“Our administration is committed to leading with diplomacy to advance the interests of the United States and to strengthen the rules-based international order,” said US Secretary of State Antony Blinken during a 2021 summit with Chinese leaders noted for the White House’s “acrimonious” and “condescending” tone towards the Asian power.
The US diplomat went on to criticize China’s “aggressive behavior,” accusing it of “economic coercion” and alleged disregard for democracy. “Each of these actions threaten the rules-based order that maintains global stability,” Blinken chided.
The term “rules-based international order” has drawn scrutiny as a favored talking point of the Biden administration. Which “rules” are being referred to, it is often asked, and who created them? If the expression is simply another name for “international law,” why not use that term?
The problem, as some observers have pointed out, is that “international law” and the “international rules-based order” are not, in fact, synonymous. The former is something concrete – a series of codes and conventions upheld by nominally-independent global bodies. The latter is, frequently, whatever the White House wants it to be: “the substitution of international law with the prerogatives of American hegemony.”
Financial Times foreign affairs columnist Gideon Rachman acknowledges as much in an editorial on the subject, writing, “America’s own actions are undermining vital parts of the rules-based order.” What’s more, Rachman observes that the rules-based international order is “a deeply uninspiring concept,” “a phrase that means nothing to a normal person.”
“Nobody is going to fight and die for the RBIO,” Rachman admits.
As a substitute slogan he proposes something even more subjective, cliché and nebulous. America should abandon any pretense of rules or outside authority entirely, he writes, and return to the Cold War rallying cry of “defending the free world.”
The issue with citing rules is that the United States frequently breaks them. “The 100 percent tariffs that the Biden administration has imposed on Chinese electric vehicles are virtually impossible to reconcile with [World Trade Organization] rules on trade,” Rachman notes.
The International Criminal Court’s recent announcement it would pursue an arrest warrant against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also placed the White House in a bind. The prospect of a junior partner of US imperialism being held accountable led Blinken to mull sanctions on the ICC, an important arbiter of the rules he claims to defend.
The saga was perfectly illustrative for those who argue both major parties share a common foreign policy, with Blinken suddenly difficult to tell apart from a conservative hawk like John Bolton who muses openly about abolishing the UN. Democrats typically at least pay lip service to the notion the US cares about global opinion, until push comes to shove.
Rachman’s Cold War framing dispenses with such need to keep up appearances. All that is necessary is to claim the United States is defending freedom and democracy, and America is good at claiming such things. No international court can rule against them if a vague notion of “freedom” is the only constraint.
But that notion is appearing more vague than ever.
A recent survey asked people worldwide whether they view their country as being democratic. In what must come as a shock to many Westerners, China was among the top performers in the study, with 79% of its citizens believing their country is highly democratic. Only about half of Americans surveyed said the same of the United States.
“People's perception of whether they live in a democracy or not is not at all aligned with procedural democracy: whether people vote for their country's leaders or not, and whether a country has the procedural attributes of liberal democracy,” explained French analyst Arnaud Bertrand.
“The perception of democracy is extremely correlated with the percentage of people who believe the government serves the majority as opposed to a minority,” he continued. “For instance, China scores highest in the world on this, with almost everyone agreeing with the sentence ‘my government usually acts in the interests of most people in my country.’”
“This is after all quite important for democracy: the whole point is that it's supposed to be ‘for the people,’ isn't it?”
Indicators of economic equality and class mobility in the United States were at their highest during the Cold War period, when the US fought a global ideological battle with the Soviet Union over which system offered its citizens a better quality of life. Those figures are now in decline as lawmakers pursue a bipartisan neoliberal vision: “the share of people who go on to earn more than their parents has been steadily declining,” reveals one study on the matter.
Rachman rejects the notion that the US and its global adversaries are “on the same moral level.”
“As in the Cold War and the earlier struggles of the 20th century, the world’s democracies do not need to apologize for being ruthless in defense of free societies,” he writes.
The claim presumes the United States has ever apologized for anything, and that the Americans doing the defending share his belief in their own freedom and democracy. But that notion now seems more uncertain than ever.