Washington's acceptance or rejection of the offer will mark a major watershed in bilateral relations and the structure of global security.
If the United States rejects the Russian offer for a technical or any other reason, the Kremlin will see this as one more proof that Washington's proposed anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in Eastern Europe will be aimed at Russia.
If it accepts the offer, Moscow will have to either accept the American ABM plans for Europe or revise its Gabala offer. At best, the Gabala radar would then be used as an additional element of the European ABM system and serve as a political symbol of Russian-American friendship on the former Soviet-controlled territory.
One way or another, Washington will not abandon its plans to deploy a nuclear missile shield around the globe, part of which will be close to the Russian border. The important points will be the system's boundaries and the conditions on which Russia will be able to monitor its elements. There are very few chances of convincing Washington not to deploy the systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.
There are two ways to solve the problem which have not been broadly discussed yet.
Russia and the United States could sign a new ABM treaty modeled after the 1972 ABM Treaty between the Soviet Union and the U.S., from which the Bush administration unilaterally withdrew in 2002 after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.
Or they can decide to fully cooperate on missile defense as equal partners.
Russia would be unable to monitor American ABM systems in Eastern Europe or elsewhere in the world without becoming an equal partner. But is such partnership possible?
In March this year, the White House hinted that there was a possibility of cooperation, although observers were unclear about what form such cooperation would take. The Russian Defense Ministry and General Staff said Russia could not join the United States' ABM initiative in Europe, at least not now. Indeed, a Russian-American crew manning a missile facility in Poland sounds incredible by all counts.
Putin, apparently believing that if you can't beat 'em, you should join 'em, put forth the Gabala initiative. He might discuss a joint ABM project with Bush in Kennebunkport as a logical continuation of the Gabala initiative. If Russian military personnel are deployed in Eastern Europe not as observers but as active players, the situation will change radically.
There may be some disagreement about the make-up of the command and operational control levels and about expenses. It will of course be very difficult to sort out such issues for a new military system operated jointly by two countries. The idea could be implemented as a long-term project, which would bring large political benefits to Russia sooner than it would bring military benefits to the U.S.
This would allow Moscow to return to the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics as an equal partner of Washington, surprising Poland and the Czech Republic and shocking anti-Russian Georgia. This would also improve Putin's image in the West, and create a good example of military-strategic cooperation between Russia and the Untied States in the former Soviet Union.
As of now, the Kremlin's statements show that Russia does not believe it can join the American ABM system as an equal partner. Therefore, it can only try to convince Washington to abandon the idea of a global nuclear missile shield, and to embrace instead the idea of mutual control and monitoring. However, Russia's status as an ABM-monitoring observer must be formalized in a top-level international agreement.
Memoranda and gentleman's agreements between presidents or defense departments would not be practical, creating grounds for a repetition of an old situation. As Putin said at the security conference in Munich last February, the West had promised not to expand NATO, but now the bloc is standing on Russia's doorstep.
Without a formal agreement, the situation in the ABM sphere would change daily, and the granting of permits to ABM facilities for Russian specialists would depend on political sentiments and considerations.
In other words, the Gabala initiative is part of a larger problem of future strategic security, which the two sides are now already scrutinizing.
The new treaty should stipulate legal guarantees of unhindered control of the ABM system, as well as the boundaries for its deployment. If attempts to limit American plans for a global ABM network fail, there should at least be procedures for bilateral coordination that would slow down their implementation.
The situation now looks hopeless. It is not as hopeless as the Kosovo problem, but it is the first nuclear deterrence hitch in Russian-American relations since the end of the Cold War. Considering the cooling of bilateral relations burdened by negative rhetoric, the ABM issue is not a short-lived PR trick.
Russia and the United States so far seem unable to find a common language to discuss ABM defense. Debates can go on forever, but the Putin-Bush meeting in Maine should clarify the issue somewhat. This is especially important ahead of the next stage of the September-October talks on the START-2 strategic arms reduction treaty, which expires in 2009.
No matter what turn the developments take, they will provide very many interesting stories for modern history textbooks.
Alexander Karavayev works for the news and analysis center at Moscow State University.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
