MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Maxim Krans) - The participants in the events that took place on October 3-4, 1993 have contrary opinions about them. Witnesses and historians are not unanimous, either.
This is only natural because too little time has elapsed since then. Surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of people have deleted these events from their memory altogether.
The authors of the study published by the Levada Public Opinion Research Center on Thursday believe that "most people have only a vague idea of what happened in October 1993." Sixty percent of those polled could not say anything on the gist of the matter. This forgetfulness is probably a defensive reaction of the human brain, which deletes horrible or shameful memories. The Black October was both horrible and shameful but I still believe that we should remember it because it will help us understand better many things about modern Russia.
The Black October saw tough confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the Soviet of People's Deputies (parliament), an attempt to impeach the president, Decree #1400 on Stage-by-Stage Constitutional Reform, which dissolved the rebellious parliament, its abrogation by the Constitutional Court, and violence in Moscow streets staged by Viktor Anpilov and Alexander Barkashov's supporters (do many people remember these names now?). Later, there was a failed assault of the Ostankino TV Center, the White House's black smoldering windows, and the corpses of people shot at the Krasnaya Presnya stadium...
On the whole, 1993 was a year of serious upheavals and a great political turn. It saw the destruction of the infant parliamentary system, and the emergence of the presidential vertical of power, which Yeltsin strengthened with every passing year and which his successor Vladimir Putin finally consolidated.
However, as distinct from August 1991, the events of October 1993 boiled down to a top-level struggle for power and the remaining state property rather than a revolution, despite their tragic character and heavy loss of life. Summing up the results of this crisis-ridden year, Yury Levada was one of the first to write about this. He noted the decisive change in public mentality, notably, the appearance of mass political apathy as a defensive mechanism. This apathy protected a considerable part of the population from the political tensions at the top, made it possible to avoid a civil war, and contributed to the nation's social and even physical survival during such upheavals.
This apathy was a result of disillusionment. During the years of perestroika euphoria and the first democratic and market reforms, many people believed that they would produce visible results in a year or two. Sociological polls showed that 80% of Russians believed that the reforms would change everything for the better. This is why in 1993 the overwhelming majority of people were still inclined to tolerate the hard life in the hope of a better future. After the Black October, these romantic hopes went up in smoke.
There was also disappointment in "democratic" leaders, doubts in their infallibility, and a crisis of trust. A typical product of the authoritarian era, Yeltsin never fully got rid of the mentality of a regional party committee leader. He turned into an anti-communist but did not become a true democrat. The same is true of his chief supporter-rivals - brave general Alexander Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov, a professor at the Plekhanov Institute of National Economy. This is why their decisions were so glaringly inconsistent. Going from one extreme to another, they could not care less about the ordinary people.
In a book written in the early 1990s, prominent French political scientist Guy Sorman noted: "The liberal revolution... can be carried out only by true liberals, not chatterboxes who are only capable of setting up Potemkin's decorations with the words 'Market Economy' inscribed on them."
There were no Russian leaders who would sincerely and consistently uphold their ideals. Yegor Gaidar and his team were removed from the government and people like Viktor Chernomyrdin were charged with implementing the reforms.
The Constitution, which was supposed to perpetuate democratic reforms, merely consolidated Tsar Boris's power, while the rights and freedoms it granted proved to be no more than a front. This is why to preserve power later Yeltsin needed a "small victorious war" in Chechnya, a Xerox box full of dollars, and the Seven Bankers holding sway.
The majority of Russians never enjoyed genuine freedom or democracy, which remained merely sweet words.
Starting from October 1993, the perestroika-revived political activity of citizens went into a sharp decline. In the estimate of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), 60% of Russians are completely disinterested in politics; the share among the young people is even bigger, 68%.
Our compatriots explained this lack of interest during a poll organized by the Levada Center together with the EU-Russia Center. Ninety four percent of them said that what is happening in Russia does not depend on them in any way, or depends on them to a very small extent.
As before, in centuries-long slavishness, people are silent. Ruling them is easy and comfortable, but can the loyalty of this "silent majority" be trusted?
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
