The Farnborough Air Show ended on Sunday having failed to bring any resounding successes or even any particular reason for optimism to domestic aircraft manufacturers. The situation is understandable and a lot of hard work will be required if this hiatus is to be converted into new quality. The only real sign that the industry has embarked on a sustainable path of development will be a significant and steady increase in civil aviation exports.
Civil disobedience
Over the course of the last two years, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) has expanded its active demonstrations at international air shows with new models of passenger airliners.
In January 2011, customers took delivery of the first mass-produced Sukhoi Superjet 100 airliner. In August, at the MAKS-2011 air show, the corporation signed firm contracts worth $7 billion for the Superjet and the medium-range MS-21 airliner currently under development.
The attempt to keep this offensive going on at the Farnborough Air Show failed. The only confirmed success for the SSJ-100 was the confirmation of the provisional order for five aircraft by the Mexican airline Interjet (their order now totals 20 airliners). In addition, head of UAC Mikhail Pogosyan said that tentative agreements about new contracts for 40 airliners had been reached during the show.
A pilot customer of the Superjet, the Armenian Armavia airline, tried out one of the aircraft and then pulled out of buying the second one it had ordered, citing financial difficulties. Things do not look good for the MS-21 either: a firm order for 50 aircraft by Malaysian Crecom Airline had to be downgraded to an optional purchase.
UAC is struggling as a manufacturer of civil aircraft. The company has a massive portfolio of successful major contracts for military equipment. This makes sense: Russia’s civil aviation industry has been lagging behind that of Western countries for a long time and the nearly twenty-year pause in the development of the industry has made the gap even wider.
However, Russia has always been good at making military equipment. Therefore, it is not surprising that this bias is firmly rooted in Western stereotypes regarding Russia.
As the American science fiction writer Neal Stephenson said, if you ask a Soviet engineer to design a pair of shoes, you'll get something that looks like the box they came in. Ask him to make a killing device, and he'll become Thomas Edison.
The impact of this stereotype on the future marketing of Russian aircraft on the international market has yet to be determined. It is unlikely that things will turn around overnight: even when new Russian aircraft catch up with their direct foreign counterparts in terms of quality, and Russian manufacturers come up with at least a comparable level of service (both of these still have a long way to go), they will still have to overcome the inertia of customers’ biased thinking.
It will literally have to be broken down. Russian manufacturers will have to resist the temptation to fall into the arms of the state budget and toward protectionism, as if that would somehow magically rid it of the need to address its fair share of the purely engineering (and particularly ergonomic) problems plaguing Russian-made machines.
The question is how far is UAC’s management prepared to go to make the breakthrough onto the global market.
The solution to the issue of making competitive civilian aircraft (along with the potential expansion of its product range of manufactured transport aircraft) will, in fact, be an indicator that UAC is transforming itself from a highly specialized exporter of tactical aircraft with huge developmental imbalances into a balanced aircraft-building concern capable of the sustainable development of its strategic assets.
The military take stock
There is another incentive for the forthcoming changes: Exports of military aviation equipment has hit a ceiling, and in the coming years, before the Russian fifth-generation fighter makes its appearance, it is unlikely that there will be any breakthrough sales similar to Chinese and Indian contracts for the Su-30 fighter.
However, during inventory taking conducted in anticipation of the export version of the T-50 fighter, the domestic aviation industry nevertheless prepared a set of proposals for the foreign markets. In recent years, UAC has rolled out several models that could potentially rekindle the fading demand for the hugely popular Su-30 family, which in the late 1990s became a symbol of success for the domestic aircraft industry.
Firstly, there is the Su-35, the ultimate version of the T-10 platform (Su-27, Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35). No outside orders have come in yet, but the export potential of this machine is strong enough to predict “the likely inevitability” of signing contracts with foreign customers in the near future.
Secondly, the product manufactured by the MiG Corporation on a new base: a multi-purpose MiG-29M/M2, carrier-based MiG-29K and the ultimate fighter from “the twenty-nines” family the MiG-35. This product line appeared before the Su-35, but there is still little cause for celebration, with the exception of contracts for carrier-based aircraft to meet the needs of India's (and now Russia’s) naval aviation.
And finally, the third, the very “third” that was demonstrated live at the Farnborough Show. This is a new trainer aircraft, the Yak-130, which has already been supplied to Algeria, as well as to the Russian Air Force. It has also been ordered by Vietnam, Syria, and, shortly before the war began in 2011, Libya (this contract has been canceled).
A modern twin seater aircraft, originally designed for training purposes, it can be used as a light attack aircraft, for which it has all the necessary features: An open board architecture makes it relatively easy to integrate controlled military equipment of both Russian and foreign production (which is important when working with foreign customers).
The need for this type of aircraft in the aviation industry in small countries cannot be overemphasized. For comparison, the Soviet Su-25 fighter (a more expensive and specialized piece of equipment) has taken part in nearly all the wars of the past 20 years. A light machine, which has the strike potential of a fighter and can carry a wide range of the standard controlled arms available on the market is a perfect universal solution for low-intensity and budget-intensive wars.
What stands out in these three front-liners of the Russian tactical aircraft – the Su-35, MiG-29M/MiG-29K/MiG-35 and Yak-130? First, it’s a clear period of rest associated with the marketing of the new equipment (mostly associated with the Yak-130 and SU-35). These machines have yet to be promoted on the market. Secondly, all of these aircraft are being ordered by the Russian Air Force in significant quantities.
This situation is drastically different from 10-15 years ago, when aircraft plants and design bureaus, those which were still afloat, were working almost exclusively for foreign customers.
Exports – government orders - exports
The aviation industry is gradually changing its sales model: An export-oriented pattern of growth points which result in accumulated systemic imbalances in the industry and erratic operation of enterprises is being replaced by a smoother flow of orders, including those based on government contracts, which have seen a resurgence in recent years.
The Russian military are very active in signing contracts for the new aircraft. The end of “procurement holidays,” which lasted from 1992-1993 (when the Air Force were receiving the remnants of Soviet orders), will alleviate the likely stagnation of the export demand for military aircraft and create a somewhat greater diversification of revenue sources for aircraft manufacturers.
This “operational pause” will last at least 5-7 years, after which the export paradigm may return, but in a more balanced form. Here, the main focus from the standpoint of the foreign market is primarily on the export version of the T-50 fighter, which has already been promised to India on an exclusive basis to the tune of 250 aircraft (the FGFA project).
However, the focus on the T-50 will return UAC back to a time where the name Tactical Air Force would be more fitting. To avoid this, the issue of the export of civilian aircraft will need to be resolved by 2020.
In this case, the UAC sales structure will be harmonized: the corporation will transition to the manufacture of new types of both civil and military aircraft, for both Russian and foreign customers. In other words, it would achieve about the same thing that the domestic helicopter manufacturers have almost achieved thanks to the nature of the market and the solid Soviet legacy that was left them.
However, to do so, they will need to make the Superjet, the MS-21 and associated equipment truly competitive and respected by consumers already spoiled by the best designs from Boeing, Airbus and Embraer. Equipment that is not adapted but specifically designed for carrying passengers.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
