Russian defense firm Oboronprom is to use Israeli components to assemble unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily intended for civilian customers, at a helicopter plant in Tatarstan.
The Russian military first showed an interest in buying Israeli-made UAVs back in 2008, after admiring their performance during the five-day war between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia. In April 2009, Russia signed a $53 million contract for 12 Bird-Eye 400, I-View MK150 and Searcher Mark II UAVs.
The Russian Defense Ministry later bought another 36 Israeli UAVs for $100 million and announced the planned purchase of 15 more UAVs in April 2010.
In early 2010 it was reported that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) was also planning to buy Israeli UAVs. Unlike the Russian army, which was in talks with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the FSB was interested in UAVs made by the company Aeronautics.
The Russian law-enforcement and security agencies' explanation of their interest in Israeli UAVs as being down to the lack of competitive Russian-made equivalents provoked an outcry among Russian UAV producers. They accused the Defense Ministry of lobbying for the interests of foreign producers.
The reality is, of course, more complicated. Recently, after spending over 5 billion rubles ($165 million) on work in this area, the Defense Ministry carried out trials of Russia's best UAVs. The results were disappointing: not a single UAV satisfied the defense ministry's specifications.
Even the Russian-made UAVs that have been delivered to the army, including the Tipchak, which entered active service in 2008, are substandard.
Specialists criticize the Tipchak for not being stable enough, while the fact that its cameras are mounted too rigidly means that it transmits blurred pictures, making for poor target acquisition. As a result, the Tipchak is unable to adjust artillery fire. If that litany of failures was not bad enough, it has a limited range of 40 km (25 miles) and its effective range is even shorter because its launching base needs to be located 15-20 km (12 miles) from the frontline for security reasons.
Other complaints include its high cost (300 million rubles, or about $10 million), high noise levels, insufficient altitude range, and consequently its heightened vulnerability to ground-based artillery fire.
The Defense Ministry is actively looking for an alternative Russian producer. Several small companies have offered improved UAV models, but they are still not up to standard. Fine tuning them and ensuring they are production-ready will take time. To date, Russia's defense ministry has been buying both high-end foreign makes and the inferior Russian UAVs but a new opportunity, built on joint-ventures, could well be opening up.
In spring 2010, Russian Technologies' Director General Sergei Chemezov announced the plan to establish a joint venture between the Russian state corporation Oboronprom and Israel's IAI. This new body was to focus solely on UAV production. Russia valued the project at $300 million but the Israeli press said it would take $400 million, with Oboronprom paying $280 million up-front and the remainder on receipt of the components.
These Israeli UAVs will be produced at a helicopter plant in Kazan by an Oboronprom-IAI joint venture. Primarily intended for civilian customers, their end users could include the Emergencies Ministry, oil companies and environmental organizations.
But is the Kazan plant up to the task? One thing is certain, it will have to work at full tilt if it is to fulfill this order alongside the production envisaged by Russia's new rearmament program, which involves the manufacture of 1,000 helicopters for the armed forces within 10 years.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
