On that day, Belarusian leader Stanislav Shushkevich, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, and his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin signed a document stating on behalf of the three republics which signed the treaty on the Soviet Union's formation in 1922 that it "has ceased to exist as a geopolitical reality and a subject of international law."
When they were signing this document at a government dacha in Viskuli, a small village lost in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha, did the three leaders realize that they decided the destiny of the people on one sixth of the world's surface? Russia's first President Boris Yeltsin has died, Speaker of Belarusian parliament Stanislav Shushkevich has retired, and former Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchyuk is no longer in big politics. Their decision is still assessed differently, but it is indisputable that having affixed their signatures to the agreement on the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, they turned over a page in history. RIA Novosti commentators interviewed several participants in the historic meeting.
"We displayed political wisdom."
In 1991, Gennady Burbulis was State Secretary and First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Government.
Question: Mr. Burbulis, how did you feel on the way to Belarus?
Answer: The trip was very urgent. Ukraine had just held a referendum and we had to take action without delay. In effect, Ukraine almost unanimously declared independence and elected a president. Initially, we planned to talk to Kravchyuk, Prime Minister Kebich and other Ukrainian leaders about their future actions. The atmosphere was friendly. I'd like to emphasize once again that the key issue of the meeting was the destiny of the new union treaty in the context of the referendum and presidential elections in Ukraine. But later on, it took a completely different turn.
Q: But did you realize that you were assuming responsibility not for three but for all fifteen union republics?
A: The situation was hectic. The Baltic republics and Georgia were already independent, and we had to do something about the Soviet Union, which was disintegrating before our eyes. It transpired that Leonid Kravchyuk did not even want to hear about any solutions within a renewed Union. He bluntly asked us whether we and Belarus could consider our political and social development without the Ukrainian people. This difficult conversation eventually convinced us that the Soviet Union ceased to exist de facto and that we had to make some decisions to prevent its break up from being chaotic and dangerous for the lives of millions upon millions of people.
We realized the consequences quite clearly and were aware of our supreme responsibility. The three leaders did not shun it; they displayed political wisdom and found a new formula - the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Q: Whose idea was it?
A: The title of CIS was sealed in a fundamental political and legal document, stating that the U.S.S.R. had ceased to exist as a subject of international law. I don't remember who exactly coined it. Kravchyuk was the most confident and decisive among us but I still believe that it had been produced collectively because every phrase and point of the agreement was discussed and weighed many times, and, as a result, we got what we have.
Q: You were together with Boris Yeltsin all the time. Did you hold consultations on Russia's future?
A: We were working on two planes, as it were. Ministers, assistants and consultants were working on drafts together and gave them to us for finalization. I'd like to note that Boris Yeltsin was the most adamant opponent of the Soviet Union's disintegration. He couldn't imagine to the very end that Russia would break its political ties with Ukraine.
I have learned a lesson from this. Everyone considered Yeltsin to be a tough man, prone to categorical decisions. Some thought that this agreement propelled him to power, but this is totally wrong. What upset him the most was that there were no more arguments for being together in an uncontrolled country with colossal nuclear and human resources.
Q: How did you inform key political players about the adopted decision?
A: I think we fulfilled all the necessary formalities. To begin with, Yeltsin called the then Defense Minister Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov and asked him about the army's potential response to the decision. Shaposhnikov reassured Yelstin that the army would support it. It was also important for us to know the potential reaction of the international community. Yeltsin made an official call to [George] Bush; the then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev interpreted the conversation, which was quite clear-cut. Yeltsin mentioned the participants in the meeting that had analyzed all the potential consequences of this step. In reply, Bush said that America was concerned but expressed his understanding of the decision.
We decided that Shushkevich ought to call [Mikhail] Gorbachev since we were on Belarusian territory. Gorbachev did not pay much attention to his explanations; he suggested that all the three leaders come to him for a talk on the following day. Shushkevich said he had to attend a Supreme Soviet session on that day, and Kravchyuk wasn't going to go anywhere. Later on, Gorbachev reproached us for inappropriate conduct. Maybe, psychologically he was right but politically our actions were absolutely balanced.
