MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Dmitry Kosyrev)
Those who love Robert Ludlum's spy and political thrillers "The Bourne Identity," "The Scarlatti Inheritance," "The Matareze Countdown" will understand the origin of this title... In the quite real diplomatic context of our days, some expect the new Russian president to renounce Vladimir Putin's foreign policy, whereas others are hoping he will maintain it. What will Medvedev do?
He is taking an inventory of his foreign policy inheritance both in Russia and globally.
Speaking at a regular meeting of Russian ambassadors and permanent envoys at global organizations in the Russian Foreign Ministry at Smolenskaya Square, Medvedev used the expression "to take an inventory."
True, he applied it to a narrow issue, the current relationship between Russia and the West, relative to national security. Medvedev said "security cannot rest on a word of honor." He added "to begin with, it is worth taking an inventory of our inheritance, including the Helsinki Final Act, and the major documents of Russia-NATO interaction." The president suggested asking why the security principles sealed in these documents are no longer applied. We should resume their implementation or find new principles, he concluded.
Is this Medvedev's new foreign policy? For an ocean super-tanker to make a U-turn, it has to cover a radius of several miles because of inertia. The same is true of a major global power's foreign policy. At this point there is no indication that the new president wants to make a sharp turn, however a new approach may be required by a changing world.
Let's look at one impressive document. Medvedev endorsed his new concept in Russian foreign policy on July 12, but the Russian media first commented on it after he mentioned it at the ambassadors' meeting in the Foreign Ministry. Those who understand what it takes to draft such documents understand that the concept was initiated under President Putin. Putin also inherited his predecessor's foreign policy in much the same way (it was approved on June 28, 2000).
It is very interesting to compare the texts of these two documents. The former concept reflected the realities of the late 1990s when Boris Yeltsin was trying to save Yugoslavia from bombing. He complained: "We are banging our fists on the table but nobody is listening." The main motive of the old foreign policy concept was extreme modesty, if not isolationism. We were not trying to interfere in international problems but did become involved only when our interests were at stake and when we had a chance to succeed.
The current concept is built on a different foundation. Here's a quote from a key, introductory part: "The evolution of international relations in the early 21st century, and Russia's consolidation have compelled us to review the conditions around us, and revise the priorities of Russian foreign policy with respect to the country's enhanced role in international affairs, and... the resulting opportunity of participating not only in the implementation of the world's agenda but also in its formulation." Herein lays the key difference between the two concepts and the two eras.
Documents of this kind are long and declarative. They are not designed for the general public but for the political class's orientation. Nevertheless, the current concept deserves to be understood beyond the realm of politics. Let's take "network diplomacy" which replaces "bloc diplomacy." The idea is absolutely correct. Permanent, internally disciplined "camps" are no longer working; countries are setting up groups to resolve specific issues - on Iran, North Korea, or the Middle East. We are living in a new world, and are still learning how complex it can be.
Consider the new rules of global competition. Today, there is competition of different models of development, and with different values. This is a wise observation, giving Russian foreign policy a host of new opportunities.
In general, this is a very far-reaching and serious document, although it has the same tedious enumeration of countries and regions, with which Russia intends to develop relations - as is traditional. But we should learn to see the main point. The old concept covered a very limited range of challenges, whereas the new one spotlights the current task of forming a new world order. By the Constitution, Medvedev is responsible for this task. He must determine the direction of Russia's foreign policy.
Speaking at the meeting, the president recalled his first foreign policy move in Europe's direction. During his recent visit to Germany, he suggested a kind of Helsinki-2, a new version of the 1975 Helsinki accords which established the foundations of European security for almost a quarter century. Now in Germany, Medvedev proposed a new binding treaty on European security, in which all European nations would take part "not as countries aligned into blocs and associations but as states, sovereign entities." In short, he proposed starting from tabula rasa.
The president mentioned at the meeting that the first reaction to his initiative was "at least neutral" and "instills one with hope in some respects" because Moscow is not the only one taking inventory of the world situation. Now that a new president has assumed power in Russia, it is worth searching for new solutions.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
