NATO is going to deploy its forces in Eastern Europe in order to "protect its members against Russian aggression". Is it really making Europe a safer place? Radio VR is discussing the issue with Professor Julian Lindley-French, the Director of the Institute of Statecraft and Director of Europa Analytica, based in the Netherlands, and Reiner Braun, the Executive Director of IALANA (International Association Of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms), Co-President of International Peace Bureau.
"You will in the future see a more visible NATO presence in the east", NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen told The Guardian.
He also outlined moves to boost Ukraine's security, "modernize" its armed forces and help the country counter the threat from Russia, the newspaper says.
The decision was taken after Poland and three Baltic states had voiced their fear of what they described as Russia’s aggression. Two non-NATO states – Sweden and Finland – have also indicated their readiness to deploy NATO troops in their territory.
Professor Julian Lindley-French: Given the events in Ukraine, most people in Europe regard this as being an aspect of Russian aggression. Because of that there is a widespread view that all the NATO members – these are the free sovereign states who’ve chosen their allegiances and their alliances – when faced with what appears to be aggression, they will seek to have a strategic reassurance, to ensure that they are comfortable, that their own borders are indeed secure.
Now, the purpose of the Atlantic Alliance – an alliance of democracies, of free states – is that when together as an alliance, it decides that it must base forces for whatever reason on the territory of its members, then it has the right to do so. I think it is very important that people in Russia, friends in Russia – a country for which I look with respect and regard, given the Russia’s history and Russia’s role in Europe and the wider world – they must understand that the defense of NATO and its countries is not seen as an act of alliance aggression, but a response to a perceived act of Russian aggression in Ukraine.
And that’s why it is absolutely vital that we maintain the lines of communication open, that we seek to find a peaceful solution in Ukraine and that we ensure that in the 21st century Europe such mutual lack of comprehension of each other’s choices and actions is avoided. So, one has to look at the NATO planning very much in that line, and not as an act of aggression, it isn’t right, but a response to the perception by NATO members across the alliance that Russia at this moment is behaving in an aggressive and inappropriate manner.
However, as you could well imagine, since Russia does not see its role in Ukraine as aggressive, it might read the intentions stated by the current NATO Secretary General, as a manifestation of aggressive plans towards Russia.
Professor Julian Lindley-French: First, there is a very clear sense and a lot of clear evidence to us that Russia is indeed orchestrating the unrest in the east of Ukraine, and that indeed the occupation of Crimea, which was clearly a dispute over the territory, is illegal under the international law.
Now, when a neighbour, a partner starts behaving like that, then one has the right to take steps to ensure that it doesn’t spread any further. The bottom-line is – we in the rest of Europe are fundamentally unsure and uncertain about the intentions of Moscow. And that’s why I say it is critical to maintain lines of communication to end this uncertainty.
The moment the uncertainties end, the moment there is a sense of a negotiated political settlement that is acceptable to all the people of Ukraine and indeed its neighbours, then we can get back to a situation when nobody is moving military forces anywhere, where snap exercises aren’t taking place every couple of months, where the rhetoric of conflict is not the essential nature of our relationship.
We need each other. We are trading partners. Russia is an essential part of European security. But right now, frankly, many of us in the West, much to our deep regret, see Russia not as a solution to European security, but behaving in a way, which is making it a problem for the European security. And until Russia and the Russian people understand this, I fear that this mutual lack of comprehension that we face at the moment could create the space in which danger develops. And we must avoid that at all costs.
London has profound concerns about what is going on, the US does too and several other European countries. So, it is important for Russia to understand how we, concerned friends and partners, see Russian actions at present.
Since you’ve mentioned the US, what the US has been doing in Ukraine is stirring up the conflict. They were in no way peace doves.
Professor Julian Lindley-French: Sorry, I’d disagree. I don’t see the evidence of the US’s troops on the Ukrainian soil. I don’t see evidence of attempts by the US to destabilize Ukraine. The essential concern form Moscow, as I understand it, is that it is the encroachment of the EU that is of concern to Moscow, not the US. So, you’d have to give me the evidence that you suggest, because, from my point of view, I simply do not see the US acting in the aggressive way that you suggest.
But how about Mr. McCain and Mrs. Nuland openly siding with the opposition in Kiev?
Professor Julian Lindley-French: The US is going to make its position clear on how it regards the political development of Ukraine, as is Moscow. And Moscow has as much right as Washington to make clear its views about the future orientation of Ukraine and the nature of the choices Ukraine makes. But the US is not seeking to influence part of a sovereign nation through the use of proxy forces or indeed military force. And that has no place in the 21st century Europe.
The essential issue here is how we negotiate the future. And that involves the Ukrainians, involves Russia, involves all the Europeans and it also involves the US, which in many ways is a European power for historical reasons. So, if we can achieve a new consensus, I'm absolutely convinced that we can reestablish trust on both sides, because that’s the essential missing ingredient right now”.
