The Mediterranean – a key region bringing together the Middle East, North Africa and Europe, is going through turbulent change. Where is it likely to take the region and all of us? Radio VR is discussing it with Javier Albarracín, the Director of Socioeconomic Development Department at the European Institute of the Mediterranean.
What we are seeing now is the Mediterranean as such dividing into new – I would say – subregions. For instance, we see that Egypt is now changing its relations with the rest of the region. It has linked its fate – political, financial, economic – much more to the Gulf Cooperation Council than before. We see that Libya has imploded, in the sense that I wouldn’t even say that Libya exists today. I think that what we are seeing now is a deep social and political fragmentation of Libya in different parts. The today’s Parliament – I don’t think they can claim legitimacy, or even that there is the rule of law beyond the streets of Tripoli.
And also, we see what is called the Levant, which is Syria, Lebanon, extending that to Iraq, where borders do not exist anymore. There has been an implosion of these states, but also an explosion – a spillover effect of instability to the neighborhood. So, in that sense, what we see is that what we could call the Mediterranean region, it has exploded and divided into different subregions, and none one them right now knows what their status quo will be, I'm not saying in the mid-term, but even next year.
But there are also new actors emerging in that region, new factors of instability. Whom would you identify as new trend-setters?
Javier Albarracín: In fact, what we see here is that violence is not a monopoly of the state anymore. Organized, let’s say, violence has spread into terrorist groups, into armed gangs, into militias or guerillas, depending on how you call them. We see them acting dramatically in Libya. We see them acting dramatically in the Sinai region of Egypt. Of course, we see them in Lebanon, in Syria and even in some other places, like in the south borders of North African countries, what is called the Sahel, we also see them moving around.
So, there is an easy access to weapons. What we also see is that there is an easier access to structured and well-organized violence, unfortunately. So, the states or the regimes right now are in a much more defensive position than they used to be. There is a fragmentation of the use of violence, it is not a monopoly anymore of the state. What we see is that the external powers (it could be Turkey, it could be the Gulf Cooperation Council, it could be Iran, it could be the US and others) are funding, training, trying to shape the political agendas of these new actors.
And also, there are external factors like the thousands and thousands of young people that feel appealed by these jihadist movements, these very Islamist movements. And then, they are going into especially Libya and Iraq, but also Lebanon and Syria to fight for their points of view.
It also looks like there's been some kind of convergence of – let’s call them – migrants’ flows, we see a lot of people displaced by those violent processes you’ve been mentioning now, moving over to Europe. And from Europe we see a lot of people moving over to the ME to get engaged in those violent processes.
In fact, I can tell you that what I see is that there is a kind of paradox in the Mediterranean. From one point of view, it is getting more and more fragmented. But from another point of view, it is getting more and more interlinked. So, in that sense, what you see is that different countries or different parts of countries are falling apart, are looking for new partners, are trying to build new international relations.
So, they are splitting and there is a much more regional and national fragmentation, but, at the same time, this fragmentation is bringing consequences of deeper interlinked relations between one country and another. You were mentioning, for instance, that violent movements are breaking countries, but, at the same time, they are creating links of illegal traffic of people, illegal traffic of weapons with other countries.
You see that the energy links are getting more and more dense and intense in the region between one country and another. We will see that food issues…because food security is something that is moving very high in the agenda of the region, because of the impact of the climate change and because of the sudden huge amounts of human beings moving from one place to another, looking as refugees for shelter and food. So, food issues are linking one country to another more, because it becomes a burden for the neighboring countries.
So, although it is a more fragmented reality, it is much more interlinked with the movement of jihadists, the spilling of refugees, of the international migration, the flows of energy, the flows of food. So, it is kind of a new paradigm that we are seeing now in the very short term – fragmentation, while deeper interlinkage.
And when we are talking about fragmentation, does it also apply to the European Mediterranean?
Javier Albarracín: Right now there are several processes inside some countries of the EU that are demanding for more autonomy, or even in some cases, like in Scotland, for a clear and open independence. But that’s not only the case of Scotland. We are seeing it also in Spain. And we are also seeing that there are some eyes looking at what is happening in Scotland from Italy and some other places.
So, in that sense, what I think the EU is doing right now is a process of introspection, to see what the EU will look like in the next five years, in the next term of the new commission in terms of how are they going to improve the economic performance, how are they going to improve job creation, what kind of political discourses Euroskeptics and Eurodefenders will be competing, what number of countries may be in the EU (and I'm talking about enlargement, but also the breakup of internal states, like the UK).
So, I think it is a historical process of introspection now, looking inwards from the EU’s point of view to redefine and to understand what the EU of the future is going to be. And that introspection might be leaving some void, some space in the neighborhood that others may be occupying right now, especially in the near neighborhood and especially, for instance, the Mediterranean. We see that there are new external powers that are playing bigger role due to this eventual void or a certain withdrawal of the EU from the region.
