ESTONIA
Quoting examples from history and recent events, a number of publications conclude that genuinely free elections in Russia could have had serious negative consequences for the world community. "Democratic elections in Weimar Germany and in lesser democracies often led to terrible results. Recent examples are Venezuela and Palestine, which have given power to terrorists. As for Russia, it would be logical to ask what is better - free elections or a mild Putin-Medvedev dictatorship?... It was unlikely that Russia would have received a better president in free elections. At best, the result would have been the same, and at worst, we would have seen history repeat itself. This is why it is better for Estonia that Putin has not repeated Hinderburg's mistakes and did not risk the same defeat in free elections." (Postimees, March 5).
Most politicians and experts do not expect any changes in bilateral relations, but think that they could be possible in the future. "This [Medvedev's election as president] is still an opportunity to turn a page in Russian-Estonian relations... However, it would be wishful thinking to hope for a major change because Russia... is neither a democracy, nor a legal state." (Aripaev, March 5).
"Russia is such a large country that any changes that take place there happen very slowly. Therefore, there will be no special changes in Russian-Estonian relations in the near future. But the fact is that the big neighbor's presidential chair will be occupied by another man, and he may decide to get rid of his status of Putin's puppet and start acting as he sees fit. This may mean changes in Russia's attitude to its neighbors." (Pohjarannik, March 5)
LATVIA
The media believe that it is vital for Latvia to cooperate with Russia, but it is essential to determine the spheres and boundaries of such cooperation. "Latvia is not at the top of Russia's list of priorities. For Latvia Russia is possibly a priority, but we do not mean much to Russia... It is clear that politically we are primarily a NATO and EU member... Russian investment in Latvia is permissible in spheres with a broad range of interests - in this way it will be balanced out." (Dienas Bizness, March 5).
The press is closely following another gas battle between Russia and Ukraine. Experts explain it by the attempts of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to establish control over all gas transactions in the country. "The Orange princess and the Orange prince have fallen out [over gas]... The problem is that Presidents Yushchenko and Putin have come to terms... but Tymoshenko... has decided to change everything her way... Gas routes do not matter as much as the money involved in them." (Telegraf, March 5).
"The current conflict is politically motivated and reflects the struggle for power between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. She controls Naftogaz and wants it to be in charge of all gas supplies to Ukraine." (Biznes&Baltiya, March 6).
LITHUANIA
Some experts believe that Moscow's actions in the gas conflict reflect the Kremlin's intention to demonstrate that Dmitry Medvedev will continue Putin's strong line and attempts to set the Ukrainian president and prime minister at odds with each other. "A closer look at the situation shows that ... this time Russia was simultaneously pursuing several economic and political objectives. For a complete success, it had to use the threat of gas supply restrictions. Squabbling over the intermediaries, Moscow is clearly trying to drive a wedge between Tymoshenko and President Yushchenko." (Lietuvos Rytas, March 8).
Some publications note that Lithuania is in an even worse situation than Ukraine because it is not a transit state and has no serious levers of pressure on Moscow. "Lithuania possibly considers itself a mature democracy and would not like to resemble Ukraine, a country that also depends on Russia for energy. However, Lithuania is not a transit state and it cannot demand, for instance, that the intermediaries be ousted from gas transactions. On the other hand, there are no serious forces here that would wish and be able to change the pattern of payments for Russian gas." (Verslo Zinios, March 7).
BELARUS
Experts unanimously associate a two-day gas war between Russia and Ukraine with the Russian president elect. "We know very well what Gazprom's potential threats in the hands of a Russian president mean - all our citizens are still suffering from their use a year ago... Apparently, the Kremlin is now regarding this gas leverage as a major symbol of presidential power on a par with traditional ones... It is no accident that we learned everything about this political argument on March 3 - on the very day and hour when the Russian Central Election Commission announced that Gazprom head Dmitry Medvedev won the presidential election by a landslide with over 70% of the vote." (Telegraf, March 5).
Experts are emphasizing that recognition by Moscow of the independent status of self-proclaimed Abkhazia and South Ossetia is bound to destabilize the situation both in Russia and the rest of the CIS. "Do the Russian leaders understand what a dangerous genie they are letting out of the bottle by starting the process of recognizing post-Soviet autonomies in adjacent countries? It would be very wrong to think that separatism in Russia is limited to 'pacified' Chechnya... Moreover, Moscow is urging other CIS countries to support its policy of encouraging separatist attitudes against which it so vehemently protested in the case of Kosovo." (Telegraf, March 10).
