MOSCOW. (Alexander Khramchikhin, head of the analytical department of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, for RIA Novosti) - As of today, Russia has a much weaker negotiating position on cuts in strategic nuclear weapons than the United States.
Russia's strategic forces are rapidly decreasing because the delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, submarine missile cruisers and strategic bombers) with an expired service life are being retired at a rate which exceeds the construction of new delivery vehicles by several times.
Worse, the majority of retired ICBMs (RS-18 and RS-20), and all SLBMs are MIRVed (multiple warhead vehicles), whereas all new ICBMs (Topol-M) have only single warhead capacity. By virtue of this, the total number of Russia's warheads is being reduced at an even faster rate than that of its delivery vehicles. Considering the number of warheads and vehicles stored in munitions depots, the United States has already doubled its superiority over Russia, and this gap continuous to increase. Russia continues building ICBMs, while the United States is not building any strategic delivery vehicles, but paradoxically, the U.S. advantage is growing at an accelerated rate.
Adoption of the RS-24 multiple-warhead missile will not give Russia any substantial advantage. Nor will the submarine-launched Bulava ballistic missile with its poor test record.
The U.S.' absolute advantage in high accuracy weapons (particularly submarine-launched cruise missiles) is making Russia's inferiority disastrous. Under the circumstances, Washington could afford not to agree to any negotiations and wait until "things straighten out by themselves." Apparently, Washington is initiating the negotiating process because President Barack Obama wants to assert a peacemaking image (as distinct from the bellicose George W. Bush), and because the United States wants to put the disarmament process under control and make it legally binding. An absolute superiority in precision conventional weapons allows the United States to safely sacrifice a considerable part of its strategic nuclear force.
The development of a nuclear missile defense system by the United States is an additional factor in the negotiating process. It does not take a rocket scientist to see a direct link between offensive (strategic nuclear forces) and defensive (missile defense) strategic armaments. Moscow is correct in linking the two, but its weak bargaining position prevents it from gaining much.
However, Moscow's irrational fixation on missile defense in Eastern Europe is perplexing. Based on its tactical and technical features, this system (which will appear no sooner than five years, if at all) does not present a serious threat even for Russia's weakened nuclear force. The United States has a far more sophisticated and dangerous Aegis-equipped missile defense system on its cruisers and destroyers, but for some reason Moscow has not voiced any concern about that.
The Bush administration had the same fixation on missile defense in Eastern Europe. As distinct from its predecessor, the Obama administration must realize that this system is useless militarily, extravagant (especially during the economic crisis), and politically volatile. Therefore, America can afford to give it up, presenting this as a major concession to Russia in exchange for help with Iran, or the issue of retrievable potential (the ability to mobilize stored warheads).
The problems of missile defense and retrievable potential are bound to complicate the signing of a new treaty on strategic nuclear forces. It is quite probable that it will not be concluded until December. START-1 expires in December, but this fact should not lead one to expect dramatic changes. Such apprehensions are unfounded. In fact, they are so irrational that it is even difficult to object to them.
Obviously, neither the United States nor Russia will start a no-holds-barred arms race the minute START-1 expires because neither has the ability or the desire to do so. As Washington's attitude to the ABM Treaty has shown, where there is a will there is a way, and even the operating agreements become of no consequence. To sum up, the expiration of START-1 and the lack of any new treaty to replace it will have no bearing on global security.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
