PHILADELPHIA, November 5 (RIA Novisti) — As the primary successor to the Ottoman Empire, which had for centuries been considered the greatest enemy of Western Christendom, Turkey was always a rather unlikely member of “the West.” Superpower standoffs, though, can make for the very strangest of bedfellows. Despite deep cultural and historical reasons to doubt its compatibility with Europe, the threat posed by the Soviet Union pushed Turkey into the Western camp during the very first years of the Cold War, a position it has occupied ever since.
The Turkish-Western partnership that was designed to counter a Soviet threat that no longer exists has, however, become increasingly rickety over the past few years. Ever since the electoral triumph of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist Justice and Development party, Turkey has changed radically, becoming simultaneously wealthier, more democratic, more religious, more self-confident, and more illiberal. These changes have brought to the surface tensions that have always existed but that were previously buried beneath a veneer of “partnership.”
Turkey had long been promised by the EU that if it behaved itself and followed the “roadmap of reform” it would be taken into the fold. In many senses Turkey has actually proved more reformist than the reformers: structural changes put into place by Erdogan helped stoke the country’s best-ever run of economic growth. It might seem counterintuitive, but in late 2014 Turkey is marginally wealthier on a per-capita basis than either Romania or Bulgaria, the EU's two newest members, and is much wealthier than Poland or Slovakia were back in 2004 when they first joined the EU.
And while it is true that Turkey’s political system retains some genuine weak points, it is obviously much more democratic in both form and practice than it was during the 1980’s and 1990’s, when Turkey’s military routinely disposed of politicians with which it disagreed. Throughout the years when “democracy” extended only as far as the army’s general staff deemed appropriate, Turkish cooperation with both Europe and the United States remained strong.
When the Turks complain about "double-standards" they really do have a point: the EU has already accepted Christian or post-Christian states located in continental Europe as full-fledged members countries, despite them having been substantially poorer than Turkey. Any reservations from Brussels about Turkey’s democratic credentials are of very recent vintage.
The real problem is really quite simple: at the same time that Turkey has become much wealthier and, at least on paper, more democratic, it has also become much more openly Islamic. Few in Brussels dare say it openly out of fear of being labeled intolerant, but the real reason for Turkey’s growing distance from the West is precisely this (genuinely popular!) religious awakening.
Ataturk’s famed program of Western-style “secularization” was accomplished at gunpoint: it was only the Turkish army’s bayonets that prevented traditionalist and conservative religious parties from electoral victory. As Turkey reformed, as it gradually removed the army’s veto, it was always a forgone conclusion that its political system would become more Islamic. While they aren’t my values, poll after poll has shown that the Turkish public is overwhelmingly supportive of Erdogan and his social conservatism, a traditionalism that is increasingly at odds with an ever-more socially progressive EU.
Turkey presents the West with a very serious problem: it (mostly) followed the proscribed playbook for economic and political reform, it opened its markets to Western investment, privatized state-owned corporations, loosened controls on its currency, and began a tentative process of political reconciliation with its Kurdish minority. Despite this very real progress, however, Turkey has actually moved further away from European integration: the prospect of Turkish EU membership is now even more remote than it was before Erdogan came to power.
What can be learned from this impasse? Well it might seem blindingly obvious, but the chief lesson is that the EU should never make rhetorical commitments that it has no intention of honoring. For reasons that, in retrospect, are self-evident, the EU was never going to accept Turkey as a full member. It should only have promised as much as it was willing to actually deliver, which would have amounted to some kind of vaguely defined free-trade zone.
The EU will suffer a very noteworthy black eye in terms of public relations, but since the coalition of nations has existed in one form or another for a half century without Turkey as a member, it will find a way to stumble along. The even more serious challenge is to NATO. Turkey has been a vital member of the alliance since the early 1950’s, and played a crucial role in preventing the expansion of Soviet power in the Middle East.
The problem is that in the current “war against terror” Turkey’s interests are simply not in alignment with those of its putative allies. For a variety of reasons (some of which deserve sympathy, and some of which do not) Turkey has decided that the fight against ISIS is inadvisable. By openly warring with the Islamic State, Turkey would potentially expose itself to a withering campaign of terrorism that would wreak havoc with its economy (which earns enormous sums from Western tourists). While Erdogan is not nearly as extreme or brutal as ISIS or al-Nursa, as the leader of a very traditionally Muslim political party, he is on friendly terms with a number of Syrian rebel groups that are considered radioactive among the pundits and policymakers of Europe and North America.
Although most Western experts are currently focused on the crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s renewed challenge to NATO, I would argue that the alliance actually faces a far more significant threat from the potential departure of Turkey. As the situation in Syria continues to deteriorate, Turkish policy is likely to deviate further and further from America’s preferred approach. The diplomatic damage has been largely contained so far, but a more confrontational and aggressive American administration (all but certain after Obama leaves office) is likely to be far less understanding.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official position of Sputnik.