UKRAINE
Ukrainian leaders are interpreting the end of the gas war as their victory. However, most analysts do not consider it a major achievement and point to the high risk of the conflict flaring up again. "The agreements reached by Gazprom and Naftogaz are designed to alleviate the current tensions, but do not resolve the problem as a whole. Apparently, Russia will replace its stick with a carrot. Psychologically, the victory is on the Ukrainian side, which is unprecedented - for the first time in 16 years a government has managed to resist the gas monopoly's pressure, but winning a battle is not winning a war." (Glavred, March 7).
The media believe that Medvedev, who failed to prevent the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, has his own grievances against Kiev and may even prove to be a tougher politician than Putin. "During the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine, Medvedev was a supervisor from the Kremlin. He may have a complex associated with Russia's defeat in this campaign. Therefore, it would be logical to expect a tougher line from Medvedev; an attempt to take revenge and cut Ukraine down to size... We are familiar with Putin's aggressive attitudes, but Medvedev... is even tougher and more pragmatic. To all intents and purposes, the best scenario for Ukraine will be a drawn out struggle for power between Putin and Medvedev. It will divert their attention from Ukraine for awhile, and we will get a small break." (Den, March 7).
MOLDOVA
Analysts are positive about the prospects for Russia's relations with the West. "Moscow would like better relations with the West and will do all it can to achieve this... It has to improve its image in the world arena... Russia and the West need each other, and a new Cold War will not happen for this reason." (Moldova Suverana, March 5).
National publications maintain that Russia is not going to recognize the independence of self-proclaimed republics and will accept the plan keeping Transdnestr in Moldova. The advocates of Tiraspol's independence are pinning their hopes on the Kosovo precedent that allows them to demand sovereignty. "The rumors about the State Duma's intention to recognize Transdnestr, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are without any foundation because there are signals to the contrary... The Russian government has firmly guaranteed that its troops, peace-keepers included, will be withdrawn from Moldovan territory immediately after the conclusion of a corresponding package of agreements." (Moldova Suverana, March 7).
"Having proclaimed sovereignty, Georgia has ignored the right of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian people to decide their own destinies. The same is true of Moldova which trampled the rights of Transdnestr... If Moscow displays the same zeal in upholding the legality of post-Soviet autonomies in the UN and other bodies as it showed in defending Serbia's territorial integrity, it will be possible to recognize the independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdnestr even without quoting the Kosovo precedent or resorting to unilateral actions." (OLVIA-PRESS, March 6).
ARMENIA
Some media are describing the actions of the opposition after the presidential election as attempts to carry out a velvet revolution in Armenia and tear it away from Russia. "A bunch of revenge-seeking adventurists started foul play and are trying to exploit social discontent." (Novoye Vremya, March 6).
Some publications are urging the authorities to follow Moscow's example and be tougher in suppressing the opposition. "Although [in Russia] revolutionary attitudes appeared to be rather weak, the state decided to crack down on them, using all the powers of law... Radical discontent with the election results was suppressed everywhere. Even in such a great country as Russia, President Vladimir Putin deemed it necessary to use Spetsnaz Special Forces in order to curb the unauthorized activities of a small group of 'revolutionaries.'" (Novoye vremya, March 5).
"Our authorities... are too passive... Official Yerevan... limits itself to meetings with representatives of international agencies... but this is not enough." (Iravunq, March 5).
GEORGIA
In response to Moscow's decision to discontinue economic sanctions against Abkhazia, the opposition leaders have called on Tbilisi to toughen policy toward Russia, in particular, to cancel its consent on Russia's WTO entry, and withdraw from the CIS. "Georgia must leave the CIS, and start conducting a consistent foreign and domestic policy." (24 Saati, March 8).
"Georgia must stop talks with Russia on WTO entry, reconsider the privatization of entities by Russian private and public companies, and start the renationalization of its strategic facilities. The Russian market is shut to Georgian companies, and it is not clear why our territory is open to Russian firms, which are successfully doing business in Abkhazia." (Gruzia Online, March 10).