We see, as I was mentioning before, some key Gulf Cooperation Council countries entering in the region deeply from the financial point of view, from the political and ideological points of view, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE. You can also see Iran entering in some of the countries or increasing its presence. Russia is also playing an increasing role in the issues like Syria, like Egypt. You can also see the US, and also China.
So, you see that there is a space, for instance, the Mediterranean that used to be a clearly European sphere of action. Now, with this introspection of Europe, there is more space to be covered. And in a moment of turbulence this space may be filled in by the other external powers – state powers, but also non-state powers, as I was mentioning before.
And in that sense, could the fragmentation of the European part of the Mediterranean present some kind of a solution that would, paradoxically, create better conditions for development?
Javier Albarracín: International and regional governance, from an institutional point of view the approval or negotiation of agreements, or cooperation schemes, it is today a very difficult task at the whole level. You see emerging new frameworks reinforcing tendencies of cooperation in some regions, the creation of new development banks by, for instance, the BRICS countries. So, the international architecture, the international governance is getting more and more complicated due to the old schemes that might be overpassed, new schemes emerging. That is real at the global scale – new emerging realities asking for a better presence.
It is even more clear at a regional level in Europe and its neighborhood. You see that there is, as I said, more fragmentation, new emerging powers, new actors demanding internally, demanding for more capacity to decide. So, it doesn’t mean that there is not going to be a new scenario that can be framed and create new institutions, but the more actors that have a say and the more actors that want to shape the agenda, the more complicated that governance becomes.
So, in that sense, fragmentation doesn’t necessarily lead to better governance. In fact, during a certain time it may lead to more complicated governance. You need to give room for new actors, redefine the equilibriums of powers in the institutions. So, it is not an easy answer. But what is clear is that the status quo has been left behind in the European and euro-Mediterranean or neighborhood area. The old status is finished and there is a new one in redefining Europe and in the eastern and the southern neighborhood in that sense.
The fragmentation, at least in the European part of the Mediterranean, is actually a reaction to mismanagement.
Javier Albarracín: Yes! The thing is that from the Western point of view or from the international actors’ point of view, we thought that nation states, our way of thinking and doing politics was something that could be extrapolated to the rest of the world. What we’ve seen is that for a certain time, when there were quite – I would say – autocratic regimes, that was true. But then, you see that the civil society or organized internal actors have opened the Pandora box and are demanding for more room to express themselves and, maybe, the model of nation states wasn’t that suitable for them.
The borders that were defined by colonialism or were defined in the last decades, were the borders that seem to me artificial. Maybe, much of them, as we know them today, are more in our minds than on the ground. The today’s maps in certain regions of the world (and I'm talking about sub-Saharan Africa and some of the regions like the eastern Mediterranean and the ME), the today’s maps that we have on our walls and in our textbooks are more meaningless for understanding what is happening in the region, than some years ago. Today you cannot trust the borders between Libya and Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Syria and Iraq, Syria and Turkey, Sahel.
All these borders, that are the political borders, today basically do exist on our maps – mental maps and in textbooks – but not anymore on the ground. And we need to physically and mentally adapt to this new scenario. We are not ready yet, we don’t understand them yet. We still think in our old-shaped way of looking at things.
Do you see any new financial centers emerging that could exert more influence on the Mediterranean? There’s the City of London, the Gulf countries — an uncontested financial center, Beirut seems to be waning in influence…
Javier Albarracín: There has been quite a lot of say on that regarding the potential. For instance, many cities not only in the region, but beyond that want to be hubs or epicenters for Islamic finance, for instance, which is something quite trendy today. London wants to become an Islamic finance center. Frankfurt, Paris, many others are trying to really attract huge quantities of Islamic finances, Sharia-compliant funds.
London can be approaching properly. And in fact, the Government has launched the public debt called the “sukuk”, which is Sharia-compliant. But the main Islamic finance epicenters are very well-defined. It is Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur and the Gulf countries. For the rest, you can attract some.
And in fact, as you were commenting before about the financial issues in the region, what we see is that the Islamic finance in the region – in the Mediterranean, in the ME, North Africa – and even at the world scale is booming in terms of assets – in terms of liquidity, in terms of the amount of funds moved under the Sharia-compliant approach. And we are talking about trillions of dollars that are moving around looking for investments, looking for different financial products.
And in that sense, what we see is that the Gulf is very active in the Mediterranean region. It is very active buying the Islamic finance banks that are in the region, establishing themselves not only from the Islamic finance’s point of view, but also sovereign wealth funds from the Gulf are becoming active in huge projects of more than half a billion dollars in the region – in real estate, in telecommunication, in management of infrastructures. They are very active.
So, in that sense, the Gulf’s approach to the region is much more comprehensive. It is very political, because they are backing their own horses there and are trying to shape their own agenda. It is very economical, because in some cases they are important trade partners, like in the case of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan. And it is very-very financial.
