It depends on whether their long-term interests coincide in not only settling the post-war situation around Georgia, but also in the Caucasus in general. Why do Europe and Russia need the Caucasus? If these interests diverge, the agreements reached at the Meindorf residence near Moscow will be short-lived.
Dmitry Medvedev and Nicholas Sarkozy decided to supplement their initial plan with additional measures. The EU agreed to guarantee non-use of force (something Russia had demanded, primarily to prevent Georgia from attacking Abkhazia, or repeating its assault on South Ossetia, particularly with massive loss of civilian life, as it did on August 8). Importantly, Russia insisted on a binding document, for the violation of which Georgia will be punished. There is no precise information from Meindorf on this score. European observers cannot guarantee anything. But will Europe be able to guarantee anything if the United States continues re-equipping Georgia?
Furthermore, 10 days after the international observers deploy their missions Russia will withdraw its troops (5,000 in France's estimate) from Georgia proper -- the territories adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This EU requirement concerned Russia's military presence in the two "buffer zones" it had set up along the borders of Georgia's former autonomies. This was the grey area of the initial, six-point Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. Referring to the previous international documents, Russia insisted on its right to stay there, whereas the plan had no clear-cut provisions on this issue. Now Sarkozy has guaranteed that the observers will appear by October 1, while Medvedev has promised to pull out the troops in this case.
Finally, the sides agreed that international consultations on Abkhazia and South Ossetia will start in Geneva on October 15. Medvedev emphasized that Russia will not reverse its position on the recognition of the republics' independence, while Sarkozy replied that "there is something to discuss."
This problem is not so simple. Conferences merely reveal positions, and do not always take binding decisions. However, in Geneva the sides are going to discuss, among other things, the security of the residents of the two republics, including technical issues, such as buffer zones free of Georgian troops around them.
Who should attend the conference - will delegates from the United States come? Should South Ossetia and Abkhazia be represented there? There are many interesting subtleties.
Who stands to gain from all this, not counting Sarkozy and Medvedev who have helped improve each other's reputation? In fact, they were giving real presents to each other. Sarkozy is now seen as an international diplomat and peacemaker. Medvedev has received evidence that Russia is not isolated, that it has partners who can help it get out of an unclear situation with some benefits.
What is Europe seeking in the Caucasus? Why did it send to Russia a delegation which apart from Sarkozy included EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso? Several interesting opinions were expressed on this subject in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, where foreign experts on Russia have met for an annual conference, Valdai-2008.
Stefan Wagstyl from the Financial Times recalled that the EU has realized the need to suspend its further expansion. Neither Ukraine, nor Georgia is part of this process, and the EU should sign separate agreements on cooperation with both of them. To do this, they have to have a clear status, and should not be under any threat. This task requires that Moscow, Kiev, and Tbilisi observe certain rules.
Nikolai Zlovin from the American World Security Institute, who is known in Russia as a columnist in two reputable newspapers, recalled that Sarkozy, acting on behalf of the Old Europe, wants to seize the initiative from Eastern Europe, which nominally includes Georgia. In other words "Old Europe" wants to take the initiative from the United States, which supports Eastern Europe. The latter has already done too much harm to the rest of Europe, and should be deprived of any opportunity to continue doing this. Zlobin did not say this, but it is clear that U.S.-backed Georgia, which undertook a punitive action against peaceful civilians is a big problem for Europe, and should be got rid of.
If Moscow allows France, which holds the EU presidency, to take the EU out of this deadlock, it will mean that Russia is a serious and long-term partner.
So, what does Moscow want in the Caucasus? This is an intricate issue. Apparently, it is time to build a new, active and realistic policy there. It is pointless to claim a monopoly of the right to settle regional problems. Now that the EU will guarantee non-use of force, let Saakashvili or the United States try to stage a provocation against it.
Moscow is interested in economic cooperation with all Caucasian countries, and it is ready to compete with Europe and America, just like in any other part of the world. Moscow does not want to see regimes in the Caucasus (or anywhere else) engaged in permanent armed provocations against Russia. This is what Medvedev insisted on during his meeting with Sarkozy.
To sum up, the tactical and strategic coincidence of interests is obvious. Now it remains to use these common interests to mould a new multilateral pan-European policy in the Caucasus.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
