Russia is backing up its rhetoric over the South Kuril Islands with action. In a surprise move that will no doubt further aggravate the long-standing territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, Russia's military-political leadership announced plans to modernize its armed forces in the country's Far East.
The plans to reorganize and bolster defenses at the Russian base on the South Kuril Islands are entirely justified and urgent. Forces there consist entirely of the shorthanded 18th machinegun-artillery division, with just 3,500 troops.
The proximity of the islands to Japan's coast makes them extremely difficult to defend. In theory, Japan could launch a massive sneak attack with considerable landing forces at night using small non-military boats (for instance, fast motorboats used for fishing) as well as inflatable attack motorboats and helicopters. By using such unconventional means, Japan would be able to keep preparations for the operation secret. In this case, the main thrust of the attack would be on Kunashir Island, the southernmost island of the chain. If the Japanese were bold enough, they might simultaneously attack Iturup Island.
Russia would do well to remember Japan's predilection for starting wars with sudden well-planned attacks, a tactic it has used in every war it has ever waged. Japan's proximity to the islands allows it to rapidly deliver cargo and reinforcements to landed troops, while backing them up with massive air support from attack helicopters. The Japanese could keep most of Kunashir under heavy fire using missiles and artillery (including precision weapons) stationed on its own shores.
The Japanese military are well trained and highly motivated. They possess huge quantities of the latest weapons and equipment. They have unique type-96 multi-purpose missiles and HATM-6 systems with hammer-like chassis, which could be delivered to the islands using light transport. These would be equally effective against tanks and artillery. This, combined with Japan's air superiority and wide use of precision weapons, would allow the Japanese to smash the defensive forces on the islands much faster and easier that we might think.
Opportunities and realities
Today, the Russian forces deployed on the islands, and in the country's Far East in general, would be helpless in the face of such an attack. The 18th machine-gun and artillery division is not up to task. They are dispersed on Kunashir and Iturup, and the defensive hardware on their coasts is largely obsolete. Their movement is limited by the difficult terrain and lack of roads. Air defense capabilities are, of course, inadequate. Under these circumstances, in the event of an enemy landing, the Russian units would likely suffer the fate of the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands in 1982.
The naval forces of the Russian Pacific Fleet are based in faraway Kamchatka and the Primorye Territory. Regardless, it's not clear that these forces would prove superior to the Japanese forces if they were to engage. And even if the Russian fleet were to prevail, the Japanese would still be able to land on the islands and supply their amphibious forces there. The Russian Fleet's ships likely would not be able to blockade the islands due to the proximity to the Japanese coast. Anti-ship missile systems on Japan's coast would prove too great a threat, not to mention the Japanese air force.
Russia stands even less of a chance of achieving air superiority in a hypothetical confrontation. The nearest Russian airfields that can accommodate combat aircraft are located on Sakhalin and Kamchatka, and the closest fighters are the MiG-31s stationed in Yelizovo on Kamchatka and the SU 27SMs in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Even if Russia were to mass combat aircraft forces from the rest of its territory in the Far East, it would not have a quantitative superiority in the air over the Kuril Islands and Hokkaido. Japan would have the undisputed advantage in quantitative terms (aviation systems, aircraft weapons, personnel training and aviation control), and would essentially be operating in the airspace above its own territory from conveniently located airfields and within its own radar field. Given these facts, Russia would be unlikely to gain complete dominance of the air in the theater of war.
Therefore, the only practical defense Russia can muster is to prolong the fighting on Kunashir and Iturup using local garrisons in order to buy enough time to concentrate its air and naval forces and to organize a large-scale counter assault, including large landings of Russian forces. During such an operation, Russia could try to achieve at least local air superiority.
In the long term, any viable defense strategy must be based on the threat of escalating hostilities and mounting air and missile strike over Japan's entire territory.
The necessary steps
It is abundantly clear that in order to successfully defend the South Kuril Islands, Russia must considerably upgrade the combat readiness of its forces and better staff and equip its bases on the islands. The islands must be self-sufficient in air defense, and this can be achieved by deploying medium- and, later, long-range missile systems. The islands also need shore-based weapons to attack small sea-based targets.
Ideally, the reconfiguration of the islands' defenses should not involve any attempts to protect their lengthy coasts, which is a tall order given that the enemy could land on small boats. It would be better to strengthen the bases of Iturup and Kunashir and provide them with the necessary firepower and effective air defenses.
It appears that this is precisely what Russia plans to do. The Defense Ministry has started re-equipping local units with modern hardware. Last year, the outdated T-55 tanks in the 18th division were replaced with more modern T-80BVs. There are also plans to deploy Buk-M1 medium-range surface-to-air missiles.
The impending reorganization of the 18th division into a unit that is in a constant state of combat readiness is fully in keeping with the new image of the Russian Armed Forces. This will be an important and urgent step in Russia's efforts to bolster its defenses in disputed territories. Russia's military and political leadership must remain focused on the defense of the South Kuril Islands.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
*Mikhail Barabanov editor-in-chief of Moscow Defense Brief.
