is not exclusively a moral authority either.
Nearly all new East European democracies made that journey from a presidential to a parliamentary republic, a trend that is considered part of recuperation. Ukraine cannot be viewed as a convalescent patient so far. Unlike the romantic events of the early 1990s, its current decision is not based on the striving for democracy as the only possible escape from the past, but is part of a merciless infighting of the authorities.
What may look like a democratic technology of the delineation of powers is in fact a carefully calculated move. Yanukovych is now controlling parliament and finds it easier to come to terms with numerous local councils than with governors. A seemingly democratic model, it is in fact no more democratic than a structure devised by Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, who wanted to hand over power to Soviets (councils).
On the other hand, this is the only feature they have in common, as different times make use of different people. There is no drama of choosing from a set of possible answers. EU and NATO membership, for which Ukrainians are not striving vehemently, contrary to the expectations of Yushchenko, is not a crossroads or the Hamletian dilemma - "To be or not to be?" It is an issue of time, as everyone realizes, and a change of foreign minister will neither slow down, nor accelerate the process.
Most importantly, the current success of Yanukovych is a tactical victory, because even his pro-Russian Party of Regions knows the high value of each minute in power, which can be lost very soon, probably even before the next elections.
No coalition can be stable when the powers involved are roughly equal, especially a coalition whose future is decided by Parliamentary Speaker Oleksander Moroz, the leader of Ukrainian socialists. No agreements can serve as a guarantee against surprises, and no divorce is final. Every new lineup of forces includes elements of the next lineup, because their inability to keep one's word is made up by the ability to negotiate new terms.
Fighting for the post of parliamentary speaker, the Socialists formed an alliance with Yanukovych and even with their sworn enemies, the Communists. Tymoshenko seems ready for a tactical union with Yanukovych on the issue of the cabinet in the hope of winning in the future, even though the promise of a law on the opposition, used to lure her into the union, may not materialize.
The situation is growing more complicated, with Ukraine pondering the possibility of turning over its gas transportation system to Russia in return for access to Russian deposits. The possibility has a whiff of a national scandal involving completely different political configurations. Tymoshenko is trying to win the ears and hearts of deputies from the government coalition, because she knows that these are mutually interchangeable people with similar economic interests, although divided by the frontline of a coalition war.
The general lineup of forces in Ukraine remains relatively balanced, and therefore the next elections will be as intriguing as the subsequent search for the unpredictable combination of the parliamentary majority. The future preferences of the political minority, who decide the future of the government in Ukraine, are not apparent at all. The stakes will grow manifold in a parliamentary-presidential republic, with the accumulation of a majority vote depending on the offer of the post of prime minister, rather than parliamentary speaker. This will dramatically change the system of political relations between the majority and the minority.
Ukraine's intrigue is a concentration of the history of democracy growing not so much from idealism, as from the chaos of the struggle of everyone against anyone. It is a kind of the Brownian motion based on the laws of democratic mechanics - not like unstable balance at all. In fact, such motion is stable and self-encouraging.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