Reiner Braun: Since 1991 NATO was looking for the arguments for going to the east. And always the argument was Russia. So, this is not a new argument. The only new point is that Rasmussen is doing this with a very aggressive voice. And the good point is that his career in the NATO is coming to the end and we will see how his follower would work.
From my understanding, quite all the NATO countries are in favour of enlarging NATO to the east. All of them are talking about more troops and more bases in the East European countries. The question is only a technical one. Some of them say they don’t want to have a permanent stationing of the troops, but from time to time. And then, they are talking about permanent bases, but only for training.
All these things are stupid. The point is that NATO has not learnt any lesson from its politics in the last 20 years, which, for me, are the background of the crisis in Ukraine. They want to continue going to the east, want to surround Russia. And I think for the peace movement this is not acceptable. Our position is that with the end of the Warsaw Pact, it is time to end NATO and I think we should continue doing this. And with our actions in Wales at the NATO summit, we will underline our position on that.
But from my previous conversations with Western experts, I got an impression that the most widespread opinion across Western Europe is that Russia does present a threat.
Reiner Braun: You know, this was the story since 1945. And when you believe that it is a threat, what can you do? You can try to enlarge the contacts, you can try to enlarge the economic relations, you can try to enlarge the political, social and societal relations with the countries which you believe are a threat.
The policy of the common security, which was the policy of Willy Brandt and Mikhail Gorbachev, said – you have to look for the interests of the other side and for your own interests, and there you have to find common points. And that’s what I think we have to do now or what we have to come back to. It is never possible that only one side says that they dictate the politics of acceptance. Then, it works like it is now – we have the confrontation between the East and the West. And we have to overcome this.
I can understand why Russia is saying that there is a threat from the Western countries. They are coming nearer and nearer to the Russian borders. And I can also understand from the historical point the belief in the threat of the Baltic countries and, maybe, from Poland. But when you do have these feelings, the people and the governments have to sit together and have to negotiate what their common points and their common interests are, but never enlarge with military purposes. This will not help.
People also say US never planned to influence neither party. Is it really the most widespread opinion in Europe?
Reiner Braun: When the responsible lady in the Foreign Ministry of the US said these words “f**k the EU!” and said – let us reduce the influence of the EU, enlarge the influence of the US in Ukraine – then, you can see the reality. The reality, from my understanding, is that all the Western countries have a huge element of confrontation politics in their politics. But the real head of the confrontation politics is the US.
They try to encircle Russia. They were always trying to enlarge into Russia and China, one from Europe and the other from East Asia. And Ukraine is a very important point to come as near as possible to the Russian border. I can’t believe that anyone in Europe believes that the US is not trying to use all their political influence, including the $5 billion that they’ve spent on the so-called civil society in Ukraine for getting the support from them.
So, the US is a big part of the problem. But we can reduce the influence of the US in Ukraine by enlarging the influence of the OSCE, this could be a step forward. But I will never believe that the US is not trying to do everything to enlarge their influence in the eastern part of Europe.
Do I get it right that to be adopted, this strategy needs to be approved by all the NATO members? And how real is the prospect of it being adopted at the Wales summit? And given the current state of discourse, do you think that there are chances that dialogue would be resumed?
Reiner Braun: To answer to the first point, you know, I cannot say in which words that general line will be adopted. But I'm quite sure that the main sentences will be that Russia is responsible for the crisis. Second, we have to enlarge our influence in East Europe by enlarging our troops, maneuvers and bases. Third, we need a higher amount of financial resources for NATO. These will be the results and this will be supported by all the NATO countries.
Maybe it will be a little bit more in general, but these will be the real consequences and decisions of the NATO summit. I'm quite sure of it. It is correct that every country has one vote, but in the reality the vote of Luxemburg is not so strong, like the vote of the US. So, it will be dominated by the main NATO countries and all of them are more or less in favour of this. Maybe, they will say some nice words, like – we want to talk. But the reality is that they will adopt a resolution which will enlarge the military positions, the military influence in the NATO politics.
Secondly, there is no alternative for a dialogue. The problem is how long it will take that everyone will accept that, and how many people will be killed till that time, and how many people will have to suffer till the dialogue will come back into the agenda. From my understanding, the Ukrainian crisis can only be solved, first, by the ceasefire, and then by a dialogue. But the dialogue includes all the parties involved in the conflict. You cannot have a dialogue without all the different players in this field present.
I think we will come back to that, but I'm not so sure and not so positive that it will be happening quickly. But this is the same like the politics of the 1970’es. To come to the politics of common security in the end of the 1980’es, it also took 20 or 25 years to have a breakthrough in such a politics. And I hope that it will not take so long, as it took that time. But it will definitely take some time.
And what we need for that, from my understanding, is the pressure of the peaceful people in the world, in different countries. And in Germany 70 percent want to have good relations with Russia, they want to enlarge these contacts. So, there is a positive feeling in the population. And maybe, what we also need is something what I call the dialogue from the bottom, so that the civil society, the peace movements and other organizations are starting and developing it in the society, and it can bring us to a better dialogue on the official political level.