Q: You stayed in touch with Yeltsin in subsequent years. Did he ever regret what happened at the Belovezhskaya Pushcha meeting?
A: We should bear in mind that during the following week the agreement was ratified by the parliaments of [several] former Soviet republics, that is, backed by the legislative and representative authorities. At the summit in Alma Ata on December 21st, all republics joined the agreement. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev was one of its most ardent supporters. He realized that it was both inevitable and promising. Therefore, Yeltsin had no regrets about the documents adopted on December 8, 1991. He regretted later attempts by some CIS leaders to depart from the fundamental provisions of the agreement, which was reached in the historic 36 hours.
First Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchyuk: "I wouldn't make any changes to the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement."
Q: Now that we are approaching an anniversary of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement, do you have any doubts about it?
A: I've been asked this question for 16 years now. And for 16 years, I've been giving the same reply. I believe that there was no alternative to the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement for many reasons. The first and the main one is that each nation has the right to freedom and independence. This is an axiom of human history. The second equally valid reason is that as a geopolitical entity, the Soviet Union was falling apart, and our task was not to take part in this process or watch it patiently but to channel this disintegration into a civilized direction. All those who attended the Belovezhskaya Pushcha meeting were deeply convinced that a new formation was the best option. We called it the Commonwealth.
Practice has shown that this was the right decision because the majority of CIS countries, which once formed the Soviet Union, are developing independently, although this is an uphill road. I can see, for example, how life in Ukraine is changing. People, especially young and middle-aged, are changing their views. Future belongs to this generation and it is capable of building a democratic Ukraine. In the last decade and a half, the majority of Ukrainians have felt that they are the masters of their country, that they have a real rather than imaginary right to elect a government and to change it if it does not suit them. There is nobody standing above them and nobody can dictate his will to them like it was in Ukraine in the difficult times for many centuries, which, I hope will not come back.
I don't want to answer this question anymore because I find it insulting.
Q: If you had a chance, would you change anything in the agreement?
A: I wouldn't make any changes to the agreement. It was a framework agreement and did not determine in detail the development of any country, their cooperation in domestic and foreign policies, or priorities in relations. All this was done much later. For instance, Ukraine and Russia started developing their relations on the basis of what was called "the Big Treaty" of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1996. It formalized the main lines of economic and political partnership. This shows again that the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreements left ample room for improvement, as many countries were euphoric about the independence they gained. They were building castles in the air. Some people in Russia thought the Soviet Union would be revived under the name of the CIS. It turned out to be very hard to uproot the old mentality, Soviet stereotypes and imperialist ambitions. That is why national ethics receive headlong assessment. Such priorities often prevail over other criteria-of the benefits of particular moves by Commonwealth countries. In this connection, the CIS as a system is not effective today. Not that there was anything wrong with the initial Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement. The problem is that this international organization did not later receive an impetus and line of development that would promote every country's progress and our partnership.
Q: What do you remember the most about the day when the Agreement was signed?
A: I remember our hopes. When Yeltsin, Shushkevich, the three countries' prime ministers, the people who took part in drafting and editing the document, and I came to a news conference after the signing, eager expectation shone in every face. We hoped that life would change for the better, that our nations would have the right to arrange their life according to their own plans. We believed we would treat each other with respect, cherish our past and our ancestors' struggle to defend their land, and work together for the sake of every CIS country and nation. We hoped for a radiant future.
Today, I can say that some of those hopes were thwarted. Be all that as it may, all the countries are making progress. This is what matters most. New people and ideas are born. We are beginning to realize what the market is about and what democracy is like. Many people see now that there is no development outside democracy. All countries that embark on the undemocratic road are doomed to collapse sooner or later.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