The authorities have reacted to criticism by the opposition with an appeal to unite in the face of a common enemy. "It does not matter whether we like each other or not. We are children of the same country and we have common enemies." (Akhali Taoba, March 10).
Experts have expected these developments, and believe that they may have positive consequences for Georgia. "What happened was expected, and it was clear that Russia would take revenge for Kosovo. Russia hinted that Abkhazia may also want independence, but Russia has untied Georgia's hands, and our stay in the CIS is becoming increasingly questionable." (Alia, March 8).
AZERBAIJAN
Some analysts are linking the aggravation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh with Russia's provocative actions aimed at demonstrating the unreliability of hydrocarbon supplies to Europe via the South Caucasus, and undermining Western influence in Azerbaijan.
"Moscow is vitally interested in discrediting our region as a dependable source of gas and a transit country. Now that strategic decisions are being made on Nabucco and supplies of Central Asian gas, Moscow would be very happy if the Europeans looked at this project through the lens of the Karabakh conflict. Being well-connected with Armenian law-enforcement bodies, Moscow might have deliberately staged this provocation... It seems that Moscow has achieved its main goal - to scare the European gas consumers." (Day.Az, March 6).
"Russia is very displeased with Azerbaijan's NATO integration. Its plan is as follows - Azerbaijan attacks Armenia, and Armenia reciprocates by crushing Azerbaijan... Some publications in the Azerbaijani press are urging the authorities to use the situation in Armenia and embark on armed actions. Russian security-related services are standing behind all this." (Azadliq, March 7)
KAZAKHSTAN
Experts believe that Kazakhstan should proceed pragmatically in assessing the project of the Odessa-Brody-Plotsk oil pipeline, which is being lobbied by Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. Kazakhstan should not risk spoiling relations with Russia and China, and should not interfere in the Russian-Ukrainian energy conflict. "We are ready to consider this project, but without encroaching on the interests of Russia and China, our strategic partners. Difficulties between Russia and Ukraine in the energy sphere are a subject of many debates, but Kazakhstan wants to stay away from this. Our approach is more pragmatic - the economy is overriding everything." (Liter.kz, March 7).
UZBEKISTAN
The press is commenting on Tashkent's decision to allow NATO to use its military bases again. Experts believe that Uzbekistan wants to improve its relations with the West after a post-Andijan chill and get rid of its dependence on Russia. "NATO is again mounting the same lame horse, which has let it down more than once. How long will it be able to ride? Until a new massacre?... Tashkent's decision is easy to explain - Uzbekistan is in a desperate position. After the Andijan massacre it has enslaving relations with Russia and is facing the resumption of EU sanctions for Andijan to be revised in April. Uzbekistan needs friends in the West." (Uznews.net, March 6).
Commentators are worried about the deplorable consequences of Tashkent's decision to discontinue gas supplies to Russia for a month and a half. "In early 2008, an unusually cold winter compelled Uzbekistan to stop supplying Russia with gas in violation of its agreements with Gazprom. This information was confirmed anonymously by a Gazprom official. He said that in response, the Russian gas monopoly stopped making advance payments to Tashkent. The Uzbek economy is very short of hard currency and may slide into a crisis. The country will have no money..." (Uznews.net, March 3).
TAJIKISTAN
To resolve the numerous problems of guest workers, some experts are urging Dushanbe to threaten Moscow with the termination of military cooperation. "Tajikistan must be much tougher in upholding its interests. It could warn [Moscow]... that it may withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and demand the immediate withdrawal of Russian military bases from its territory to be replaced with foreign bases. This is probably the only threat that may have any serious influence on the Russian government." (Asia-plus, February 28).
Some journalists maintain that Tajikistan has huge reserves of uranium, from 15% to 40% of the world's resources. They believe that this why the United States, Russia and China have recently become interested in Tajikistan, but the republic is unable to use its strategic advantages. "Despite all the prerequisites, there is no chance of establishing a nuclear industry in Tajikistan, even in the long-term. A paradoxical situation is repeating itself - possessing huge water resources, the residents of the country are short of drinking water. Having a scientific potential, industrial infrastructure, and proven uranium resources, Tajikistan is not using these benefits, but rather idly watching other countries implement their strategic interests." (Djumhuriyat, February 28).
RIA Novosti is not responsible for the content of outside sources.
