Yet half a year before the end of his term he has sent Assistant Secretary of State William J. Burns to Switzerland to meet an Iranian envoy. Burns has already left for Geneva, where the Iranian Six (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany plus Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy) will meet Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief negotiator, on July 19.
This is not the first time American ambassadors have sat at the same negotiating table with their Iranian counterparts (they have done so at previous meetings with the Six), but this time Washington will be represented by a much higher-level delegate.
There is only one item on the agenda. In Geneva, Jalili is supposed to give a detailed reply to the Six's latest, compromise proposals on the Iranian nuclear program.
Meanwhile, the White House seems determined to open an American diplomatic "interests section" at the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. This would be a small but significant step towards restoring diplomatic relations. The United States cut diplomatic ties with Iran after its embassy in Tehran was demolished in 1979 and 52 diplomats kept hostage till 1981.
Washington has already warned that it is not going to make an about face in its policy towards Iran. Nevertheless, Burns is the third highest official in the State Department (by the way, he was U.S. ambassador in Moscow until last May). He wouldn't have been sent to Geneva without a serious reason.
The Six have asked Tehran to stop its "nuclear games". Under the May proposals, dubbed a "freeze-for-freeze" plan, Tehran is asked to stop uranium enrichment in exchange for fuel supplies for its nuclear power plants, technological assistance in the development of the civilian nuclear industry, economic aid, and investment. In turn, the world community will freeze further sanctions against Tehran. Once this is done, the sides would start specific talks.
Tehran has long demanded direct talks with Washington instead of talking to those it calls "American surrogates" - London, Paris, and Bonn. This is regrettable, and not entirely fair, for the three capitals have long been trying to persuade Bush to do exactly this. Europe has wearied of Washington's ostentatiously stubborn attitude to Iran, particularly against the background of skyrocketing oil prices and Israel's growing nervousness. Israel has said more than once that it is not going to wait until Iran brings its centrifuges to the weapon-grade stage, and is prepared to bomb Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak (Iran's main "nuclear factories") to prevent it from doing so.
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown flew to Washington to try to change Bush's mind early this year, but to no avail. Later, France's President Nicolas Sarkozy had a go, but also failed. Finally, Syrian President Hafez Assad accepted Sarkozy's proposal to act as a mediator in normalizing relations between the European Union (EU) and Iran. U.S. presidential Democratic nominee Barack Obama also backed the idea of direct talks with Iran. Bush was facing pressure from all sides.
Washington is widely expected to make only a symbolic step backwards. This is the last chance for Bush to leave some positive memory of his presidency. The administration may be hoping for another display of Persian stubbornness to justify its own position, but such a hope would be unfounded. Despite its special place in the oil club Iran is not in a comfortable economic situation, and new sanctions would hit it hard.
It was not easy to persuade Bush to change his attitude to Iran, not to mention open a US interests section in Tehran, which he calls the center of the "world's axis of evil." The state department has been telling Bush for almost two years that it was time to talk with Iran, because war is not an option. But any attempts to do so were resisted by Vice President Dick Cheney or Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
How will Tehran reply to the proposals? If it rejects them, Washington will be able to play a lot of other cards. It could freeze all transactions with Iranian banks or on their behalf, ban any investment in the Iranian economy, and block the insurance of Iranian ships or vessels carrying Iranian cargoes by all insurance companies of the world. The last measure would be the most painful. No vessel can enter any port without being insured.
The decision to open a U.S. interests section in Tehran is only of symbolic sensation. It is based on strictly pragmatic interests, and is something the state department has been urging Bush to do for a long time. Burns openly declared the intention at congressional hearings a week ago, but his statement went largely unnoticed. The section will be similar to the one Washington operates in Havana. The United States has not had diplomatic ties with Cuba since 1961, but opened a diplomatic office for contacts with it in 1977, also at the Swiss Embassy. Such offices function as limited embassies, but are officially included into the diplomatic mission which hosts them. In this case, this will be the Swiss Embassy.
Needless to say, the United States will be acting independently of Switzerland. The State Department, as well as the CIA and other intelligence services, have long complained that without an official presence in Tehran they have to settle for information provided by allies, mostly Britain, but they do not believe that the British are telling them all they know. A similar Iranian Interests Section has been operating in the Pakistani Embassy in Washington for several years.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
