Izvestia
Interros man takes over Norilsk Nickel
Andrei Bougrov, proposed by Vladimir Potanin’s Interros, has replaced Alexander Voloshin as chairman of the board of directors at Norilsk Nickel.
Bougrov’s election was the main surprise to emerge at the company’s AGM on Thursday. He replaces independent director Alexander Voloshin, who is a Rusal man and former Kremlin administration head.
Reaching a quorum was not a problem because five major shareholders own almost three-quarters of company stock. Potanin’s Interros owns 30%; Deripaska’s Rusal, 25%; trader Trafigura, 8%; Norilsk Nickel management, 7%; and Alisher Usmanov’s Metalloinvest, about 5%.
Twenty-five candidates claimed 13 seats on the board of directors. The meeting elected four Interros representatives, four independent directors, two Rusal managers, and one each from Norilsk Nickel management, Trafigura and Metalloinvest.
Most observers had expected Voloshin to remain in his post. In his day, he headed the executive office of the Russian president and Russia’s Unified Energy Systems. He was made head of Norilsk’s board of directors in December 2008 when Deripaska (who purchased his Norilsk stake in spring 2008) and Potanin buried the hatchet in their battle for control over the company.
This breathing space lasted 18 months. At last year’s annual meeting, Voloshin failed to make it even to the board. Andrei Klishas, of Interros, accused him of inactivity and playing up to Rusal in the shareholder conflict. But six months later, an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting appointed Voloshin to the board and made him its chairman once again.
Interros is adamant that Bougrov was voted in by independent directors. Andrei Kirpichnikov, Interros’ PR chief, says: “Observers were present at the board meeting and they saw no unfair play. Bougrov’s candidacy was advanced by one of the independents, and we found it reasonable. His election best reflects the distribution of capital.”
Rusal PR director Vera Kurochkina declined to comment, while Oleg Petropavlovsky, an analyst at BrokerCreditService, thinks Rusal will now take a timeout to watch the developments.
Other experts met the appointment with some optimism. “Everyone is now sick and tired of the shareholder war. Bougrov’s election is most likely connected with Norilsk Nickel’s development program and acquisitions announced the other day by Interros. Bougrov is a production man and means business. Why was Voloshin not elected? Minority stakeholders are interested in more investment in production and expansion of business through takeovers. The state is keen to see more output and more sales that bring in taxes. Voloshin suggested nothing of the kind,” explains Mikhail Zavodov, development director for Fleming Family & Partners Asset Management. “How will the shareholder conflict end? Rusal is facing hard times and has no free resources available. Deripaska may sell his stake to Interros. If the conflict abates, everybody will benefit.”
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
Lessons of the Great Patriotic War
Today marks 70 years since the start of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany, which claimed 26.6 million Soviet lives. People in Moscow, St. Petersburg and cities across Russia will lay flowers at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier and other war memorials. An exhibition will open in Moscow’s Manezh exhibition hall, newspapers, radio and TV networks will broadcast war veterans’ recollections, and films will be shown about the time when the people and the government united to fight a common enemy and, despite myriad deprivations, were victorious.
As always on this date, politicians and the media will discuss the lessons of June 1941, they will talk about how the country and the army were unprepared for war, how the bulk of the army’s senior command had been shot, about Stalin’s criminal miscalculations and maniacal mistrust of intelligence reports and his obsessive fear of provoking Hitler into attacking. But these damning verdicts must not obscure the other lessons, which are, perhaps, even more important.
The country was not prepared for war, its defense industry and army were in no fit state to repel Hitler’s well-armed, fully mobilized military machine. Our forces lacked even the basics such as: reliable radio contact (only 221 of the 832 T-34 tanks deployed in the border districts had radios), air reconnaissance (like Germany’s Focke-Wulf 189 Eagle Owl reconnaissance plane), radar stations, rapid-fire air defense guns and a great deal besides, such as officers with a command of the modern approach to war and tactical operations. This was particularly apparent in the first days and months.
We recall this today because, since 1945, our army and defense industry have found themselves in the same state of unpreparedness on more than one occasion. This is what happened during the first Chechen war in December 1994 and again in August 2008.
Regrettably, the authorities and general public only opened their eyes to their army’s needs when their country’s sovereignty, honor and interests were threatened. Serious reforms were initiated only after the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, when it was patently clear that the weapons and military equipment fielded to repel Georgian aggression in Tskhinval had no place in a modern theater of operations.
However, the move to a new-look army and navy is still advancing only sluggishly, in zigzags, often shocking those concerned, including war and army veterans.
The most important lesson is preparations to repel an act of aggression must start long before it is launched. This must not only be done through politics and diplomacy, the country’s defense capability must be comprehensively strengthened and both army and navy must have everything they need to repel any possible attack. This is not an arms race, it means ensuring the military has modest, but sufficient, modern defense technology and combat systems. Military personnel must expand their skills constantly, and be trained to use them efficiently, including through military exercises.
This is a key guarantee against a repetition of the June 1941 tragedy.
Vedomosti
Belarus struggles to repay Russian energy debt
Energy trader Inter RAO UES stopped short of actually cutting off power supplies to Belarus, consenting to a new debt deferment at the last moment.
Belarus has broken the deadline for repaying its debt to Russia’s Inter RAO UES. A company spokesman said on Tuesday the trader was prepared to cut off power supplies at midnight. The source declined to cite the amount overdue.
Inter RAO UES’s chief executive Boris Kovalchuk last week made it clear they were only talking about the principal sum: “There are penalties due as well, but we are trying to be incredibly constructive: we are only discussing the principal amount.”
Belarus in 2009 bought 2.9 billion kWh, or 18.4% of Russia’s energy exports. Supplies were halted in 2010 due to transmission line repairs, and resumed in 2011.
Reports came earlier this month that Belarus was in arrears, with an energy debt exceeding 1.5 billion rubles ($53.5mn). Belarus wrote that off to the economic crisis and problems of buying Russian rubles.
On June 9, Inter RAO UES halved supplies to Belarus. A Belarusian Energy Ministry official said the country could make do with that since Inter RAO UES accounts for only 7% of its power consumption. The next day, Alexei Shirma, head of the Belarusian state-run electrical company Belenergo, arrived in Moscow to negotiate a deferment. They agreed that Belarus would clear the debt by July 5.
Indeed, Inter RAO UES has received the first payment and expected the second before June 20, the company source said. However, Belenergo asked for another deferment, promising to repay the entire debt on time.
At eight o’clock Moscow time the companies said they had reached another agreement. “We have granted Belarus another deferment until Monday,” the Inter RAO UES source said adding they will not cut off power until then. Belenergo management was unavailable for comment, while the Belarusian government spokesperson declined to comment, as did the Russian presidential office representative.
Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said on Tuesday that the first $800 million of the Eurasec anti-crisis loan has been transferred to Belarus.
“Belarus has enough money, and could have done without this loan,” said Yaroslav Romanchuk, head of the Mises Research Center in Minsk. However, officials in Belarus had obviously not expected Inter RAO UES to respond so harshly, and had not made exchanging dollars or euros for Russian rubles to pay for the energy supplies a priority, he explained.
This decision may end up costing Belarus a fortune, said Nick Piazza, head of BG Capital investment bank, because energy produced from Russian natural gas costs $20/MWh more than that imported from Russia.
Sergei Musiyenko from the Belarusian president’s consultative council believes Inter RAO UES is trying to use Belarus’ financial straits to force it to privatize Belenergo.
RIA Novosti is not responsible for the content of outside sources.
