Mehmet Ogutcu: This project is one of the most polarizing projects that the EU has ever discussed. I have no doubt that whatever the EU is doing right now, especially some factions within the EU, is politically motivated.
Mostly inspired by Washington, because the US is clearly against Nord Stream 2, for a couple of reasons; one being that they want to sell their over-priced LNG [Liquefied Natural Gas] across the Atlantic, which is not in the interests of the European Union; and the second one, it is often heard, that this project is going to increase the EU’s dependence on Russia, which is around 30 percent overall, as for Germany it’s about 40 percent.
These concerns are leading to confusion within the European Union, and I don’t think it is only the legal arguments that the European Commission is putting forward. And it’s really motivated by political imperatives, especially the US threat with sanctions on European companies, as it does also not only in the case of Russia, but Iran, starting from November 4.
There is a very clear push for banning Iranian crude exports. It’s part of a concerted effort from Washington to penalize countries which are not in line with US interests.
Sputnik: Denmark has recently withheld from granting permission for the implementation of the project. Several European politicians have stated that Europe no longer has hard legal leverage to halt the project. What’s your feeling regarding that matter?
Mehmet Ogutcu: Denmark is the last string among all other countries, so it has already passed through Finland, Sweden, so Denmark is the last one. I think again here, the US probably has used its influence to block this project, which has already left it almost 5 billion euros, almost half of the whole investment foreseen for the project.
I believe that the pressure is real, coming from Washington, and also the concern among Central European countries, some of them at least, is very real; with increasing dependence on Russia and the fear that Russia might be using the pipeline as leverage in its relationships with these countries.
And the fate of the existing Ukrainian gas transit route arrangement, which will expire in 2019, as you know, at the end of the year, when also Nord Stream 2 is expected to come on stream – that’s another serious concern, because when you look at it from outside, objective thinking requires that a route that is stable and direct without any transit country, should be preferable to Ukraine, where we know what difficulties are, in terms of transparency, in terms of political difficulties and additional costs. However, in this project, Nord Stream 2, we cannot look at it only from the commercial, rational [perspective].
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There are very strong geopolitical imperatives that we have to bear in mind. Also, you have to think of Nord Stream 2, not in isolation from the TurkStream Project, which is going ahead full speed in the Black Sea coming to Turkey.
I think everything is on schedule for bringing Russian gas to the Turkish Thrace, there are two strings there as well; altogether we have about 31 bcm [billion cubic meters] of gas coming. Part of it will stay in Turkey and part, especially from the second pipeline, will go to South and South Eastern Europe.
Again, when you discuss Nord Stream 2, you have to see it in the broader context of other Russian projects coming also through Turkey. We have to understand different dimensions in this project.
As it stands, I don’t think we can say that Danish concerns or Eastern and Central European concerns can easily be done away. The US, through the trade wars that we saw the Trump administration start, through sanctions towards Iran, China, Russia are real, I don’t think they’re going to go away. But this might lead to some modifications of the dates and approach of Nord Stream 2, as well as Turkish Stream I think; although the first stream has been completed, there is concern whether US sanctions will also be felt there.
The views expressed in this article are those of the speaker, and do not necessarily reflect Sputnik's position.