Bronislaw Komorowski, a moderate conservative, has won the presidential elections in Poland with a narrow margin that points to a deep economic, social and ideological divide in Polish society.
Russia is a particularly sore point in that divide because Poles associate most of their myths, wounds, fears and also warm feelings with it.
This year's presidential elections in Poland have been the most dramatic since "real socialism" collapsed there in 1989. After midnight on July 5, Komorowski agreed to uncork a half-bottle of champagne, keeping the magnum until morning because Jaroslaw Kaczynski unexpectedly surged ahead of him several basis points during the night counting.
Why was Komorowski's victory so difficult, even though he seemingly had all the advantages?
Poland's eastern and central regions, almost all of which had been formerly incorporated in the Russian empire, voted for Kaczynski. Komorowski's electorate lives in the rich western and northwestern provinces. Why is that if both candidates represent rightwing forces? The only difference is that Komorowski is a liberal and Kaczynski a conservative nationalist.
Only Russian voters can understand the difference, because the Union of Right Forces and United Russia are miles apart politically although they both position themselves as rightwing center parties.
Komorowski was supported by the majority of the media, business and the EU and NATO allies. The liberal media, which dominate the Polish information space, tried to scare people with Kaczynski just as Boris Yeltsin's television scared Russians with communist leader Gennady Zyuganov in 1996.
Besides, Kaczynski joined the presidential race only after his brother was killed in an air crash near Smolensk on April 10, and his main rightwing opposition party Law and Justice (PiS) had negative ratings in the polls throughout the past year.
Komorowski snatched victory from Kaczynski at the last possible moment, although his chances should have been strengthened by Kaczynski's odious reputation in Russia and other CIS countries and his anti-Russian and anti-EU statements. It is unlikely that Poles voted for Kaczynski only because they felt sorry for him after the death of his brother; much water has flown under the Polish political bridge since the first shock at the news of the Smolensk tragedy.
Like in many other Slavic countries, the answer could be found in people's feelings, fears and dreams.
Michal Karnowski writes in Polska Times that Komorowski's victory has given full power to his liberal party Civic Platform (PO). Neither the Social Democrats, who ruled in the 1990s and the early 2000s, nor the Kaczynski brothers, who encountered strong resistance on the part of the liberal press and powerful opposition parties in parliament, enjoyed such power.
But this position also entails full responsibility, public dissatisfaction and other problems all parties in power have.
Poles are not happy with this situation, although they cannot clearly formulate their complaints, just as people in Russia. Their dissatisfaction is expressed in the ballot papers, which is why Kaczynski made an unexpected spurt to victory. Despite his rightwing beliefs, he has promised to break the connection between the government and business and to restore government supervision of healthcare and education.
He also created a sensation by praising Leonid Brezhnev's favorite, Edward Gierek, former first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party. It was not coincidental that Kaczynski praised Gierek, whose "deviant socialism" has more supporters in Polish society than any other era in recent Polish history.
Although the mainstream media have always denounced the "real socialism" past which Poland shares with Russia, Poles have not learned to wholeheartedly love capitalism, especially in the eastern provinces, where industry has never taken hold.
A quarter of Poles are working away from their homes, often in neighboring cities. According to Wieslaw Lagodzinski, press secretary of the Central Statistical Office, there are about 500,000 unregistered workers from other Polish cities in Warsaw, whose population is 1.7 million of people. This is strongly reminiscent of the situation in Russia.
The liberal capitalism created in Poland by Social Democrats and their partners has not improved the situation. Money was attracted to money and investment to existing infrastructure, boosting the development of Wroclaw, Gdansk and industrial centers in Silesia, while small towns in eastern Poland fell into decay. They could have been helped with firm trade relations with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, but Poland's policy did not favor such ties.
Poles have made a new choice now, but Komorowski and his Civic Platform will have to prove that they can rule the country in the interests of the people. These interests include good relations with Russia and other eastern neighbors.
Nearly all Poles are ready to promote this cause. The Polish media have printed positive commentaries on the film about the Smolensk tragedy shown on Sunday by Russia's Channel One.
The list of candidates for Poland's new ambassador to Russia includes, apart from career diplomats, also several highly respected Poles such as film director Krzysztof Zanussi.
This is a striking difference from the Kaczynski era of 2005-2007, when Polish-Russian relations were in limbo.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti commentator Dmitry Babich)
