Three years ago I was sitting in the house of a Syrian intellectual, a Christian, whose Russian-Ukrainian wife works as a technician in a liquor factory in Damascus. "You know,” she said, “When we have some kind of equipment breakdown we have to look for a Christian or Alawi engineer, someone whose religious affiliation does not prohibit them from drinking alcohol. The Sunnis won't even come to the gates of the factory." She paused and then added: "Only ten years ago this was not the case. Islamic attitudes have a bigger impact today."
As events in the Middle East unfold at breakneck speed, I can only look back at a time, less than a month ago, when in this column I urged Arab democrats not to fear dealing with the Islamist opposition to corrupt autocratic regimes in the region.
And that is where my conversation in Damascus, mentioned above, becomes very topical, because the future of Syria has become a much more acute worry. The country has so far been untouched by the turmoil. However, its president, Bashar al-Assad, said in a rare interview with the Wall Street Journal that although he intends to open up the country economically, he is not going to introduce any substantial political change to his autocratic regime. The Assad clan, which has been running Syria for 40 years now, is Alawite. These members of a minority religious sect that broke away from mainstream Shia Islam have serious reasons to worry. Syria is in fact a very special case in the Arab world because it is the most outstanding example of a minority-based regime in the region. With 74 per cent of the 23 million-strong population Sunni Muslims, the Alawites account for at most two million. However, they control major posts in the government, the army and security services, hence also controlling taxation, issuing business licenses and so on. Relying on the secularist ideology of the Syrian branch of the Baas party, the Assads (first the father, and now the son) have allowed selected representatives of other religious minorities to advance to top posts in order to maintain stability (former defence minister Mustafa Tlas is one of the more famous examples of the Alawite regime's "token Sunnis.")
In the 1970s and 1980s, the current leader’s father Hafez al-Assad, and the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood waged a relentless war. The "Brothers" attacked army barracks, shot police officers and civilian officials, and even bombed the Soviet military advisory mission compound in Damascus. Finally, in 1982 Assad Senior laid siege to the city of Hama, the "Brotherhood’s" main stronghold, destroying it with artillery fire. The death toll was estimated at the time to be 50,000 people, the vast majority of them civilians. Since then the Islamists have been hidden deep underground. The Assad regime relies heavily on Iranian aid, acting as Tehran's proxy in the Arab world as well as the main supplier of Hezbollah fanatics to Lebanon. It is also the Arab world’s main opponent to any deal with Israel, which has occupied the Golan Heights since 1967.
In 1999 to 2000, after the death of Hafez al-Assad, there was a brief "Damascus spring," with journalists allowed to criticize aspects of Syrian political life. Independent candidates ran in parliamentary elections (usually a complete sham) and even mobile phones, the Internet and satellite TV were finally allowed. It did not last long, as Bashar al-Assad was pressured by his father's cronies to end his experiments with democracy for the sake of "stability." The Syrian population is currently divided into two unbalanced groups: a significant, educated, urban, middle class minority, which wants democracy, but is afraid that it will bring the "Brotherhood" to powe; and the Sunni majority, of which at least part would probably be inclined to follow the Islamist demagogues. No one can be certain what exactly will happen if events spin out of control, as there is no reliable statistical data to show people's attitudes.
Still, I'd venture the thought that a Syrian revolution is, historically speaking, not long in the making, and that it will probably be a good thing. I am certain that Syrian intellectuals, thoughtful and well educated, will command enough support not to let the country turn into some kind of Sunni version of Iran. Moreover, with access to the Internet and a multitude of satellite TV channels the people of Syria already have certain passive political experience and knowledge, which will, with proper leadership, prevent them from taking this important and likeable Arab country in the wrong direction. What is also important is the general revulsion Syrians seem to have towards violence. Syrian coups d'etat were usually bloodless affairs, which is encouraging. But the more the Assad government keeps the lid screwed on this pressure cooker, the stronger the explosion will be.
For the outside world, a change in Damascus could also improve the situation. As opposed to the Egyptian regime of Hosni Mubarak, that of Assad Junior is not a mainstay of stability, but rather a source of instability in the wider Middle East. If it were to change its ways (unlikely) or to leave power (a more realistic assumption), that could mean a blow to Iranian infiltration of the Arab heartland and serious problems for Hezbollah. It could also mean some movement towards peace with Israel – which is not going to happen as long as the current leadership is in the driving seat in Damascus. For the Assads, a state of war with Israel has become a permanent excuse for keeping the country under a mild version of martial law and suppressing any opposition.
President Bashar al-Assad should start acting to reform his stagnant country now, instead of waiting for the inevitable explosion, even if it is delayed by a few years. We have only felt the first gusts of the wind of change that is now blowing through the Arab world. This is a challenge for Arab regimes, for Israel and the outside world. There will be more on Israel's difficult choices in a future column.
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What is Russia's place in this world? Unashamed and unreconstructed Atlanticist, Konstantin von Eggert believes his country to be part and parcel of the "global West." And while this is a minority view in Russia, the author is prepared to fight from his corner.
Konstantin Eggert is an independent Russian journalist and political analyst. In the 1990s he was Diplomatic Correspondent for “Izvestia” and later the BBC Russian Service Moscow Bureau Editor. Konstantin has also spent some time working as ExxonMobil Vice-President in Russia. He was made Honorary Member of the Order of the British Empire by Queen Elizabeth II.
