Experts had long been discussing it, although the moratorium will not achieve much because the provisions of the CFE Treaty have pushed the signatories into a deadlock.
Russia has actually fulfilled the treaty (the deployment of Russian troops in the breakaway Moldovan republic of Transdnestr does not violate the treaty's principles). East European countries have not ratified it, and are unlikely to do so. And lastly, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the expansion of NATO call for new deterrence principles.
However, nobody seems to need them, neither the United States, nor the East European NATO countries, who seem to like the old agreement more.
Old Europe accepts Moscow's view on the need to formalize new European realities, but nobody wants to scrutinize the principles and parameters of new treaties.
The conflict over the possible deployment of an American ABM system in Europe has cast a bright light on a situation described in Putin's speech at the Munich security conference. He said then that for the last 15 years Russia had been meeting the United States halfway on security issues, whereas the U.S. replied by increasing its [military] presence in Europe or regarding Russian moves as an expected unilateral retreat. This created the background for the ABM deployment and the CFE deadlock.
Let us review the sides' ABM complaints and arguments. The U.S. ballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe is allegedly designed to protect the United States from Iranian ballistic missiles. NATO should protect Eastern Europe from intermediate-range missiles, which is why Washington intends to sign a separate agreement with each country where it wants to deploy its ABM systems, an agreement that will not be tied to their NATO obligations.
The Kremlin has admitted that these ABM systems will not directly threaten the Russian strategic deterrence forces, but sees no reason for deploying them in Eastern Europe. According to Russian experts, the United States does not need to deploy new systems to effectively deter the missile threat.
Besides, Russia fears that the modernization of the ABM systems could have negative consequences. Yury Baluyevsky, chief of the Russian General Staff, said the U.S. would be able to integrate the East European zone into the global ABM system after 2013, thus incapacitating Russian nuclear forces.
The recent visit by Pentagon chief Robert Gates to Moscow came after Putin had a telephone conversation with President George W. Bush in late March. The American leader proposed holding consultations and supplying embracing ABM data to Russia. Gates took the matter further by saying that the United States invited Russia to join its defensive projects, including ABM, as a partner, and to share early warning information.
However, Moscow's response to the proposal was skeptical. First, space-based interceptors are boosted by ordinary ballistic missiles, and therefore the silos in Poland, where ABM interceptors will be deployed, can easily house live attack missiles. How can this be prevented if the United States has withdrawn from the 1972 ABM treaty? Should the Kremlin simply trust its word?
Under the old treaties, the Americans may not deploy nuclear missiles in Central, let alone Eastern, Europe. However, the deployment of launchers is not limited by any treaties (other than a bilateral agreement between the United States and Poland). So, who will guarantee that the last stage of the missile is not nuclear-tipped?
According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the early warning radar in the Czech Republic will be combined with the modernized radar in Thule, Greenland, the radar in Britain, and the ABM radar in Alaska. Information from these radars will be integrated in a single command system where Russia will be denied access. Besides, to guarantee target acquisition by the Czech radar, the Pentagon is analyzing the possibility of deploying a forward-based radar in the South Caucasus, which would be able to detect the launching of missiles from the Southern Federal District and the Urals.
The Russian military argue that if 10 launching sites are being established in Poland now without as much as a polite notification, who will guarantee that their number will not grow to 20 or 30 in five years?
Modernization is another argument. By that time, the capability of the East European ABM may be increased through an extension of the missiles' flight time and an increase in the number of the missiles' multiple independently targeted warheads.
So, Moscow believes that the United States is deploying a strategic ABM system in Europe to protect itself from Russia's nuclear missiles under the pretext of the alleged Iranian missile threat, which is not even a reality at present.
The 20 years of Russian-American relations show that in the absence of a ratified agreement we can rely only on vague personal assurances, this time made by two lame ducks. Putin and Bush are leaving their offices, and so the issue will be taken over by a new U.S. administration, which is likely to take a tougher stance in regard of the Kremlin. Therefore, unless the issue is settled definitely by autumn, the divide in Russian-American relations will grow deeper and more apparent.
Alexander Karavayev is an expert at the Center for Post-Soviet Studies.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
