Poland’s defense minister and his German counterpart are set to make Europe’s rapid reaction force (RRF) or, as it is called in official documents, Rapid Deployment Capacity their own project and a strong irritant for Russia – with 5,000 of their troops taking the risk. Here is a statement made by the Polish Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz at a joint conference with his German counterpart Boris Pistorius:
“Poland and Germany take responsibility for the rapid reaction forces – the European military force for swift reaction to military threats. Starting from July, our battle groups, consisting of 2,500 Polish soldiers and 2,500 German ones, will be ready for rapid reaction. These are the forces fulfilling the tasks set by [the EU’s] Strategic Compass [established in March 2022].”
Officially, Poland and Germany are acting within the framework of the EU’s common decisions. The establishment of the joint European rapid reaction force was agreed upon in March 2022, and was supposed to become one of the priorities of the current Belgian presidency in the EU. But in the context of the ongoing NATO proxy war against Russia, this sudden initiative of Poland and Germany – the two main European sponsors of Volodymyr Zelensky’s regime – looks sinister.
“Germany and Poland will of course say that the RRF is a defensive unit to help defend other NATO countries as fast as possible,” says Mikael Valtersson, former defense politician in the non-systemic Sweden Democrats party and air defense officer. “But it's obvious that the RRF also is prepared for fast defense of NATO ‘vital security interests,’ i.e. rapid deployment near NATO in Ukraine, Moldova or less likely in the Caucasus.”
Russia has warned many times that the appearance of regular troops from NATO countries in Ukraine would lead to a conflict between Russia and the Western alliance with unpredictable consequences. The emergence of a substantial European “rapid reaction” contingent in Georgia or any other country in the Caucasus would also meet a strong response from Russia. One should not forget Vladimir Putin’s formula coined back in 2008 that membership of Ukraine and Georgia in NATO would mean crossing “red lines” for Russia. So far, every attempt to trespass Russia’s red lines in Ukraine and Georgia has led to bad consequences for its initiators.
Brussels and European countries have been toying with the idea of creating the EU’s own rapid reaction force since the late 1990s. Initially, Russia was not against European autonomy in military matters, but the rapid reaction force was never regarded as an alternative to NATO. Instead its creation became a sort of a byproduct of NATO’s expansion eastward.
In 1999, the same year as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO, EU member countries agreed in Helsinki to establish the so-called Headline Goal for the EU Battle Groups. By 2007, according to the concept of EU Battle Groups (EUBG), these units were supposed to reach the condition of battle-readiness and perform missions 30-120 days long, according to European Council records. However, the EU’s infamous “eurocratic” red tape “drowned” the idea until the crisis year of 2022. Then, the EU’s Strategic Compass was adopted, which included the RRF, but serious action on it has started only now, with the initiative coming from Germany and Poland.
So, why did Poland and Germany decide to take on the burden which they were supposed to share with the remaining 25 EU members?
“For Germany, it's a clear sign that Germany is fast abandoning its reliance on soft power and gradually relies on military means,” Mikael Valtersson told Sputnik. "In Poland's case, this new and closer cooperation with Germany is probably a result of the change of government in Poland."
Valtersson believes that the governments in Germany and Poland, as well as the rulers of the EU in Brussels, understand that “any adversary will be forced to respond in kind” to the establishment of Rapid Reaction Capacity on its borders. And it is not hard to see that the likeliest adversaries are Russia and Belarus, and that they can be expected to “respond in kind” by deploying their own troops.
Interestingly, during the early days of the European Battle Groups, the idea was to use the new European force on the EU’s southern borders for missions described as evacuations and stabilization – much more popular among the South European EU members than confrontation with Russia. Meanwhile, the current move by Germany and Poland pivots the RRF to the East with promises “to help Ukraine” and “to defend NATO’s eastern flank.” The missions in the south (in Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean) have obviously been put on the back burner, since the south was not even mentioned by Kosiniak-Kamysz and Pistorius in their press conference.
Besides sending their own troops, Germany and Poland could destabilize the situation in many other ways. Mikael Valtersson notes that both Germany and Poland have positioned themselves as leaders of the so-called “Armor Coalition,” which has set for itself the aim of supplying tanks to Ukraine. The coalition, set to be activated on March 26 this year, may move the developments in Ukraine in a very dangerous direction even without putting “Western boots on the ground.”