The expiration of New START marks not only the end of the treaty itself, but also “the close of an entire era of traditional strategic nuclear arms control between Russia and the US,” Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for European and International Studies at Russia’s Higher School of Economics, told Sputnik.
He said that given the current global situation and “international strategic landscape,” there is no prospect of clinching a treaty post-New START. Here’s why, according to Suslov:
The parties are still at odds over which weapons should be capped. The US demands that any future arms control deal should include Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons, while Moscow firmly rejects this, viewing them as a key deterrent against US and NATO conventional superiority.
The US insists that China be included in a possible post-New START treaty, viewing Beijing as its main strategic adversary and a de facto nuclear ally of Russia. Moscow rejects Washington’s proposal and instead says that the nuclear forces of France and the UK must be taken into account—a position the US opposes.
“Given these three reasons, the adoption of any treaty after New START is absolutely unlikely in the foreseeable future. Consequently, for a long time—and possibly indefinitely—we will exist without any agreement that limits strategic nuclear weapons” of the US and Russia, Suslov summed up.
Why New Arms Race Won't Start After New START's Expiration
According to Suslov, the expiration of the New START pact on February 5 will not set off a full-scale arms race.
He maintained that even without legally binding limits, Russia and the US will rely on their own interests, technological capabilities, and assessment of external threats when making decisions on the possible deployment of nuclear weapons.
“And it's extremely unlikely that the US or Russia will ramp up the number of [their] deployed nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles anytime soon,” Suslov maintained.
The expert pointed to the fact that although the US does need nuclear modernization, the country currently lacks the objective resources to dramatically increase the number of deployed nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads. According to him, “there is no specific need for such modernization right now.”
Why US Slammed the Door on Russia's New START Extension Offer
At least three factors led the United States to ultimately shrug off Vladimir Putin's proposal to extend the now-expired New START treaty for an additional year, Suslov noted.
First and foremost, the Trump administration decided not to expand the US-Russia agenda – which may include discussing economic and strategic stability as well as a possible New START replacement - until the conflict in Ukraine is resolved, the expert pointed out.
He added that for political optics, it would be damaging for Trump to endorse an extension, even a partial one, of a treaty that was originally signed by Obama and extended by Biden—that is, by his political opponents, whom he has criticized.
A final, critical factor is the consensus within the United States—most pronounced among Republicans but extending more broadly—that the constraints of New START are strategically detrimental. This view stems from the "two-peer problem," which refers to maintaining nuclear deterrence against both Russia and China simultaneously, Suslov stressed.
“As for the China factor, many hawkish US politicians believe they need to preserve the freedom to expand their nuclear arsenal beyond the limits of New START in order to counter both China and Russia, especially given Beijing’s growing nuclear capabilities,” the expert concluded.