MOSCOW. (Vadim Dubnov, independent commentator, for RIA Novosti) - Ramzan Kadyrov could have become president of Chechnya even without the Kremlin's help.
Unlike many of his regional counterparts, he could have won an election. This may seem as strange as the trust that Moscow has given to his clan for more than six years now. After all, at one time his father declared jihad on Russia.
But in the end, it all makes sense. Chechnya's ideological split has been somewhat exaggerated. Even in the romantic era of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the ex-Soviet general who became the breakaway republic's first president, the idea of independence was not such an obsession for Chechens as it was for the Baltic nations. Despite its dramatic history, Chechnya, like its North Caucasian neighbors, was one of Russia's most conservative regions. They toyed with the idea of independence as long as it was an unpunished act of disobedience, but during the war the majority of Chechens wanted primarily to survive rather than win. Chechen bureaucrats were never seriously divided, either. Officials from President Doku Zavgayev's government (1995-1996) served independent Ichkeria, as the republic called itself, and later on Ramzan Kadyrov's father Ahmad and Ramzan himself with the same zeal.
The choice of Ahmad Kadyrov was an act of desperation because the separatist-warlord-turned-Moscow-loyalist was a symbol of "Chechenization." The Kremlin was trying to find any loyal Chechen leader who could control part of the warring forces. The former Ichkerian mufti remained something of a comical figure in Chechnya. Having placed his bets on the Kremlin and individual field commanders like the Yamadayev brothers, he merely emphasized his weakness and inability to become the leader of all of Chechnya.
If Kadyrov senior could have won over real separatist leaders, this attitude might have changed - the second war of the late 1990s had almost completely lost any signs of ideological confrontation. But the separatists could not side with Ahmad Kadyrov for obvious reasons.
As for his son Ramzan, they all remember him as an ordinary boy who rushed around with papers between his father's headquarters and other Ichkerian offices, and do not bear a grudge against him.
Not only civilians, but also many commanders are sick and tired of the war, which they consider increasingly devoid of sense. Only the fanatics, the most vindictive militants, and former bandits who have nowhere to go are still fighting in the mountains. All others have quickly realized that almost nothing bad will happen to them if they change sides.
During a raid in Grozny two years ago, pro-government militiamen shot a separatist fighter who took shelter in his wife's house. Some time later, the widow married one of the militiamen. Eventually, the vengeful separatists killed both of them. The drama, though one might have thought it was military in nature, was written up in a regular report on family crime. This is how it was perceived by Chechens, and this is representative of Chechenization under Ramzan Kadyrov.
With the myths cast aside, Chechen policy has been reduced to a familiar Russian struggle for power. Ramzan is sooner an anti-hero than a hero for the Chechens, and receives condescending and fastidious smiles in equal proportion. But as distinct from his father, Kadyrov has objectively become the only person capable of leading all of Chechnya in the extremely mediocre local bureaucratic landscape.
In short, even without of the official authority granted him by the Chechen constitution, Kadyrov would have more powers than former rebel leaders Dudayev, Aslan Maskhadov, and Shamil Basayev put together. Chechenization of power in the republic, which has reached a new height with Kadyrov's appointment, has triumphed by bringing long-awaited stability. But stability also carries risks. Although he realizes that the loss of power would be the loss of everything, Kadyrov will not take offense and leave for the mountains - this is not his style.
But the trouble is that for all its might, the Chechen vertical of power does not seem eternal or even long-term. Local officials traditionally resolve routine bureaucratic disagreements by shooting or blowing up their opponents rather than prosecuting them for tax evasion. Blood feuds are common on both sides of the front, and the wave of clan, bureaucratic, and financial grievances is mounting. Tomorrow, Chechenization may arrive at its logical conclusion - an all-out confrontation. References to ideological struggle or intrigues by militants will no longer do the trick. Under the circumstances, it would be naïve to count on a monolithic unity of bureaucrats or militiamen, especially since Ramzan Kadyrov knows he is being watched from all sides.
The Chechen version of consolidating power is merely eroding it. Without Ramzan Kadyrov, or his model of power, Chechnya would present a much more terrible sight than even troubled Dagestan. In that case, Russia would find it much harder to restore constitutional order in this republic than to win the struggle against a mythical striving towards independence.-0-
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
