YAKUTSK. (Pavel Andreyev, RIA Novosti political commentator) – Security issues dominated the second day of discussions at the 6th summit of the Valdai Discussion Club in Yakutsk. Sessions held on the topics of a nuclear reset and Euro-Atlantic security architecture illustrated the significance of the impasse on both tracks and the need to continue the debate.
The problem with the strategic arms reduction treaty, which Russia and the U.S. are negotiating before the expiration of the START treaty in December, is that it doesn’t fulfil the proclaimed objective.
First, it appears to be a false assumption that nuclear arms would have disappeared once the Cold War was gone. On the contrary, in the chaotic, fragmented, unsettled system of international relations, where new uncontrolled threats arise even from non-state entities, the role of the deterrent is hard to underrate.
Second, there is every reason to believe that a significant reduction – let alone abolition – of the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals would not serve as a positive example for other countries or groups of people to follow suit or abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The idea of a non-nuclear world with today’s unstable security conditions is a non-starter. On the one hand, the lack of trust in the U.S. within the Russian elite undermines the idea that Washington is ready to abandon its nuclear weapons. On the other hand, had Russia and the U.S. written off their nuclear warheads, this could potentially have provided additional impetus for the more threatening elements in the international community to further develop their own nuclear capabilities relative to both countries.
For Russia additional stimulus to avoid a serious decrease in its nuclear capability is the long overdue military reform, which would cut back on conventional forces, thus increasing the role of the nuclear deterrent.
So why is there an aspiration in Moscow and in Washington to sign the START extension?
The process of “resetting” the relations between Russia and the U.S. comes at a very important time for Washington. In the short term cooperation with Russian can really ease American efforts in Afghanistan and Iran. For Russia the interests are more long term – including U.S. competition in former Soviet republics, security threats arising from Russia’s exclusion from a European security system, etc.
However, it seems like these long-term Russian interests are indeed the real obstacles to a true thaw in relations between Moscow and Washington. And these won’t be solved by the START treaty.
So the reason for a START extension is that there is in fact no other realistic interaction or mechanism between Moscow and Washington besides the nuclear arms treaty. And so it is filling the vacuum in the process to “reset.”
In fact there won’t be any dramatic reduction. The parameters outlined in the declaration signed by the Presidents of both Russia and the U.S. in July in Moscow hint at a rather superficial reduction in nuclear potential. It will be easy to sign, keep up the impression of a “reset” and will not destabilize the status quo.
A way to address Russia’s fundamental security concerns is to reconsider the principles of the Euro-Atlantic security arrangement. Russia’s exclusion from this has been a source of the tensions between Russia and the West and a hot point in the Valdai discussions this year.
For centuries Russia had been a part of the pan-European security system. Yet all the post-Cold War efforts to preserve its place “within” it have failed.
The problem however might not be the architecture itself, but rather the failure of the participants to comply with the rules of the existing institutions. These failures have lead to wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus and to continuing tensions around plans to deploy the Ballistic-Missile Defense system and the potential Russian response to it.
Europe is concerned with these issues, but lacking a coherent, long-term global security strategy, it leaves it up to the U.S. and Russia to be the principal pillars in the Euro-Atlantic security structure. This shows that the actions of the U.S. and Russia – together – continue to mean a lot to Europe and beyond.
The debate about the shape of the future Euro-Atlantic security system is based on the conflict between conservatism and revisionism. The West sees Russia looking to upset the comfortable system it now finds itself in. Russia criticizes the West for revisionist attitudes, notably for breaking its promises not to expand NATO, its attempts to deploy NATO troops in the new member states, its plans to establish a missile defense system in Europe, and for wars in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan.
There is hardly a solution for this so far. Russia has yet to present its concrete proposal on a European security treaty and wave away the concerns of the West if it pursues a purely anti-NATO agenda. And the question remains as to the nature of a treaty. Is it an agreement of equal states guaranteeing mutual security or one of equal poles drawing up lines for spheres of influence?
Yet rationalism, not grand designs appear to be the key principle in the construction of the new arrangement or the modification of the existing one. Simple, practical steps like cooperation on a joint missile defense system may well serve the purpose of a step-by-step inclusion of Russia back into a joint security arrangement.
