MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov)
Turkmenistan has officially chosen the successor of late president Saparmurat Niyazov, who died so suddenly - Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, acting president, former first deputy prime minister and healthcare minister, a person close to Niyazov.
No one doubted the choice: there were no other real candidates anyway. However, the question where Turkmenistan without Niyazov will turn - eastward, westward or toward Russia - remains relevant. Although the new president's statement on continuity and neutrality in foreign policies, made long before the election, cooled the passions, there are still plenty of possible scenarios and forecasts.
It will be difficult for Russia to preserve its present stand in Turkmenistan, many experts say. It will be easier to strengthen it significantly, which is encouraged by circumstances.
The new Turkmen leadership will have to make serious changes to the unique, not to say exotic, political system of the country and to launch some important social reforms. Some of them have already been announced, such as return to 10-year instead of 9-year secondary school, to 5-year instead of 4-year higher education, return of retirement pensions and expansion of village hospitals.
Obviously, social and political reforms conducted simultaneously will require additional financing, not to mention international support. At present, however, there is a shortage of both.
Turkmenistan's only revenues come from energy and cotton exports. For objective reasons, late Niyazov had chosen Russia as his main partner in gas exports, and the parties signed a 20-year supply agreement.
Almost all of the country's gas export routes go across Russia and via its pipelines, which gives Moscow a certain advantage for promoting its own interests.
On the other hand, it seems that the United States, the West and China could compete with Russia in the Turkmen gas sector. Nazar Suyunov, former oil and gas minister, says that the republic has huge potential reserves. Turning them into industrial reserves requires exploration, which in turn requires huge investment. But the country does not have the necessary conditions for attracting it. It needs reforms and specialists, which it has not had "for a long time." It seems other candidates could have a go in this situation. But the position of Russian Gazprom, which has all but monopolized the Turkmen gas sector, looks more favorable.
As to international support or, in other words, bilateral Russian-Turkmen relations, Moscow's position is rather strong.
Ashgabat's neutral policy did not encroach on Russia's interests in the region. Perhaps, this stand is more suitable for Russia than Turkmenistan's membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At least, it will not have to shoulder potential problems that may arise from Turkmenistan's difficult relations with its neighbors.
As to Russia's regional interests, notably, on the status of the Caspian Sea, which is directly related to the possibility of a third military presence there, Turkmenistan's stance is more favorable for Moscow than the attitude adopted by Kazakhstan, which is a CSTO member.
Ashgabat has even supported Russia's interests in the issue of third countries' military bases in Central Asia. After the U.S. base in Khankala, Uzbekistan, was closed, America eyed the military airport Mary-2 in south Turkmenistan, which is situated in direct proximity to Afghanistan and Iran. Niyazov, however, made it clear that the issue could not be decided without consulting Moscow, given its interests in Central Asia.
Yet all the preferences Russia has in Turkmenistan may not be enough. If Russia does not act to promote its interests in the country, it may be ousted by rivals - the U.S., West Europe and China, experts say.
So Moscow should not limit cooperation with Turkmenistan to gas supply, but try to establish long-term relations with the country's new leadership.
